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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-5195 
MICHAEL JONES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
COURT OF APPEALS 
[February -, 1983) 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Section 24-301(d) of the District of Columbia Code 1 pro-
vides that a person tried for a crime and acquitted solely by 
reason of insanity may, after a 50-day evaluation period, be 
committed to a mental institution indefinitely unless he 
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he is no 
longer mentally ill and dangerous. We granted certiorari to 
determine whether the Due Process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment permits indefinite commitments under such cir-
' "(1) If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an of-
fense raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground 
that he was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a 
hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pur-
suant to this subsection or subsection (e) of this section. 
"(2)(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection 
shall have a hearing, unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to 
determine whether he is entitled to release from custody. At the conclu-
sion of the criminal action referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection, 
the court shall provide such person with representation by counsel .... 
"(B) ... Within 10 days from the date the hearing was begun, the court 
shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law 
with respect thereto. The person confined shall have the burden of proof. 
If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person con-
fined is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or uncondi-
tional, the court shall enter such order as may appear appropriate." D.C. 
Code § 24-301(d) (1981). 
--; 
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cumstances. 454 U. S. 1141 (1982). 
I 
Of central importance to this case is the system Congress 
established in 1970 when it amended§ 24-301 ("§ 301") as part 
of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Pro-
cedure Act of 1970, § 207, 84 Stat. 473, 601-603. Section 301 
addresses the general topics of the insanity defense and men-
tal competency to be tried. In its 1970 amendments, Con-
gress left in place a requirement that defendants plead insan-
ity affirmatively, and it added a sentence to subsection (j) 
stating, "No person accused of an offense shall be acquitted 
on the ground that he was insane at the time of its commis-
sion unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is 
affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evi-
dence." 2 It also substantially revised subsection (d), which 
specifies what happens to a person who, like petitioner, is ac-
quitted solely by reason of insanity ("insanity acquittee"). 3 
'See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 73 (1970). 
Note that a person acquitted by reason of insanity cannot be committed 
automatically after his acquittal or forced to bear the burden of proof in 
order to obtain release at a § 30l(d)(2) hearing unless he raised the defense 
himself. § 301(d)(l); see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 u: S. 705 (1962). Peti-
tioner has never claimed that the Government, not he, raised the question 
of insanity in this case. 
3 Before 1970, § 301 had required automatic commitment of all insanity 
acquittees to a psychiatric hospital. In Bolton v. Harris, 130 U. S. App. 
D. C. 1, 395 F. 2d 642 (1968), however, the United States Court of Ap-
peals-which then exercised appellate jurisdiction over District of Colum-
bia Code offenses-had held that insanity acquittees had to be given a judi-
cial hearing with procedures substantially similar to those in civil 
commitment proceedings before they could be held beyond a reasonable pe-
riod necessary to evaluate their present mental condition. The current 
version of § 301(d) represents a partial codification of the Bolton holding 
insofar as it requires a judicial hearing, but it mandates procedures mark-
edly different from those which apply at civil commitment hearings. See 
H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, at 74; H. R. Rep. No. 91-1303, 91st Cong., 
2d Sess., 233 (1970) (conference report); n. 7, infra. 
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Subsection (d)(l) now provides that an insanity acquittee 
shall be committed automatically to a hospital for the men-
tally ill until he qualifies for release under one of the other 
provisions of the statute. Subsection (d)(2), however, re-
quires that such a person be given a hearing within 50 days of 
his confinement to determine whether he is eligible for re-
lease. The court ordering the initial commitment must en-
sure that the insanity acquittee is represented by counsel. 
At the 50-day hearing, "[t]he person confined shall have the 
burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the person confined is entitled to his release 
from custody, either conditional or unconditional, the court 
shall enter such order as may appear appropriate." See 
n. 1, supra. Both the insanity acquittee and the Govern-
ment have a right to appeal : the court's decision. 
§ 301(d)(3). 4 ' 
Judicial interpretations have filled certain important lacu-
nae in the statutory scheme just described. Section 301, for 
instance, nowhere states the substantive standard for acquit-
tal by reason of insanity. At the time of the proceedings at 
issue in this case, the District of Columbia courts employed 
the so-called "Durham rule," acquitting by reason of insanity 
if the criminal act with which a defendant was charged was "a 
'If an insanity acquittee does not win release at the 50-day hearing, or if 
he waives the hearing altogether, any subsequent efforts to obtain re-
lease-conditional or unconditional-are governed by subsections (e) or 
(k). Subsection (e) provides that when the superintendent of the mental 
hospital in which an insanity acquittee is confined certifies to the court that 
he has regained his sanity, will not be dangerous to himself or others in the 
reasonable future, and is entitled to release, the court may release him if 
the Government does not object. If the government does object, the court 
must hold a hearing. Under subsection (k), an insanity acquittee still in 
custody may initiate proceedings to obtain his release at six-month inter-
vals, and the statute dictates that he bear the burden of proof "on all is-
sues." In addition, an insanity acquittee may apply for habeas corpus if he 
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product of a mental disease or defect." 5 Nor does § 301 
state specifically what showing would entitle an insanity 
acquittee to release at a 50-day hearing under subsection (d), 
but the Court of Appeals in this case held that the insanity 
acquittee must show that he is no longer mentally ill or dan-
gerous to himself or others. 6 What the court below called 
"[t]he twofold proof requirement of mental illness and dan-
gerousness," see 432 A. 2d 364, 372 (1981) (en bane), also ap-
plies in civil commitment proceedings in the District of Co-
lumbia, with the important difference that there the 
Government must bear the burden of proof by clear and con-
vincing evidence. 7 
5 At the time of petitioner's first hearing, the District of Columbia Supe-
rior Court still used the standard for determining insanity that had been 
used by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit from 1954 to 1972. See Durham v. United States, 94 U. S. App. 
D. C. 228, 214 F. 2d 862 (1954); United States v. Brawner, 153 U. S. App. 
D. C. 1, 471 F. 2d 969 (1972). Shortly after petitioner's hearing, however, 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, like the United States Court of 
Appeals before it, abandoned the Durham test in favor of one like that pro-
posed by the American Law Institute. See Bethea v. United States, 365 
A. 2d 64J 79 (DC 1976). :J 
• United States v. Jones, 432 A. 2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (DC 1981) (en 
bane). The court held that the same showing was required for release at a 
§ 301(d)(2) hearing as would justify subsequent release under§ 301(e) if the 
superintendent of the hospital to which an insanity acquittee had been com-
mitted certified the acquittee's eligibility for release to the court. Al-
though § 301(e) is phrased in the conjunctive-i. e., it appears that an in-
sanity acquittee would have to be both no longer mentally ill and no longer 
dangerous to obtain release-the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
clearly interprets the standard as justifying release if either condition is 
met. Ibid. 
7 See D.C. Code § 21-545(b) (1981). That section does not expressly re-
quire clear and convincing proof, but the requirement has been read into it 
after Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979), held that due process re-
quired clear and convincing proof. See In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 1233 (DC 
1979). There are other differences between procedures for civil commit-
tees and § 301 release procedures. Candidates for civil commitment may 
demand a jury for their commitment hearing. D.C. Code § 21-545(a) 
81-5195-0PINION 
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II 
5 
On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested as he ap-
parently tried to shoplift a jacket from a department store in 
the District of Columbia. He was arraigned the next day in 
the District of Columbia Superior Court on a single charge of 
attempted petit larceny, a misdemeanor punishable by no 
more than one year's incarceration. 8 At the arraignment, 
the court (on its own motion) requested the Forensic Psychia-
try office at the District of Columbia General Hospital to per-
form a preliminary examination of petitioner's competency to 
stand trial. 9 The examining psychiatrist reported two days 
later that, in his opinion, petitioner was competent to stand 
trial, but that he should be committed to a psychiatric hospi-
tal for treatment, because he showed signs of a mental disor-
der, including auditory hallucinations. 10 The court then or-
dered petitioner committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital ("St. 
Elizabeth's"), a public hospital for the mentally ill, for a more 
extended evaluation of his competency. 11 
(1981). After the initial commitment, a civil committee may obtain his re-
lease at any time, without judicial review, if the chief of service of the hos-
pital where he is committed determines that he "is no longer mentally ill to 
the extent that he is likely to injure himself or other persons if not hospital-
ized." D.C. Code § 21-546(a) (1981); compare § 301(e). See also id., 
§ 21-548. Like insanity acquittees, civil committees may request judicial 
hearings every six months to determine whether they may be released, 
even if the hospital has not recommended release. Compare§§ 21-546(a), 
21-547 with § 301(k). 
8 See D.C. Code §§ 22-103, 22-2202 (1981). 
• See App. 1, Record 46. Section 301(a) provides that the court may 
order such an examination if it appears to the court "that, from the court's 
own observations or from prima facie evidence submitted to it ... [the de-
fendant] is of unsound mind or mentally incompetent so as to be unable to 
understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own de-
fense .... " 
10 See Record 47. 
11 Until early February 1976, however, petitioner remained in the Dis-
trict of Columbia Correctional Center awaiting an opening in the evalua-
6 
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Petitioner spent four weeks at St. Elizabeth's. A psy-
chologist at St. Elizabeth's submitted a report to the court, 
stating the opinion of the St. Elizabeth's staff that petitioner 
was competent to stand trial. However, the staff also ex-
pressed the opinion that if petitioner had in fact committed 
the offense it was "the product of his mental disease," which 
the staff diagnosed as "Schizophrenia, paranoid type." 12 
Sometime shortly after the court and the parties received 
this report, petitioner pleaded not guilty by reason of 
insanity. 
Trial was held on petitioner's attempted petit larceny 
charge on March 12, 1976. There is no record of the trial ex-
cept for the Superior Court docket entry. It indicates that 
the Government and petitioner's counsel stipulated to a state-
ment of facts, that the Government presented testimony by 
the same psychologist who had prepared the St. Elizabeth's 
report, and that the court found petitioner not guilty by rea-
son of insanity and ordered him committed to St. Elizabeth's 
pursuant to § 301(d)(l). See App. 3. 
On May 25-somewhat more than 50 days later-petitioner 
received his 50-day hearing pursuant to § 301(d)(2)(A). The 
Government announced at the outset of the hearing that it 
was prepared to go forward with the testimony of Dr. Ger-
trude Cooper, another staff psychologist at St. Elizabeth's. 
The Government noted, however, that the burden was on pe-
titioner to prove that he should be released at this hearing. 13 
In brief testimony, Dr. Cooper stated that she had inter-
viewed petitioner once and seen him around the Ward an un-
specified number of times, and she repeated the general opin-
ion of the staff 14 as well as some second-hand observations by 
tion ward at St. Elizabeth's. See id., at 48-51. 
12 See id., at 51. The report also disclosed that petitioner was being 
given 400 milligrams of Thorazine (a psychotropic drug) daily, and that, in 
the opinion of the staff, petitioner did not require hospitalization pending 
trial. 
13 See May 25 Transcript 3-4. 
14 In response to the Government's request to describe petitioner's con-
81--5195---OPINION 
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the occupational therapists. 10 Dr. Cooper also testified that 
the staff at St. Elizabeth's continued to diagnose petitioner as 
suffering from schizophrenia, paranoid type, and that "be-
cause his illness is still quite active, he is still a danger to him-
self and to others." She concluded, ''We would like to keep 
him still at the hospital and work with him." 16 Petitioner's 
cross examination was even briefer-it established that Dr. 
Cooper was unsure whether petitioner had committed lar-
ceny or assault, but that "based on what [she] recall[ed] of 
the record, he is likely to repeat the same conduct either 
way." 11 
duct on the Ward, Dr. Cooper testified: "Well, pretty much all of us have 
agreed that he is [a] very self-a-facing [sic] individual and no one really gets 
to !mow him ve:ry well. He does not create any problems. He doesn't get 
into any difficulty but he also does not lead to active social life. He is not a 
very active participant in the informal activities on the Ward. The pa-
tients play cards, play pool, do things like that. He keeps to himself more. 
"I might add, this is sort of a heavy dose of medication and we are hoping 
that as his illness becomes less active that we can reduce that." Id., at 
8-9. Dr. Cooper also testified that petitioner was being given 900 milli-
grams of Thorazine a day at that time. Id., at 8. (Shortly before the 
hearing, however, she submitted a report which indicated that petitioner 
was receiving 1000 milligrams of Thorazine daily, plus a tranquilizer. 
Record 54.) 
1
• Dr. Cooper reported information she had received from the Occupa-
tional Therapy Department: "They found that Mr. Jones is quiet; that he 
responds to other people both patients and staff. He does not initiate con-
tact. That he tends to be by himself. That he carries out projects in an 
acceptable fashion. That while some of the time he may accept their tech-
nical direction and other times he seems to ignore it. For example, having 
finished a piece of copper work ... he was advised then to apply a coat of 
laquer. This he chose to ignore and would not do it which caused the ther-
apy assistant some anxiety. 
"In shbrt he is not always responsive in a positive way to what goes on 
but there are some positive features. He does want to recover. He does 
ask for suggestions as to what he might do and we feel he is positively moti-
vated." May 25 Transcript 7. 
_:] '
0 ld., at 9. 
11 Id., at 10-11. Counsel also asked whether petitioner would do better 
in a less restrictive wing of St. Elizabeth's, but the Government success-
8 
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At the close of the hearing, the court declared, "[T]he de-
fendant-patient is mentally ill and as a result of his mental ill-
ness, at this time, he constitutes a danger to himself and oth-
ers." 18 Petitioner was returned to St. Elizabeth's, although 
the court issued no formal order of commitment and the 
docket showed only that the case had been continued for six 
months. 
The fact that the docket did not reflect that a hearing had 
been held caused some confusion, and, in October 1976, new 
counsel appeared for petitioner and demanded a § 301(d)(2) 
release hearing. After some procedural maneuvering, a sec-
ond Superior Court hearing was held on February 22, 1977, 
at which petitioner demanded to be released or recommitted 
under customary civil commitment standards. Having stud-
ied the May 25 transcript and having heard argument on the 
constitutionality of petitioner's continued confinement, the 
court reaffirmed the findings at the earlier hearing, and it 
specifically denied petitioner's request that the Government 
be required to bear the burden of proof at a new hearing if it 
wished to keep him in St. Elizabeth's. 19 
Petitioner appealed this ruling to the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals. A panel of the court affirmed the Supe-
rior Court; then it granted rehearing and reversed. 20 Fi-
nally, the court heard the case en bane and affirmed the Su-
perior Court ruling. It held: 
fully objected to that line of questioning. 
18 Id., at 13. 
19 Record 29--30. Petitioner based his claim for relief on Waite v. Ja-
cobs, 154 U. S. App. D. C. 281, 287, 475 F. 2d 392, 398 (1973), and United 
States v. Brown, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 402, 408, 478 F. 2d 606, 612 (1973), 
in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had sug-
gested that when an individual acquitted by reason of insanity had been in 
detention for a considerable period of time, not longer than the sentence he 
would have served had he been convicted, his continued detention should 
be governed by civil commitment standards. See Record 66. 
00 396 A. 2d 183 (1978); 411 A. 2d 624 (1980) (on rehearing). 
81-5195---OPINION 
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] 
"[T]he acquittee's mental illness is initially established by [-
affirmative proof. Dangerousness is no less validly estab-
lished by proof that the defendant committed the criminal 
act, a finding necessarily underlying any acquittal by reason 
of insanity .... 
Pe.fit,'0>1(• c...rjue~ 
-j~ .. t Jue 1roc.e !.S 
does. nc-f rer..-. i-J the. 
l 
"[T]he presumption that a mental condition continues is a 
reasonable one and it is also reasonable to require the person 
who raised the presumption to refute it by affirmative proof." 
_ 432 A. 2d, at 373--374. 
III 
Government to commit him indefinitely without ever proving 
by clear and convincing evidence that he meets the commit-
ment requirements in § 301(d)-i. e., that he is presently 
mentally ill and would be a danger to himself or others if re-
leased. His case rests primarily on three unanimous deci-
sions handed down by this Court during the past decade: 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979), O'Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975), and Jackson v. Indiana, 
rr:,'""\406 u. s. 715 (1972). 21 
\!.;)Addington and O'Connor dealt with "civil commitment": 
state-imposed psychiatric hospitalization premised on an indi-
vidual's mental illness but not necessarily on the fact that he 
has committed a criminal offense, the most familiar type of 
involuntary commitment. 22 O'Connor held that a men-
tally ill individual had a "right to liberty," which the State 
could not abridge by confining him to a mental institution, 
[ 
21 None of this Court's opinions has interpreted the Due Process clause 
with respect to the involuntary commitment of insanity acquittees. The 
one case in which it has dealt with the rights of insanity acquittees, Lynch 
v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962), involved statute~· interpretation of an _,,,,.-d'--
earlier version of§ 301, see nn. 2--3, supra, rather than the Constitution. 
22 See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 
87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190, 1193 (1974). 
/ 
/ 
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even for the purpose of treating his illness, unless in addition 
to being mentally ill he were likely to harm himself or others 
if released. 422 U.S., at 573-576; see id., at 589 (BURGER, 
C. J., concurring). Then, in Addington, the Court care-
fully evaluated the standard of proof in civil commitments ac-
cording to the due process analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976), holding finally that "due process re-
quires the state to justify confinement by proof more sub-
stantial than a mere preponderance of the evidence," 441 
U. S., at 427, specifically "clear and convincing evidence," 
id., at 433. The level of certainty involved in "clear and con-
vincing evidence" was necessary to preserve fundamental 
fairness to candidates for civil commitment in light of their 
strong interest against involuntary confinement and psychi-
atric treatment, see id., at.427; cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U. S. 745, 766-770 (1982); yet to require more as a constitu-
tional matter would unduly impair governmental efforts to 
protect both mentally ill individuals and society at large, 441 
c.-:,. U. S., at 427-431. 
\..2!.)Jackson v. Indiana considered the commitment of persons 
charged with a crime but found incompetent to stand trial. 
It held that "due process requires that the nature and dura-
tion of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the pur-
pose for which the individual is committed." 406 U. S., at 
738. Consequently, the State was not permitted to hold the 
defendant more than the reasonable period of time necessary 
to determine whether he was competent or likely to attain 
competence in the foreseeable future, unless it instituted the 
t'°r.:\customary procedures for civil commitment. Ibid. 
\J.!/Petitioner's contention is that, once he has been confined for 
longer than the maximum sentence he could have received 
for attempted petit larceny, the Government has no greater 
interest in keeping him hospitalized involuntarily than it has 
in civil commitment cases. Like the involuntary committees 
in Jackson, therefore, he argues that the Government may 
1 l 
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not continue his involuntary commitment unless it at least ac-
cords him the minimum due process protection recognized in 
Addington: that the Government must bear the burden of 
proving his committability by clear and convincing evidence. 
Recognizing that the current version of§ 301(d) represents a 
congressional judgment that the Government should not have 
to carry the burden of proof in initiating or continuing his 
commitment, see H. R. Rep. No. 91-1303, supra, n. 2, at 
233, petitioner concedes what cannot harm him-that the 
Government has legitimate reasons to commit insanity 
aquittees for some period of time without carrying the bur-
den of proof prescribed in Addington. But he argues that 
confinement without clear and convincing evidence to justify 
it can extend only for a reasonable period of time, and at most 
only as long as he could have been incarcerated had he been 
convicted on his criminal charges rather than acquitted by 
reason of insanity. 
@rhe issue, therefore, is not whether the Due Process clause 
forbids treating insanity acquittees differently from other 
civil commitment candidates. Petitioner concedes that they 
should be treated differently for some purposes. The dis-
pute before us, rather, concerns whether the differences be-
tween insanity acquittees and other civil commitment candi-
dates justify treating them differently on a permanent basis, , 
as § 301(d) provides, by relieving the Government of ever 
meeting the Addington burden. 23 
23 In the courts below, petitioner argued that he had a right to a jury on 
equal protection grounds as well as the due process rights defined in 
Addington, arguing that because he is similarly situated to candidates for 
civil commitment the Government must commit him under the civil com-
mitment provisions in the District of Columbia Code, see note 7 supra, but 
he has not pressed his jury claim before this Court. Accordingly, we do 
not reach petitioner's equal protection theory, and we express no opinion 
whether either due process or equal protection give him a right to a jury 
determination of his present mental illness and dangerousness. 
12 
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IV 
Involuntary confinement and psychiatric treatment, if un-
necessary, represent a massive intrusion on individual auton-
omy; yet the governmental interests in commitment are often 
strong, lying at the core of the State's traditional parens pa-
triae and police powers. No set of procedures and standards 
can guarantee error-free commitment decisions, but when 
both governmental and individual interests are at their stron-
gest, we can try to reduce the consequences and likelihood of 
error. Therefore, following the approach of Addington and 
Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, we address the petitioner's in-
terests in avoiding unjustified commitment, the Govern-
ment's interests in continuing petitioner's commitment with-
out meeting the requirements of Addington, and the 
possibility that alternativ¢s will protect individual interests 
more without compromising the Government's legitimate 
objectives. ' 
A 
Every person presumptively has an interest in not being 
hospitalized and subjected to psychiatric treatment involun-
tarily. "The Court repeatedly has recognized that civil com-
mitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation 
of liberty that requires due process protections." Addington 
v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 425; see Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 
584, 600-601 (1979). Mental illness without more "does not 
disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts 
of an institution." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 
575. Even prison inmates who may be mentally ill have an 
interest in remaining in the general population rather than 
being placed in a mental hospital: 
"None of our decisions holds that conviction for a crime 
entitles a State not only to confine the convicted person 
but also to determine that he has a mental illness and to 
subject him involuntarily to institutional care in a mental 
81-5195---0PINION 
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hospital. . . A criminal conviction and sentence of 
imprisonment extinguish an individual's right to freedom 
from confinement for the term of his sentence, but they 
do not authorize the State to classify him as mentally ill 
and to subject him to involuntary treatment without af-
fording him additional due process protections." Vitek 
v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 493--494 (1980). 24 
Petitioner's interest in avoiding involuntary commitment is 
no weaker than that of a person threatened with civil commit-
ment. The Government argues that, by raising the insanity 
defense, petitioner labelled himself as mentally ill-at least 
as of the date of his attempt to steal the jacket-and thus he 
lacks an interest in avoiding the social stigma that may attach 
to mental illness. A voiding stigma, however, is only one of 
the reasons why an individual might object to involuntary 
commitment. 25 Several of this Court's cases have recognized 
21 We do not suggest, of course, that the Government must meet the 
standards of Addington and O'Connor in seeking to commit individuals for 
treatment while they are legitimately in custody. See Vitek v. Jones, 
supa at 494--496, cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 617--629 (wards of the 
state). 
2;'5 In Addington and Vitek the Court recognized an interest in not being 
stigmatized by society at large on account of being labelled "mentally·ill," . 
see 441 U. S., at 426; 445 U. S., at 492. Yet other aspects of involuntary 
commitment affect the individual in a far more immediate way: "Persons 
incarcerated in mental hospitals are not only deprived of their physical lib-
erty, they are also deprived of friends, family, and community. Institu-
tionalized mental patients must live in unnatural surroundings under the 
continuous and detailed control of strangers. They are subject to intru-
sive treatment which, especially if unwarranted, may violate their right to 
bodily integrity. Such treatment modalities may include forced adminis-
tration of psychotropic medication, aversive conditioning, convulsive ther-
apy, and even psychosurgery." Parham v. J.R., supra, at 626 (BREN-
NAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted). 
Once the individual is hospitalized involuntarily, he may to a significant 
extent lose the right enjoyed by others to refuse medical treatment. See 
Youngberg v. Romeo, -- U.S.--, -- (1982) (involuntary commit-
14 
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that persons who have already been labelled as mentally ill 
nonetheless retain an interest in avoiding involuntary hos-
pitalization and treatment. E. g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 
422 U. S., at 575; Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). 
Even those who admit they are mentally ill may, if compe-
tent, select an appropriate course of treatment unless some 
legitimate governmental interest justifies depriving them of 
that freedom. Therefore, treating insanity acquittees 
differently from other civil commitment candidates cannot be 
justified by reference to the interests of the insanity 
acquittees themselves. 26 
tee's due process right to freedom from unreasonable restraint limited to a 
guarantee that professional judgment has been exercised). It is possible 
(although this Court has never approved the practice) that he will be sub-
jected to restraint or medication for reasons that have more to do with the 
needs of the institution than with his individualized treatment needs. See 
Mills v. Rogers, -- U.S.--, -- (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 2d 
836, 845 (CA3 1981) (en bane). This treatment may affect his very person-
ality and his ability to think or to function in the outside world. Once the 
Government has established that he is not capable of caring for himself, 
sound policy may limit his ability to seek judicial relief from day-to-day pro-
fessional treatment decisions, see Youngberg v. Romeo, supra, at--; 
Parham v. J.R., supra, at 618, but we cannot presume that he lacks a 
strong interest in having that initial determination made carefully or in 
preserving the maximum degree of personal autonomy. See also Burt, Of 
Mad Dogs and Scientists: The Perils of the "Criminal-Insane", 123 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 258, 261-273 (1974). 
26 There can be no question that an individual's interest in avoiding un-
justified commitment gives him an interest in who bears the burden of 
proof at a commitment hearing. "To experienced lawyers it is common-
place that the outcome of a lawsuit-and hence the vindication of legal 
rights-<lepends more often on how the factfinder appraises the facts than 
on a disputed construction of a statute or interpretation of a line of prece-
dents. Thus the procedures by which the facts of the case are determined 
assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive rule 
of law to be applied. And the more important the rights at stake, the 
more important must be the procedural safeguards surrounding those 
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The Government claims that § 301's special procedures for 
insanity acquittees serve two legitimate objectives. The 
first is simply greater accuracy in the commitment process. 
The Government argues that the most important function of 
the Addington standard is to protect those who exhibit odd 
behavior-but who are not mentally ill or dangerous-from 
the inherent uncertainty of diagnoses and clinical predictions 
of dangerousness. 27 As a class, the argument continues, in-
sanity acquittees are more likely to be presently mentally ill 
and dangerous than other candidates for civil commitment, so 
there is no need for Addington's protections (with the risk 
they entail that dangerous persons will be released because 
the Government cannot meet its burden). 
Second, the Government notes that the procedures and 
standards for committing insanity acquittees are inextricably 
linked to those that apply to the insanity defense itself. 28 
v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 423. Cf. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S. 510, 
524 (1979). 
27 See Brief for the United States, 37: "[I]n the case of the insanity 
acquittee, there is a greatly diminished hazard of improvident commitment 
resting solely upon 'abnormal behavior which might be perceived by some 
as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact 
within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable.' [Addington v. · \· 
Texas, 441 U.S., at 426-427.)" See also H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, 
-ft. 2, at 74; Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S., at 715 (dictum). 
28 In contexts other than civil commitment, the State may have legiti-
mate reasons to commit mentally ill individuals besides the likelihood that 
they will be dangerous to themselves or others ifreleased. Jackson v. In-
diana aclrnowledged that the State's interest in determining whether the 
accused would be able to stand trial in the foreseeable future justified com-
mitment for a "reasonable period of time.'' 406 U. S., at 738; McNeil v. 
Director, Pautuxent Institution, 407 U. S. 245, 249--250 (1972)(accepting 
the legitimacy of short-term confinement of convicted criminal for a psychi-
atric evaluation). Yet the Court has rejected the argument that criminal 
charges alone justified indefinite commitment if the State could not make 
16 
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The Government argues that Congress made an appropriate, 
compassionate decision to allow mentally ill defendants to es-
cape punishment by proving their insanity by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, thus making assertion of the insanity 
defense considerably easier than the Constitution requires, 
see Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 799 (1952). According 
to the Government, however, the necessary complement of 
that choice was placing the burden on insanity acquittees to 
disprove continued mental illness and dangerousness at the 
subsequent commitment stage. This system arguably dis-
courages spurious "not guilty by reason of insanity" pleas. 29 
Furthermore, the Government maintains, a system in which 
it was easy for an accused to avoid criminal punishment on 
the basis of mental illness and yet hard to isolate that person 
and ~nsure that he receives psychiatric treatment would 
eventually prove unacceptable to the public. 30 
the showing required for regular civil commitment. See Jackson v. Indi-
ana, supra, 406 U. S., at 729-730. Several other decisions assume that 
the State may, without proving dangerousness, commit for treatment a 
person already legitimately in custody. See, e. g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 
U. S. 480 (1980); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 510 (1972); cf. 
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107, 111 (1966). See also Parham v. J.R., 
supra, 442 U. S., at 619 (where State stands in loco parentis it may act in 
best interests of a minor child). , 
29 Brief for the United States, 39, n. 30. 
30 See id., at 37-39; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, n. 2, at 74; cf. Note, 
Rules for an Exceptional Class: The Commitment and Release of Persons 
Acquitted of Violent Offenses by Reason of Insanity, 57 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 
281, 299-303 (1982). 
The Government eschews reliance on a third rationale for treating insan-
ity acquittees differently: that they may be punished for having committed 
a criminal act by confining them to a mental intstitution. The dissenting 
opinion below argued that this was Congress's true purpose in enacting the 
current version of§ 301(d). See 432 A. 2d, at 378-381 (Ferren, J., dissent-
ing). It is questionable whether confinement to a mental institution and 
subjection to "psychopharmacological management" (which is now the 
dominant form of institutiJi2al mental treatment), see American Psychi- .J.... 
atric Association, Statement on the Insanity Defense 15 (1982 (hereinafter ) 
" ,. 
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Neither of these rationales justifies a permanent adjust-
ment in the standard and burden of proof required for an in-
voluntary commitment. 31 Addington considered the strong 
public interest in committing those who are mentally ill and 
dangerous, but held that those interests were adequately 
served by a system in which the Government had to prove 
the predicates for commitment by clear and convincing evi-
dence. A significant departure from that benchmark is ac-
ceptable only if it is reasonably related to objectives not 
present in Addington, and then only if there are no alterna-
tives that accomodate the additional public interests with less 
danger to individual interest. 32 In this case, the Govern-
AP A Statement)1, would pass constitutional muster as appropriate punish- ~ 
ment for a crime. Compare Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 
366-367 (1910) (describing cadena temporal) with n. 25, supra. In any 
event, it would be difficult to justify confining insanity acquittees for 
longer than those found guilty of the same cri~es without proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of some additional fact. Cf. infra, at 21-22. 
31 The Government's two justifications for § 301(d)'s departures from the 
Addington standards are somewhat inconsistent. If the Government 
were required to disprove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt once the de-
fense had been raised, see Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469 (1895), 
acquittal by reason of insanity would not necessarily be an accurate indi-
cator of present mental illness. and dangerousness, so (under the first the-
ory) presumably the Government could not rely on the insanity acquittal at 
the subsequent commitment stage. But (on the Government's second the-
ory) such a lenient standard for avoiding punishment would demand com-
mitment standards that made it very difficult for insanity acquittees to 
avoid involuntary commitment. In a jurisdiction that required the defend-
ant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, see Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U. S. 790 (1952), the opposite would be true: an insanity acquittal would be 
highly accurate, but there would be no need to favor the Government at 
the commitment stage in order to deter spurious insanity pleas or to "bal-
ance" the insanity acquittal/commitment system. 
32 The Court has often inquired whether alternative procedures more 
protective of individual interests were reasonably likely to accomplish the 
State's legitimate objectives. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 
319, 335 (1976), at 235; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 657--658 (1972); 
Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 542--543 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 
18 
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ment's arguments might at most support depriving insanity 
acquittees of the due process protections in Addington for a 
limited period of time, but they cannot support relieving the 
Government of its Addington burden permanently.33 
C 
The determination at a prior proceeding that petitioner 
committed a criminal act, which was the product of a mental 
disease or defect, certainly has relevance to the question 
whether he should be committed, but it is not enough to jus-
tify the permanent shift in the burden of proof that § 301(d) 
establishes. There is a substantial body of research suggest-
ing that a consistent pattern of past violent behavior is a good 
indication of the likelihood of future violence in the near 
term, 34 and the same may well be true of criminal, non-violent 
254, 267 (1970). Addington's assessment of the comparative merits of var-
ious standards of proof demonstrates the role of alternatives in our due 
process analysis of involuntary commitment. See 441 U. S., at 425--433. 
The Court has also rejected indefinite commitments where the State's pur-
poses would be fully served by commitments of limited duration, with an 
opportunity to renew the commitment at the end of its definite term. See 
Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U. S., at 738; McNeil v. Director, 
Paut/xent Institution, 407 U. S., at 249; cf. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S., 
at 510-511. 
33 Thus, we need not consider the legitimacy of the interests asserted by 
the Government, or to what extent they might justify departing from the 
standards in Addington. The judgment below must be reversed if, assum-
ing for the purposes of argument that the Government's interests are le-
gitimate, they could not justify depriving petitioner of his Addington pro-
tections at the second hearing. 
MJ. Monahan, The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior 71, 80-81 
(NIMH 1980) (hereinafter Monahan); see, e. g., Cocozza, Melick & 
Steadman, Trends in Violent Crime Among Ex-Mental Patients, 16 Crimi-
nology 317 (1978); Pasewark, Pantle & Steadman, The Insanity Plea in 
New York State, 51 N. Y. St. B. J. 186, 221-222 (1979). Note, however, 
that Cocozza et al.'s study showed that ex-mental patients with a single 
prior arrest were slightly less likely than members of the general popula-
tion to be arrested again for a violent crime. The frequency of prior vio-
lent behavior is an important criterion in statistical predictions of future 
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behavior like the attempted larceny in this case. Such con-
siderations are inevitably taken into account at a commitment 
hearing, if not by legislative adjustment of the commitment 
standards, then through individualized assessments by men-
tal health professionals whose understanding of the case at 
hand is informed by research. 
This Court's decisions suggest that the mere fact of past 
criminal behavior has never justified permanent departure 
from the minimum due process standards associated with 
civil commitment. In Addington the petitioner did not dis-
pute that he had engaged in a wide variety of assaultive con-
duct that could have been the basis for criminal charges had 
the State chosen to prosecute. See 441 U. S., at 420-421. 
Similarly, the petitioner in Jackson v. Indiana had been 
charged with two robberies, and this Court required the 
State to follow its civil commitment procedures if it wished to 
commit him for more than a limited period of time. 
Bax:strom v. Herold involved a set of involuntarily committed 
patients all of whom had been convicted of various offenses, 
and yet the Court determined that they could not be treated 
differently than other civil commitment candidates after their 
convictions expired. The principal difference between this 
case and Baxstrom is petitioner's admission that his at-
tempted larceny was "the product" of his mental illnessi but 
the evidence that criminal behavior by the mentally ill is' 
likely to repeat itself, see note 34 supra, does not distinguish 
between behaviors that were the product of mental illness 
and those that were not. 35 
There are many ways to take into account petitioner's past 
conduct and mental condition without permanently excusing 
violence. See 10,' Mom1:lr11:n, ,Htpt a, 11:t 108. 
35 The connection between a person's mental condition and specific crimi-
nal acts required to find that person "not guilty by reason of insanity" is 
more a social judgment than a sound basis for clinical prediction. It is 
doubtful that persons acquitted by reason of insanity display a rate of fu-
ture "dangerous" activity higher than civil committees with arrest records. 
20 
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the Government from meeting its Addington burden. The 
most obvious are simply allowing the finder of fact to con-
sider them in reaching a commitment decision, or requiring 
mental health professionals who testify at a § 301(d)(2) hear-
ing to address them. A "not guilty by reason of insanity" 
verdict might conceivably justify shifting the burden of proof 
as § 301(d) does for a limited period of time. See United 
States v. Brown, 155 U. S. App. D.C. 402, 408, 478 F. 2d 
606, 612 (1973); AP A Statement 15 (the future dangerousness 
of insanity acquittees "may be assumed, at least for a reason-
able period of time'') (emphasis added). But at the end of 
that period the Government would be required to justify fur-
ther commitment under the standards of Addington. These 
methods would vindicate the Government's interest in accu-
rate commitment decisions without depriving an insanity 
acquittee permanently of the due process protections in 
Addington. 36 
""Apart from the availability of superior alternatives, there are several 
arguments why a "not guilty by reason of insanity'' verdict might not de-
serve the weight it is given by § 301. First, the passage of time erodes the 
predictive value of past behavior. Even if an insanity acquittee remains 
mentally ill, the likelihood that he will repeat the same act, if he has not 
repeated it since, diminishes with time. Monahan 52, 72; Rubin, Predic-
tion of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 Archives of General 
Psychiatry 397, 401-406 (1972). See also Quinsey, The baserate problem 
and the prediction of dangerousness: a reappraisal, 8 J. L. & Psychiatry 
329 (1980). Second, the verdict entails no determination whether the in-
sanity acquittee's mental illness is chronic or merely temporary. Al-
though in many cases a mental illness may continue in a more or less con-
stant state over a long period of time, there are doubtless conditions that 
might satisfy the "mental disease" element of the insanity defense that do 
not. Third, although various jurisdictions may consider even non-violent 
crimes such as attempted petit larceny "dangerous," see Note, Commit-
ment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 605, 609, and n. 21 
(1981), there is surely room for doubt whether a single attempt to shoplift 
and a string of brutal murders should be accorded the same effect in a com-
mitment procedure. Seen. 34, supra. Finally, the "not guilty by reason 
of insanity" determination is backward-looking, focusing only on one mo-
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As to the Government's second rationale, the § 301 system 
as it now stands is not designed to deter spurious insanity de-
fenses. An insanity acquittee who is really "sane"-i. e., his 
defense was completely spurious-should have no trouble 
proving his right to release by a preponderance of the evi-
dence at a § 301(d)(2) hearing or a subsequent release hear-
ing. The supposed deterrent effect of the shift in the burden 
of proof affects only that marginal group of insanity 
acquittees who-because of the uncertainties inherent in psy-
chiatric predictions of dangerousness-are not likely to dis-
prove their mental illness and dangerousness by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, but whom the Government is not likely 
to prove mentally ill and dangerous by clear and convincing 
evidence. 37 The Government has no legitimate interest in 
preventing members of this group from trying to convince a 
jury that they shbuld not be held accountable for their 
crimes. If Congress were to make asserting a false insanity 
defense a crime, punishable by incarceration, 38 the Govern-
ment in the past, while the commitment decision must be addressed to the 
present and the foreseeable future. In sum, the "fit" between the verdict 
at a criminal trial and the question to be answered at a commitment hear-
ing is less than perfect, and it weakens the argument that improved accu-
racy justifies a permanent departure from the Addington standards. 
37 Addington recognized, "The subtleties and nuances of psychiatric di-
agnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations." 441 
U. S., at 430. Commentators and researchers have long acknowledged 
that, even for persons with a history of violence, psychiatric prediction of 
dangerousness is inaccurate roughly two-thirds of the time, with mental 
health professionals usually erring on the side of predicting that an individ-
ual will be dangerous. See Monahan 44-61; Diamond, The Psychiatric 
Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 439, 447 (1974); Note, 57 
N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 29~299. Predictions of dangerousness may often 
reflect institutional biases or agreement with the consequences of the pre-
dictio~. g., retaining a patient for treatment, see supra, at-,.-. See 7-
also AP A Statement, 13-14. For this very reason, the burden and stand-
ard of proof are critical. 
38 But see n. 31, supra. 
22 
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ment would not be able to prove this group guilty of the new 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Even on the assumption 
that they were "really" not insane, but that the evidence on 
the issue of insanity was evenly balanced, at most the Gov-
ernment has an interest in confining them for the length of 
time specified by statute as the punishment for the crime 
they committed. 
The same holds true for the suggestion that more stringent 
release standards are required to make the insanity defense 
politically acceptable. Those whose abuses of the defense 
are likely to produce the greatest public indignation can still 
be expected to prove their sanity and win release. Those 
who would be affected by a shift in the burden of proof fall 
into the region of legitimate dispute, even among experts, 
and the public's interest in isolating them on accoun~ of their 
criminal actions does not extend beyond the sentence they 
could have received. After that point, the Government has 
the same interest in confining them for involuntary psychi-
atric treatment that it has for civil commitment candidates, 
and it should be expected to justify that commitment under 
the Addington standards. 
In sum, permanent departure from the due process stand-
ards in Addington is not reasonably related to any of the Gov-
ernment's purported interests in treating insanity acquittees 
differently from candidates for civil commitment. Even if · 
we accepted the Government's rationales at face value, they 
would at most support deferring-for some definite period of 
time-the Government's obligation to justify petitioner's in-
voluntary commitment by clear and convincing evidence, 
rather than eliminating that obligation altogether. Further-
more, shifting the burden of proof only for a limited period of 
time provides insanity acquittees with significant protection 
from continued involuntary confinement if they are not men-
tally ill or dangerous. Therefore, due process requires that 
at some point the Government justify an insanity acquittee's 
continued commitment by clear and convincing evidence. 
81-519&-0PINION 
JONES v. UNITED STATES 
V 
23 
Our determination that the Government may not be ex-
cused permanently from meeting the Addington burden 
raises a problem common to this Court's due process deci-
sions. To hold that the balance of governmental and individ-
ual interests does not support applying§ 301(d)'s allocation of 
proof in all cases is not to promulgate a comprehensive set of 
rules defining when the Government may hold an insanity 
acquittee against his will without meeting the Addington 
burden. Congress remains the institution best suited to bal-
ance public and individual interests and to design a set of pro-
cedures that accomodates each. At the margin, any such 
system will require that lines be drawn, and the role of the 
courts is limited to evaluating legislative solutions in light of 
particular cases. Cf. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U. S. --
(1982) (invalidating one-year statute of limitatations for sup-
port suits by illegitimate children); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 
U. S., at 738-739. 
Accordingly, in this case we need not decide at what pre-
cise point after an insanity acquittal the Government must 
meet its Addington burden to justify further confinement, or 
even whether the interests it asserts are constitutionally suf-
ficient to justify any but the most limited commitment, see 
Jackson v. Indiana, supra, without clear and convincing 
proof of whatever standards govern the commitment. 39 It is 
enough to note that-accepting for the purposes of argument 
the interests asserted by the Government in this case-none 
of the justifications put forward for requiring petitioner to 
bear the burden of disproving his mental illness and danger-
39 Even if differences between insanity acquittees and other candidates 
for civil commitment justified legislative departure from the twin substan-
tive standards of mental illness and dangerousness in O'Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 573--574, Addington would still require that the 
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ousness support committing him under that standard for 
longer than the time he would have served had he been con-
victed and sentenced for attempted larceny. 
The maximum possible sentence for attempted larceny in 
the District of Columbia, without regard to any statutory re-
ductions, is one year. By the time of his February 22, 1977, 
hearing, petitioner had been in custody for 17 months, either 
in St. Elizabeth's or in the District of Columbia Correctional 
Center. Therefore, he should have received the benefit of 
the Addington standards at that time. The judgment of the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals is reversed. 
So ordered. 
u[cu;Sec-Q t}t,rc)I. Jle,A-
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JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Section 24-301 of the District of Columbia Code provides .- __ ~ J L~ 
that a person tried for a crime and acquitted solely by reason "~J'-d,vl,~ --C.V 
of insanity may, after a 50-day evaluation period, be commit-
ted to a mental institution indefinitely unless he proves by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is not mentally ill or 
dangerous. We granted certiorari to determine whether the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the equal 
protection guarantee it embodies, permit indefinite commit-
ments under such circumstances. 454 U. S. 1141 (1982). 
I 
Of central importance to this case is the system Congress 
established in 1970 when it amended§ 24-301 ("§ 301") as part 
of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Pro-
cedure Act of 1970, § 207, 84 Stat. 473, 601-603. Section 301 
addresses the general topics of the insanity defense and men-
tal competency to be tried. In its 1970 amendments, Con-
gress left in place a requirement that defendants plead insan-
ity affirmatively, and it added a provision stating, "No 
person accused of an offense shall be acquitted on the ground 
that he was insane at the time of its commission unless his 
insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is affirmatively 
established by a preponderance of the evidence." 1 It also 
'See §301(j ); H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1970). 
2 
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substantially revised § 301(d), which specifies what happens 
to a person who, like petitioner, is acquitted solely by reason 
of insanity ("insanity acquittee"). 2 
Subsection (d)(l) now provides that an insanity acquittee 
shall be committed automatically to a hospital for the men-
tally ill until he qualifies for release under one of the other 
provisions of the statute. Subsection (d)(2), however, re-
quires that such a person be given a hearing within 50 days of 
his confinement to determine whether he is eligible for re-
lease. The court ordering the initial commitment must en-
sure that the insanity acquittee is represented by counsel. 
At the 50-day hearing, "[t]he person confined shall have the 
burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the person confined is entitled to his release 
from custody, either conditional or unconditional, the court 
shall enter such order as may appear appropriate." 3 Both 
Note that a person acquitted by reason of insanity cannot be committed 
automatically after his acquittal or forced to bear the burden of proof in 
order to obtain release at a § 301(d)(2) hearing unless he raised the defense 
himself. § 301(d)(l); see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962). Peti-
tioner has never claimed that the Government, not he, raised the question 
of insanity in this case. 
2 Before 1970, § 301 had required automatic commitment of all insanity 
acquittees to a psychiatric hospital. In Bolton v. Harris, 130 U. S. App. 
D.C. 1, 395 F. 2d 642 (1968), however, the United States Court of Ap-
peals-which then exercised appellate jurisdiction over District of Colum-
bia Code offenses-had held that insanity acquittees had to be given a judi-
cial hearing with procedures substantially similar to those in civil 
commitment proceedings before they could be held beyond a reasonable pe-
riod necessary to evaluate their present mental condition. The current 
version of § 301(d) represents a partial codification of the Bolton holding 
insofar as it requires a judicial hearing, but it mandates procedures mark-
edly different from those which apply at civil commitment hearings. See 
H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, at 74; H. R. Rep. No. 91-1303, 91st Cong., 
2d Sess. 233 (1970) (conference report); n. 6, infra. 
3 The relevant subsections of § 301(d) provide as follows: 
"(1) If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense 
raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground that he 
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the insanity acquittee and the Government have a right to ap-
peal the court's decision. § 301(d)(3). 
If an insanity acquittee does not win release at the 50-day 
hearing, or if he waives the hearing altogether, any subse-
quent efforts to obtain release-conditional or uncondi-
tional-are governed by subsections (e) or (k). Subsection 
(e) provides that when the superintendent of the mental hos-
pital in which an insanity acquittee is confined certifies to the 
court that he has regained his sanity, will not be dangerous to 
himself or others in the reasonable future, and is entitled to 
release, the court may release him if the Government does 
not object. If the Government does object, the court must 
hold a hearing. Under subsection (k), an insanity acquittee 
still in custody may initiate proceedings to obtain his release 
at six-month intervals, and the statute dictates that he bear 
the burden of proof "on all issues." In addition, an insanity 
acquittee may apply for habeas corpus if he has exhausted his 
other remedies under the statute. See §§ 301(g), 301(k)(7). 
Judicial interpretations have filled certain important lacu-
nae in the statutory scheme just described. Section 301, for 
instance, nowhere states the substantive standard for acquit-
tal by reason of insanity. At the time of the proceedings at 
was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a hospi-
tal for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant 
to this subsection or subsection (e) of this section. 
"(2)(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection 
shall have a hearing, unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to 
determine whether he is entitled to release from custody. At the conclu-
sion of the criminal action referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection, 
the court shall provide such person with representation by counsel .... 
"(B) ... Within 10 days from the date the hearing was begun, the court 
shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law 
with respect thereto. The person confined shall have the burden of proof. 
If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person con-
fined is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or uncondi-
tional, the court shall enter such order as may appear appropriate." D.C. 
Code § 24-301(d) (1981). 
4 
81-5195--OPINION 
JONES v. UNITED STATES 
issue in this case, the District of Columbia courts employed 
the so-called "Durham rule," acquitting by reason of insanity 
if the criminal act with which a defendant was charged was "a 
product of a mental disease or defect." 4 Nor does § 301 
state specifically what showing would entitle an insanity 
acquittee to release at a 50-day hearing under subsection (d), 
but the Court of Appeals in this case held that the insanity 
acquittee must show that he is no longer mentally ill or dan-
gerous to himself or others. 5 What the court below called 
"[t]he twofold proof requirement of mental illness and dan-
gerousness," see 432 A. 2d 364, 372 (1981) (en bane), also ap-
plies in civil commitment proceedings in the District of Co-
lumbia, with the important differences that there candidates 
for commitment may demand a jury for the · commitment 
hearing and the Government must bear the burden of proof 
by clear and convincing evidence. 6 
• At the time of petitioner's first hearing, the District of Columbia Supe-
rior Court still used the standard for determining insanity that had been 
used by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit from 1954 to 1972. See Durham v. United States, 94 U. S. App. 
D.C. 228, 214 F. 2d 862 (1954); United States v. Brawner, 153 U. S. App. 
D.C. 1, 471 F. 2d 969 (1972). Shortly after petitioner's hearing, however, 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, like the United States Court of 
Appeals before it, abandoned the Durham test in favor of one like that pro-
posed by the American Law Institute. See Bethea v. United States, 365 
A. 2d 64, 79 (DC 1976). 
• United States v. Jones, 432 A. 2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (DC 1981) (en 
bane). The court held that the same showing was required for release at a 
§ 301(d)(2) hearing as would justify subsequent release under § 301(e) if the 
superintendent of the hospital to which an insanity acquittee had been com-
mitted certified to the court the acquittee's eligibility for release. Al-
though § 301(e) is phrased in the conjunctive-i. e., it appears that an in-
sanity acquittee would have to be both no longer mentally ill and no longer 
dangerous to obtain release-the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
clearly interprets the standard as justifying release if either condition is 
met. Ibid. 
6 See D. C. Code § 21-545(a)-(b) (1981). That section does not expressly 
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5 
On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested as he ap-
parently tried to shoplift a jacket from a department store in 
the District of Columbia. He was arraigned the next day in 
the District of Columbia Superior Court on a single charge of 
attempted petit larceny, a misdemeanor punishable by no 
more than one year's incarceration. 7 At the arraignment, 
the court (on its own motion) requested the Forensic Psychia-
try office at the District of Columbia General Hospital to per-
form a preliminary examination of petitioner's competency to 
stand trial. 8 The examining psychiatrist reported two days 
later that, in his opinion, petitioner was competent to stand 
trial, but that he should be committed to a psychiatric hospi-
tal for treatment, because he showed signs of a mental disor-
der, including auditory hallucinations. 9 The court then or-
require clear and convincing proof, but the requirement has been read into 
it after Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979), held that due process 
required clear and convincing proof. See In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 1233 
(DC 1979). There are other differences between procedures for civil com-
mittees and § 301 release procedures. After the initial commitment, a civil 
committee may obtain his release at any time, without judicial review, if 
the chief of service of the hospital where he is committed determines that 
he "is no longer mentally ill to the extent that he is likely to injure himself 
or other persons if not hospitalized." D.C. Code § 21-546(a) (1981); com-
pare § 301(e). See also id. § 21-548. Like insanity acquittees, civil com-
mittees may request judicial hearings every six months to determine 
whether they may be released, even if the hospital has not recommended 
release. Compare §§ 21-546(a), 21-547 with § 301(k). 
7 See D. C. Code §§ 22-103, 22-2202 (1981). 
8 See App. 1, Record 46. Section 301(a) provides that the court may 
order such an examination if it appears to the court "that, from the court's 
own observations or from prima facie evidence submitted to it ... [the de-
fendant] is of unsound mind or mentally incompetent so as to be unable to 
understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own 
defense .... " 
• See Record 47. 
6 
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dered petitioner committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital ("St. 
Elizabeths"), a public hospital for the mentally ill, for a more 
extended evaluation of his competency. 10 
Petitioner spent four weeks at St. Elizabeths. A psy-
chologist at St. Elizabeths submitted a report to the court, 
stating the opinion of the St. Elizabeths staff that petitioner 
was competent to stand trial. However, the staff also ex-
pressed the opinion that if petitioner had in fact committed 
the offense it was "the product of his mental disease," which 
the staff diagnosed as "Schizophrenia, paranoid type." 11 
Sometime shortly after the court and the parties received 
this report, petitioner pleaded not guilty by reason of 
insanity. 
Trial was held on petitioner's attempted petit larceny 
charge on March 12, 1976. There is no record of the trial ex-
cept for the Superior Court docket entry. It indicates that 
the Government and petitioner's counsel stipulated to a state-
ment of facts, that the Government presented testimony by 
the same psychologist who had prepared the St. Elizabeths 
report, and that the court found petitioner not guilty by rea-
son of insanity and ordered him committed to St. Elizabeths 
pursuant to § 301(d)(l). See App. 3. 
On May 25-somewhat more than 50 days later-petitioner 
received his 50-day hearing pursuant to § 30l(d)(2)(A). The 
Government announced at the outset of the hearing that it 
was prepared to go forward with the testimony of Dr. Ger-
trude Cooper, another staff psychologist at St. Elizabeths. 
10 Until early February 1976, however, petitioner remained in the Dis-
trict of Columbia Correctional Center awaiting an opening in the evalua-
tion ward at St. Elizabeths. See id., at 48-51. 
"See id., at 51.. The report also disclosed that petitioner was being 
given 400 milligrams of Thorazine (a psychotropic drug) daily, and that, in 
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The Government noted, however, that the burden was on pe-
titioner to prove that he should be released at this hearing. 12 
In brief testimony, Dr. Cooper stated that she had inter-
viewed petitioner once and seen him around the Ward an un-
specified number of times, and she repeated the general opin-
ion of the staff 13 as well as some second-hand observations by 
occupational therapists at St. Elizabeths. 14 Dr. Cooper also 
testified that the staff at St. Elizabeths continued to diagnose 
12 See May 25 Transcript 3-4. 
18 In response to the Government's request to describe petitioner's con-
duct on the Ward, Dr. Cooper testified: 
"Well, pretty much all of us have agreed that he is [a] very self-a-facing 
[sic] individual and no one really gets to know him very well. He does not 
create any problems. He doesn't get into any difficulty but he also does 
not lead to active social life. He is not a very active participant in the in-
formal activities on the Ward. The patients play cards, play pool, do 
things like that. He keeps to himself more. 
"I might add, this is sort of a heavy dose of medication and we are hoping 
that as his illness becomes less active that we can reduce that." Id., at 
8-9. 
Dr. Cooper also testified that petitioner was being given 900 milligrams 
of Thorazine a day at that time. Id., at 8. (Shortly before the hearing, 
however, she submitted a report which indicated that petitioner was re-
ceiving 1000 milligrams of Thorazine daily, plus a tranquilizer. Record 
54.) 
1
' Dr. Cooper reported information she had received from the Occupa-
tional Therapy Department: 
"They found that Mr. Jones is quiet; that he responds to other people 
both patients and staff. He does not initiate contact. That he tends to be 
by himself. That he carries out projects in an acceptable fashion. That 
while some of the time he may accept their technical direction and other 
times he seems to ignore it. For example, having finished a piece of cop-
per work ... he was advised then to apply a coat of laquer. This he chose 
to ignore and would not do it which caused the therapy assistant some 
anxiety. 
"In short he is not always responsive in a positive way to what goes on 
but there are some positive features. He does want to recover. He does 
ask for suggestions as to what he might do and we feel he is positively moti-
vated." May 25 Transcript 7. 
8 
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petitioner as suffering from schizophrenia, paranoid type, 
and that "because his illness is still quite active, he is still a 
danger to himself and to others." She concluded, "We would 
like to keep him still at the hospital and work with him." 16 
Petitioner's cross examination was even briefer-it estab-
lished that Dr. Cooper was unsure whether petitioner had 
committed larceny or assault, but that "based on what [she] 
recall[ed] of the record, he is likely to repeat the same con-
duct either way." 16 
At the close of the hearing, the court declared, "[T]he de-
fendant-patient is mentally ill and as a result of his mental ill-
ness, at this time, he constitutes a danger to himself and oth-
ers." 17 Petitioner was returned to St. Elizabeths, although 
the court issued no formal order of commitment and the 
docket showed only that the case had been continued for six 
months. 
The fact that the docket did not reflect that a hearing had 
been held caused some confusion, and, in October 1976, new 
counsel appeared for petitioner and demanded a § 301(d)(2) 
release hearing. After some procedural maneuvering, a sec-
ond Superior Court hearing was held on February 22, 1977, 
at which petitioner demanded to be released or recommitted 
under customary civil commitment standards. Having stud-
ied the May 25 transcript and having heard argument on the 
constitutionality of petitioner's continued confinement, the 
court reaffirmed the findings at the earlier hearing, and it 
specifically denied petitioner's request that he receive a jury 
hearing and that the Government be required to bear the 
burden of proof if it wished to keep him in St. Elizabeths. 18 
16 Id ., at 9. 
16 Id. , at 10-11. Counsel also ·asked whether petitioner would do better 
in a less restrictive wing of St. Elizabeths, but the Government success-
fully objected to that line of questioning. 
11 Id., at 13. 
18 Record 29-30. Petitioner based his claim for relief on Waite v. J a-
cobs, 154 U. S. App. D.C. 281 , 287, 475 F . 2d 392, 398 (1973) , and United 
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Petitioner appealed this ruling to the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals. A panel of the court affirmed the Supe-
rior Court; then it granted rehearing and reversed. 19 Fi-
nally, the court heard the case en bane and affirmed the Su-
perior Court ruling, rejecting the due process and· equal 
protection arguments that petitioner now presses in this 
Court. 432 A. 2d 364, 372-374. 
III 
Petitioner's due process argument rests primarily on three 
recent unanimous decisions of this Court: Addington v. 
Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979), O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 
U. S. 563 (1975), and Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715 
(1972). 20 
Jackson considered the commitment of persons charged 
with crimes but found incompetent to stand trial on account 
of their mental condition. It held that "due process requires 
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some rea-
sonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is 
committed." 406 U. S., at 738. Consequently, the State 
was not permitted to hold the defendant for longer than the 
reasonable period necessary to evaluate his competence or 
the likelihood that he would regain competence in the fore-
seeable future, unless it was willing to give him the full hear-
States v. Brown, 155 U. S. App. D.C. 402, 408, 478 F. 2d 606, 612 (1973), in 
which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit had sug-
gested that when an individual acquitted by reason of insanity had been in 
detention for a considerable period of time, not longer than the sentence he 
would have served had he been convicted, his continued detention should 
be governed by civil commitment standards. See Record 66. 
19 396 A. 2d 183 (1978); 411 A. 2d 624 (1980) (on rehearing). 
20 None of this Court's opinions has interpreted the Due Process Clause, 
or the Equal Protection Clause, with respect to the involuntary commit-
ment of insanity acquittees. The one case which addresses the rights of 
insanity acquittees, Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962), involved in-
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ing it provided for indefinite civil commitments. Ibid. 
Addington and O'Connor dealt directly with civil commit-
ments. O'Connor held that a mentally ill individual has a 
"right to liberty" that a State cannot abridge by confining 
him to a mental institution, even for the purpose of treating 
his illness, unless in addition to being mentally ill he is likely 
to harm himself or others if released. 422 U. S., at 573-576; 
see id., at 589 (BURGER, C. J., concurring). Then, in 
Addington, the Court carefully evaluated the standard of 
proof in civil commitment proceedings. Applying the due 
process analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 
(1976), the Court held that "due process requires the state to 
justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere 
preponderance of the evidence," 441 U. S., at 427, specifi-
cally "clear and convincing evidence," id., at 433. A prepon-
derance standard was not sufficient to preserve fundamental 
fairness to candidates for civil commitment in light of their 
strong interest in avoiding involuntary confinement and psy-
chiatric treatment. See id., at 427; cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U. S. 745, 766-770 (1982). Yet to require more than 
clear and convincing evidence as a constitutional matter 
would unduly impair governmental efforts to protect both the 
mentally ill and society at large. 441 U. S., at 427-431. 
Addington and O'Connor balance the Government's inter-
est in isolating and treating those who may be mentally ill 
and dangerous, the difficulty of proving or disproving mental 
illness and dangerousness in court, and the massive intrusion 
on individual liberty inherent in involuntary psychiatric hos-
pitalization. Petitioner contends that the Government has 
no greater interest in keeping him hospitalized involuntarily 
than it has in the ordinary civil commitment cases governed 
by Addington and O'Connor, at least once he has been con-
fined for longer than the maximum sentence he could have re-
ceived for attempted petit larceny. Therefore, he argues 
that he cannot be confined indefinitely unless the Govern-
ment accords him the minimum due process protections re-
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quired for civil commitment. Petitioner concedes arguendo 
that the Government may have legitimate reasons to commit 
insanity acquittees for some definite period without carrying 
the burden of proof prescribed in Addington, but he contends 
that such confinement can extend only as long as he could 
have been incarcerated had he been convicted on his criminal 
charges rather than acquitted by reason of insanity. 
The issue, therefore, is not whether due process forbids 
treating insanity acquittees differently from other candidates 
for commitment. Petitioner is willing to concede that they 
may be treated differently for some purposes, and for a lim-
ited period. The dispute before us, rather, concerns the 
question whether the differences between insanity acquittees 
and other candidates for civil commitment justify confining 
insanity acquittees indefinitely, as § 301 provides, without 
the Government ever having to meet the procedural require-
ments of Addington. 21 
A 
The most obvious difference between insanity acquittees 
and other candidates for civil commitment is that, at least in 
the District of Columbia, an acquittal by reason of insanity 
21 A number of our decisions have countenanced involuntary commitment 
without the full protections of Addington and O'Connor, but these have in-
volved persons already legitimately in custody and strictly limited periods 
of psychiatric institutionalization. E.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 
715, 738 (1975) (acknowledging that the State's interest in determining 
whether an accused would become competent to stand trial in the foresee-
able future justified commitment "for a reasonable period of time"); McNeil 
v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U. S. 245, 249--250 (1972) (accepting 
the legitimacy of short-term commitment of a convicted criminal for psychi-
atric evaluation); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 510 (1972) (commit-
ment of convicted sex offender, limited to duration of sentence); Baxstrom 
v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107, 111 (1966) (commitment of prison inmates who 
are determined to be mentally ill during their prison term). See also 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 617-629 (1979) (wards of the state). But 
cf. Note, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 425 (1979) (burden and standard of proof in 
short-term civil commitment). 
12 
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implies a determination beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant in fact committed the criminal act with which he 
was charged. See Bethea v. United States, 365 A. 2d 64, 
9~95 (D.C. 1976); § 301(c). For that reason-disregarding 
for purposes of argument the problems that punishing some-
one acquitted by reason of insanity might entail 22-the Gov-
ernment conceivably has an interest in confining insanity 
acquittees to punish them for their criminal acts. 23 
Such confinement, however, could not extend beyond the 
period Congress has established as a sentence for commission 
of the crime charged. We addressed similar circumstances 
in Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972), in which the 
State argued that special commitment orders under a sex of-
fender statute could be justified "merely as an alternative to 
penal sentencing," id., at 510. We stated: 
22 According to ~he traditional view, the insanity defense is premised on 
the notion that society has no interest in punishing insanity acquittees, be-
cause they are neither blameworthy nor the appropriate objects of deter-
rence. See A. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense 15 (1967). In addition, 
insanity and mens rea stand in a close relationship, which this Court has 
never fully plumbed. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 536-537 (1968) 
(opinion of MARSHALL, J.); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 800 (1952); cf. 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975). Some have also suggested that 
a statute providing for acquittal by reason of insanity may create a reason-
able expectation, protected by the Due Process Clause, that insanity 
acquittees will not be punished. See Note, 57 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 281, 285 
(1982). 
In any event, it is questionable that confinement to a mental hospital-
along with subjection to "psychopharmacological management," often the 
focus of institutional mental care, see American Psychiatric Ass'n, State-
ment on the Insanity Defense 15 (1982) (hereinafter AP A Statement)-
would pass constitutional muster as appropriate punishment for a crime. 
Compare Weems v. United States , 217 U. S. 349, 366-367 (1910) (describ-
ing sentence of cadena temporal) with n. 34, infra. 
zi The Government denies that the purpose of§ 301(d) is to punish insan-
ity acquittees for their crimes, and it eschews reliance on this interest. 
Nevertheless, the dissenting opinion below argues that Congress enacted 
the current version of § 301(d) with the intent of punishing insanity 
acquittees. See 432 A. 2d, at 37!?r-381 (Ferren, J., dissenting). 
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"That argument arguably has force with respect to an 
initial commitment ... which is imposed in lieu of sen-
tence, and is limited in duration to the maximum permis-
sible sentence. The argument can carry little weight, 
however, with respect to the subsequent renewal pro-
ceedings, which result in five-year commitment orders 
based on new findings of fact, and are in no way limited 
by the nature of the defendant's crime or the maximum 
sentence authorized for that crime." Id., at 510-511. 24 
Once Congress has defined a crime and the punishment for 
that crime, additional punishment can only be justified by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of additional facts, within 
the limits of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and and upon no-
tice to defendants that they are subject to such additional 
punishment. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U. S. 605, 610 
(1967); In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 361-364 (1970). 
B 
The Government claims that § 301's departures from the 
Addington standards are justified because insanity 
acquittees, as a class, are more likely to be presently men-
tally ill and dangerous than other candidates for civil commit-
ment. According to the Government, the most important 
function of the Addington standards is to protect those who 
exhibit odd or eccentric behavior-but who are not necessar-
ily mentally ill or dangerous-from the inherent uncertainty 
of psychiatric diagnoses and predictions of dangerousness. 
Insanity acquittees, the argument continues, have both en-
gaged in criminal behavior and admitted their mental illness 
24 Note that in Humphrey v. Cady the petitioner had in fact received a 
judicial hearing on his present mental illness and dangerousness, at which 
the State bore the burden of proof, before he was recommitted at the end 
of his sentence. See 405 U.S., at 507. Nevertheless, once his sentence 
had expired the State's interest in punishment could not justify according 
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as of the time of their criminal conduct. The Government 
concludes on that basis that Addington's protections, which 
entail a certain risk that dangerous persons may avoid com-
mitment because the Government cannot meet its burden, 
are unnecessarily inaccurate as applied to insanity 
acquittees. 
A "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict is not irrele-
vant to the determination of an individual's present mental 
illness and dangerousness. A substantial body of research 
suggests that a consistent pattern of past violent behavior is 
a good-although far from perfect-indicator of the near-
term likelihood of future violence, 25 and one might well infer 
that a consistent pattern of criminal, non-violent behavior, 
such as petitioner's attempt to shoplift, might be a good sta-
tistical predictor of similar non-violent behavior in the future. 
Nevertheless, our precedents in other commitment con-
texts are inconsistent with the argument that the mere fact 
of past criminal behavior justifies indefinite confinement 
without the benefits of the minimum due process standards 
associated with civil commitment. In Addington itself, the 
petitioner did not dispute that he had engaged in a wide vari-
20 J. Monahan, The Clinical Prediction of Violent Behavior 71, 80-81 
(NIMH 1980) (hereinafter Monahan); see, e. g., Cocozza, Melick & 
Steadman, Trends in Violent Crime Among Ex-Mental Patients, 16 Crimi-
nology 317 (1978); Pasewark, Pantle & Steadman, The Insanity Plea in 
New York State, 51 N.Y. St. B. J. 186, 221-222 (1979). But commen-
tators and researchers have long acknowledged that, even for persons with 
a history of violence, psychiatric prediction of dangerousness is inaccurate 
roughly two-thirds of the time. See Monahan 44-61; Diamond, The Psy-
chiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 439, 447 (1974); 
Note, 57 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 298-299. Mental health professionals usually 
err on the side of predicting that an individual will be dangerous, often be-
cause of institutional biases or agreement with the consequences of the pre-
diction--e. g., retaining a patient for treatment, see supra, at 7. See also 
AP A Statement, 13-14. As Addington recognizes, "[T]he subtleties and 
nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach 
in most situations." 441 U. S., at 430. 
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ety of assaultive conduct that could have been the basis for 
criminal charges had the State chosen to prosecute. See 441 
U. S., at 420-421. Similarly, the petitioner in Jackson v. 
Indiana had been charged with two robberies, yet we re-
quired the State to follow its civil commitment procedures if 
it wished to commit him for more than a strictly limited pe-
riod. 406 U. S., at 729-730. 
In the closest precedent, Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 
107 (1966), the petitioner had been convicted of assault and 
sentenced to a term in prison, during which he was certified 
as insane by a prison physician. At the expiration of his 
criminal sentence, he was committed involuntarily to confine-
ment in a state mental hospital under procedures substan-
tially less protective than those used for civil commitment. 
Id., at 108-110. The Court held that, once he had served his 
sentence, Baxstrom could not be treated differently from 
other candidates for civil commitment. Id., at 112-113. 
The principal difference between this case and Baxstrom is 
petitioner's admission, as part of his insanity plea, that his 
crime was "the product" of his mental illness, but the connec-
tion between mental condition and specific criminal acts re-
quired to find an individual "not guilty by reason of insanity" 
is more a social judgment than a sound basis for clinical 
prediction. 26 
Other considerations counsel against allowing the Govern-
ment to predicate indefinite confinement without Addington 
protections on a simple insanity acquittal. First, even if an 
insanity acquittee remains mentally ill, so long as he has not 
repeated the same act since his offense, the passage of time 
26 The available evidence that criminal behavior by the mentally ill is 
likely to repeat itself does not distinguish between behaviors that were the 
product of mental illness and those that were not. See sources cited in 
note 25, supra. It is doubtful that persons acquitted by reason of insanity 
display a rate of future "dangerous" activity higher than civil committees 
with similar arrest records. 
16 
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erodes the likelihood that he will repeat it. 'l:1 Second, the 
"not guilty by reason of insanity" determination is backward-
looking, focusing only on one moment in the past. The com-
mitment decision, on the other hand, must address the 
present and the foreseeable future. Indeed, a claim of "tem-
porary insanity" falls squarely within the traditional scope of 
the insanity defense. Certainly some conditions satisfying 
the "mental disease" element of the insanity defense do not 
persist for an extended period. Third, § 301 fails to reflect 
the commonsense truth that some crimes are more indicative 
of dangerousness than others. Various jurisdictions may 
consider non-violent misdemeanors "dangerous," but there is 
room for doubt whether a single attempt to shoplift and a 
string of brutal murders are equally accurate and equally 
permanent predictors of dangerousness. 28 Finally, we can-
not ignore the adverse effect extended institutionalization 
may have on an individual's ability to prove that he is no 
longer mentally ill and dangerous, both because it deprives 
him of the economic wherewithal to obtain independent medi-
cal judgments and because the treatment he receives may 
make it difficult for him to show he has recovered. 29 
27 Monahan 52, 72; Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill 
Criminals, 27 Archives of General Psychiatry 397, 401-406 (1972). See 
also Quinsey, The Baserate Problem and the Prediction of Dangerousness: 
A Reappraisal, 8 J. L. & Psychiatry 329 (1980). 
28 See Note, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 605, 609, and n. 21 (1981). The frequency 
of prior violent behavior is an important element in predictions of future 
violence. See Monahan 107. Cocozza et al.'s study, see n. 25, supra, 
showed that ex-mental patients with a single prior arrest were slightly less 
likely than members of the general population to be arrested for a violent 
crime. 
29 The current emphasis on using anti psychotic drugs to eliminate the 
characteristic signs and symptoms of mental illness, especially schizophre-
nia, may render mental patients docile and unlikely to engage in violent or 
bizarre behaviors while they are institutionalized, but it does not "cure" 
them or allow them to demonstrate that they would remain non-violent if 
they were not drugged, and it may even create false symptoms of illness in 
some cases. See APA Statement lfr-16; Note, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1720, 
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There are many ways to take into account criminal behav-
ior and past mental condition without depriving insanity 
acquittees of the Addington protections. 3° Certain aspects 
of§ 301(d)'s commitment procedures, apart from its allocation 
of the burden of proof, reflect these considerations-first in- · 
sofar as the statute requires that all insanity acquittees be 
committed automatically, with a release hearing only after a 
50-day observation period, and second insofar as the testi-
mony of mental health professionals at the hearings is in-
formed by their own experience with and current research on 
dangerous, mentally ill patients. The fact of an insanity ac-
quittal and the evidence on insanity adduced at trial are cer-
tainly admissible at a commitment or release hearing. In ad-
dition, a "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict might 
conceivably justify confinement for a limited period following 
the insanity acquittal without requiring the Government to 
meet its Addington burden. 31 But at the end of that period 
the Government would be required to justify further i::ommit-
ment under the standards of Addington. 
C 
The Government also argues that the procedures and 
standards for committing insanity acquittees are inextricably 
1724-1727 (1982). 
30 In considering the requirements of due process, we have often inquired 
whether alternative procedures more protective of individual interests at 
reasonable cost were likely to accomplish the state's legitimate objectives. 
See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976); Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U. S. 645, 657-658 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 542-543 
(1971). 
31 See United States v. Brown, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 402, 408, 478 F. 2d 
606, 612 (1973); AP A Statement 15 (the future dangerousness of insanity 
acquittees "may be assumed, at least for a reasonable period of time") (em-
phasis added). We have consistently rejected indefinite commitments 
where the state's purposes would be served fully by commitments of lim-
ited duration, renewable only with full due process protections. See Jack-
son v. Indiana, 406 U. S., at 249; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institu-
tion, 407 U. S., at 249; cf. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S., at 510-511. 
18 
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linked to those that apply to the insanity defense itself. It 
maintains that Congress decided, compassionately, to allow 
mentally ill defendants to escape punishment by proving 
their insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, thus mak-
ing assertion of the insanity defense considerably easier than 
necessary under Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790, 799 (1952). 
According to the Government, however, the necessary com-
plement of that choice was requiring those acquitted by rea-
son of insanity to disprove their continued mental illness and 
dangerousness at the subsequent commitment stage. This 
system arguably discourages spurious insanity pleas. Fur-
thermore, the Government argues, a system in which it was 
easy for an accused to avoid criminal punishment on the basis 
of mental illness, yet hard to isolate that person and ensure 
that he receives psychiatric treatment, would eventually 
prove unacceptable to the public. 32 
Insofar as withdrawing Addington protections deters in-
sanity pleas, it will affect. only those defendants who think 
they may be able to prove their past insanity but not their 
32 Cf. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. , at 715; Note, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev., 
at 299-303. The Government's arguments with regard to accuracy, see 
part B, supra, and political acceptability are somewhat inconsistent. If 
the Government were required to disprove insanity beyond a reasonable 
doubt once the defense had been raised, see Davis v. United States, 160 
U. S. 469 (1895), acquittal by reason of insanity would not necessarily be an 
accurate indication of more than the existence of a reasonable doubt as to 
sanity, so (to preserve accuracy) the Government could not rely on the in-
sanity acquittal to prove mental illness and dangerousness at a subsequent 
commitment hearing. Nevertheless, in terms of political acceptability, 
such a lenient standard for avoiding punishment would demand commit-
ment standards that made it difficult for insanity acquittees to avoid com-
mitment. In a jurisdiction that required defendants to prove their insan-
ity beyond a reasonable doubt at their criminal trial, see Leland v. Oregon, 
supra, the opposite would be true: an insanity acquittal would be highly 
accurate, but there would be no need to favor the Government at the com-
mitment stage in order to deter spurious pleas or to "balance" the 
acquittal/commitment system. 
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present recovery or non-dangerousness, but as to whom the 
Government could not prove present mental illness and dan-
gerousness by clear and convincing evidence. 33 Such defend-
ants come within a zone of uncertainty created by the inher-
ent limitations of contemporary knowledge, see n. ~, 2~ 
supra, in which reasonable experts and factfinders may often 
disagree in good faith. As long as such persons raise their 
defense in good faith, society has no legitimate interest in 
preventing them from trying to convince a jury that they are 
not guilty by reason of insanity. 
Even if a small number of defendants who raise the insan-
ity defense do so in bad faith, yet without the expectation 
that they could prove they were not committable once the 
trial was over, the individualized inquiry contemplated by 
Addington and O'Connor precludes severely disadvantaging 
every person acquitted by reason of insanity in order to deter 
a small subgroup of those who consider raising the defense. 
Jndeed, accepting a similar "deterrence" argument would 
force us to overrule Jackson, which contemplates that a per-
son charged with a crime may escape both trial and more-
than-brief confinement if he is incompetent to stand trial but 
cannot be civilly committed. See 406 U. S., at 729. More-
over, assuming deterring false pleas by defendants who are 
"really" not insane justify confinement after an insanity ac- j J 'l i/,'f, ·" 
quittal, that rationale cannot justify confinement for any 
longer than if they were "really" convicted. 
The same holds true for the theory that § 301 reflects a so-
cial judgment that persons who commit crimes while men-
tally ill should not go free without treatment. Insofar as it 
"'Those who plead insanity in bad faith, yet nonetheless get acquitted by 
reason of insanity, are likely to produce the greatest public indignation. 
But a hypothetical insanity acquittee in this group should have little trou-
ble proving that he is not mentally ill, even under the commitment stand-
ards of § 301(d). Therefore, commitment standards favoring the Govern-
ment cannot deter truly spurious insanity pleas. 
20 
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supports depriving insanity acquittees of due process protec-
tions, it cannot do so for an unlimited time, without regard to 
the seriousness of their conduct. And in any event, the Gov-
ernment may not subject them to a greater risk of unjustified 
confinement and medical treatment because of their criminal 
acts for longer than it can take away the liberty of those who 
are convicted and punished for the same acts. After that 
point, the Government has no more interest in confining 
them for involuntary psychiatric treatment than it has for 
civil commitment candidates, and it should be expected to 
justify further confinement under the Addington standards. 
D 
Finally, the Government argues that the interest of insan-
ity acquittees in avoiding commitment is weaker than that of 
other candidates for civil commitment. On this theory, one 
who raises the insanity defense identifies himself as mentally 
ill-at least as of the date of the criminal conduct charged-
and thus loses any interest in avoiding the social stigma that 
may attach to mental illness. We reject the suggestion that 
this justifies confining insanity acquittees indefinitely with-
out the protections in Addington. 
In Addington and Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480 (1980), we 
recognized that individuals have an interest in not being stig-
matized by society at large on account of being labelled men-
tally ill. 441 U. S., at 426; 445 U. S., at 492. A voiding 
stigma, however, is only one of the reasons why an individual 
might object to involuntary commitment; other aspects of in-
voluntary commitment affect him in a far more immediate 
way. 34 We have repeatedly acknowledged that persons who 
34 "Persons incarcerated in mental hospitals are not only deprived of 
friends, family, and community. Institutionalized mental patients must 
live in unnatural surroundings under the continuous and detailed control of 
strangers. They are subject to intrusive treatment which, especially if 
unwarranted, may violate their right to bodily integrity. Such treatment 
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have already been labelled as mentally ill nonetheless retain 
an interest in avoiding involuntary commitment, e.g., 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575; Baxstrom v. 
Herold, supra, as do those, such as prisoners, who have no 
interest in avoiding confinement per se, see Vitek v. Jones, 
445 U. S., at 493--494. 35 Every person has a strong interest 
in not being involuntarily hospitalized and subjected to psy-
chiatric treatment. If different due process standards for 
insanity acquittees can be justified at all, it must be on the 
basis of different governmental interests, or different terms 
and conditions of commitment, not diminished individual 
interests. 
E 
In sum, indefinite commitment without the due process 
protections adopted in Addington and O'Connor is not rea-
sonably related to any of the Government's purported inter-
ests in confining insanity acquittees for psychiatric treat-
ment. The rationales upon which the Government seeks to 
justify § 301's departures from Addington at most support 
modalities may include forced administration of psychotropic medication, 
aversive conditioning, convulsive therapy, and even psychosurgery." 
Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S., at 626 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted). 
A person who has been hospitalized involuntarily may to a significant ex-
tent lose the right enjoyed by others to withhold consent to medical treat-
ment. See Youngberg v. Romeo, -- U.S.--, -- (1982) (involun-
tary committee's due process right to freedom from unreasonable restraint 
limited to a guarantee that professional judgment has been exercised). 
Although this Court has never approved the the practice, it is possible that 
he will be subjected to medication for reasons that have more to do with 
the needs of the institution than with individualized therapy. See Mills 
v. Rogers, -- U. S. --, -- (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 2d 836, 845 
(CA3 1981) (en bane); n. 29, supra. We cannot presume that he lacks a 
strong interest in having the decisions to commit him and to keep him insti-
tutionalized made carefully, and in a manner that preserves the maximum 
degree of personal autonomy. 
35 But see n. 21, supra. 
22 
81-5195-OPINION 
JONES v. UNITED STATES 
deferring Addington's due process protections-its require-
ment that the Government carry the burden of proof by clear 
and convincing evidence-for a limited period of time, in no 
event exceeding the term for which an insanity acquittee 
could have been incarcerated had he been convicted of the 
crime with which he was charged. 36 
IV 
Petitioner also challenges his continued commitment on 
equal protection grounds, arguing that once the period for 
which he could have been incarcerated for attempted petit 
larceny had passed he should have received, in addition to the 
elements of due process required by Addington and O'Con-
nor, the statutory procedural protections accorded civil com-
mitment candidates in the District of Columbia. These in-
clude, primarily, the right to a jury trial at the time of the 
initial commitment decision and substantially more advanta-
geous release procedures. See supra, at 3-4 and n. 6. The 
question for equal protection purposes, then, is similar to the 
due process question discussed above: may the Government 
36 Of course, to hold that the interests asserted by the Government in this 
case cannot support holding insanity acquittees in confinement past the 
maximum term of the sentence they could have received, unless the Gov-
ernment can prove their mental illness and dangerousness by clear and 
convincing evidence, is not to promulgate a comprehensive set of rules gov-
erning the treatment of insanity acquittees. Nor is it to hold that the in-
terests asserted by the Government in this case do in fact justify commit-
ment up to the date on which a sentence would have expired; because that 
date has passed we need not reach the question in this case. Congress and 
the state legislatures are fully capable of balancing public and individual 
interests and of designing a set of procedures that accommodates each. 
At the margin, any such system will require that lines be drawn, and the 
role of the courts is to evaluate whether legislative solutions, in light of 
particular cases, meet the requirements of due process. Cf. Mills v. 
Habluetzel, 456 U. S. -- (1982) (invalidating one-year statute of limita-
tions on support suits by illegitimate children); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 
U. S., at 738-739. 
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confine insanity acquittees indefinitely without providing 
them the same protections given civil commitment 
candidates? 
Many of the cases discussed above furnish guidance as to 
the requirements of equal protection in the commitment con-
text. In Baxstrom v. Herold, we held that a prisoner who 
had been administratively determined to be insane during his 
prison term could not be committed to further involuntary in-
stitutionalization at the conclusion of his sentence unless the 
State used its customary civil commitment procedures, in-
cluding jury review and a determination of dangerousness. 
383 U. S., at 110; see supra, at 15. To similar effect is Hum-
phrey v. Cady, which questioned the validity of jury-less 
commitments under Wisconsin's Sex Crimes Act if they ex-
tended beyond the duration of the maximum sentences sex 
offenders could receive for the offenses they had committed. 
405 U. S., at 510-511. Jackson v. Indiana held that even a 
person charged with a crime, but found incompetent to stand 
trial on account of his mental condition, could not be commit-
ted indefinitely without the State's customary civil commit-
ment procedures. 406 U. S., at 729-730. 
Petitioner's case is not distinguishable. Like the petition-
ers in Baxstrom and Humphrey, he has been confined for 
longer than the term for which he could have been incarcer-
ated as punishment for his criminal act, and, like the petition-
ers in Baxstrom and Jackson, he has never been given a com-
mitment hearing that satisfied the due process requirements 
for indefinite commitment. For the reasons discussed in 
part III, supra, the Government's interests in confining him 
without the due process protections of Addington cannot jus-
tify more than a definite commitment, extending at most as 
long as the maximum term of confinement he could have re-
ceived as a sentence. The same reasoning applies to his 
right to equal protection. The Government's interests in 
punishing those who have committed crimes or in ensuring 
the accuracy of the commitment process provide no basis for 
24 
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distinguishing between insanity acquittees and civil commit-
tees after the term of the possible sentence has elapsed. 
And the Government's interest in "balancing" insanity ac-
quittals and subsequent commitments cannot justify the in-
definite commitment scheme of § 301. Having been confined 
under an indefinite commitment order for longer than the 
maximum sentence he could have received, petitioner's cur-
rent commitment is invalid, and he may not now be treated 
differently than civil committees. 
In the context of this case, that means that petitioner must 
now receive a commitment hearing equivalent to that pro-
vided other candidates for civil commitment in the District of 
Columbia, because the legitimate term of his prior commit-
ment under § 301(d) has expired. If he is in fact recommit-
ted at that hearing, his rights to release must also be equiva-
lent to those of civil committees. 37 
V 
The maximum sentence for attempted petit larceny in the 
District of Columbia is one year. 38 Beyond that period, peti-
tioner should not have been kept in involuntary confinement 
unless he had been committed under the standards of 
Addington and O'Connor, and he should have been given the 
same rights as civil committees or candidates for civil com-
mitment. By the time of his February 22, 1977, hearing, pe-
37 We do not reach the question whether, had petitioner been given an 
initial commitment hearing consistent with the requirements of due proc-
ess for indefinite commitment, equal protection would now demand that he 
be given a new commitment hearing under civil standards, or merely that 
he be given the same rights to release as civil committees. Nor do we 
reach the question whether the Government may confine petitioner, ifhe is 
recommitted, to a facility other than one used to treat involuntary civil 
committees. 
38 Petitioner has not contended that statutory sentence reductions or 
other sentencing factors should limit the maximum sentence he could have 
received for purposes of the analysis in this case. 
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titioner had been in custody for 17 months, either in St. Eliz-
abeths or in the District of Columbia Correctional Center. 
Therefore, at that time he should have received the benefit of 
the Addington due process standards, as well as the further 
statutory protections given candidates for civil commitment. 




In this case petitioner was committed to St. 
Elizabeths upon being acquitted of attempted larcenv by 
reason of insanity. At two subsequent hearings the 
District of Columbia Superior Court found that he remained 
mentally ill and dangerous. The correctness of those 
findings is not before us, as petitioner did not challenge 
them on appeal. 1 Nor are we asked to decide whether the 
A 
District's procedures for release from confinement are 
constitutional. 2 Nor, indeed, does petitioner challenge 
directly his automatic commitment following his insanity 
acquittal. Rather, his argument is that an insanity 
acquittal provides an inadequate basis for an indefinite 





released because he has been committed for a period longer 
than the duration of his hypothetical maximum sentence. 
We do not agree either that an indefinite commitment is 
invalid or that the acquittee's hypothetical maximum 





JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether petitioner, who was 
committed to a mental hospital upon being acquitted of a 
criminal offense by reason of insanity, must be released 
because he has been hospitalized for a period longer than 
he might have served in prison had he been convicted . 
. f~-~ 
I ~--.....,,..-~!; 0, 
In the District of Columbia a criminal defendant may 
~ be acquitted by reason of insanity tHl1eso his insanity 
is "affirmatively established by a preponderance of the 
evidence." D.C. Code §24-301 (j) (1981) • 1 If he 
1section 24-30l(j) provides: 
" ( j) Insanity shall not be a defense in any er iminal 
Footnote continued on next page. 
2. 
successfully invokes the insanity defense, he is committed 
to a mental hospital. §24-30l(d) (1). 2 Within 50 days of 
commitment the acquittee is entitled to a hearing to 
determine his eligibility for release, at which he has the 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
proceeding in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia or in the Superior Court of the 
District of Columbia, unless the accused or his attorney 
in such proceeding, at the time the accused enters his 
plea of not guilty or within fifteen days thereafter or at 
such later time as the court may for good cause permit, 
files with the court and serves upon the prosecuting 
attorney written notice of his intention to rely on such 
defense. No person accused of an offense shall be 
acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time of 
its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who 
raises the issue, is affirmatively established by a 
preponderance of the evidence." 
2section 24-30l(d) (1) provides: 
"(d) (1) If any person tried upon an indictment or 
information for an offense raises the defense of insanity 
and is acquitted solely on the ground that he was insane 
at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a 
hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is 
eligible for release pursuant to this subsection or 
subsection (e)." 
Under this provision, automatic commitment is permissible 
only if the defendant himself raised the insanity defense. 
See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962). 
3. 
he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous. §24-
30l(d) (2) . 3 If he fails to meet this burden at the 50-day 
hearing, the committed acquittee subsequently may be 
released, with court approval, upon certification of his 
recovery by the hospital chief of service. §24-30l(e) . 4 
3section 24-30l(d) (2) provides in relevant part: 
11 (2) (A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) 
shall have a hearing, unless waived, within 50 days of his 
confinement to determine whether he is entitled to release 
from custody ..•• 
(B) If the hearing is not waived, the court shall 
cause notice of the hearing to be served upon the person, 
his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney and hold the 
hearing. Within ten days from the date the hearing was 
begun, the court shall determine the issues and make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect 
thereto. The person confined shall have the burden of 
proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the person confined is entitled to his 
release from custody, either conditional or unconditional, 
the court shall enter such order as may appear 
appropriate. 11 
The statute does not specify the standard for determining 
release, but the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
held in this case that, as in release proceedings under 
§24-301 (e) and §21-545 (b) , the confined person must show 
that he is either no longer mentally ill or no longer 
dangerous to himself or others. See 432 A.2d 364, 372 and 
n. 16 (1981) (en bane). /\ 
Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following pages. 
. . 
4. 
Alternatively, the acquittee is entitled to a judicial 
hearing every six months at which he may establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to 
4section 24-30l(e) provides in relevant part: 
11 
( e) Where any per son has been con£ ined in a hospital 
for the mentally ill pursuant to subsection (d) of this 
section, and the superintendent of such hospital certifies 
(1) that such person has recovered his sanity, (2) that, 
in the opinion of the superintendent, such person will not 
in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or 
others, and ( 3) in the opinion of the superintendent, the 
person is entitled to unconditional release from the 
hospital, and such certificate is filed with the clerk of 
the court in which the person was tried, and a copy 
thereof served on the United States Attorney or the 
Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, whichever 
office prosecuted the accused, such certificate shall be 
sufficient to authorize the court to order the 
unconditional release of the person so confined from 
further hospitalization at the expiration of fifteen days 
from the time said certificate was filed and served as 
above; but the court in its discretion may, or upon the 
objection of the United States or the District of Columbia 
shall, after due notice, hold a hearing at which evidence 
as to the mental condition of the person so confined may 
be submitted, including the testimony of one or more 
psychiatrists from said hospital. The court shall weigh 
the evidence and, if the court finds that such person has 
recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future 
be dangerous to himself or others, the court shall order 
such person unconditionally released from further 
con£ inement in said hospital. If the court does not so 
find, the court shall order such person returned to said 
hospital. . .• 11 
5. 
release. §24-30l(k) . 5 
Independent of its commitment of insanity acquittees, 
the District of Columbia also has adopted a civil-
commitment procedure, under which an individual may be 
committed upon clear and convincing proof by the 
Government that he is mentally ill and likely to injure 
5section 24-30l(k) provides in relevant part: 
11 (k) (1) A person in custody or conditionally released 
from custody, pursuant to the provisions of this section, 
claiming the right to be released from custody, the right 
to any change in the conditions of his release, or other 
relief concerning his custody, may move the court having 
jurisdiction to order his release, to release him from 
custody, to change the conditions of his release, or to 
grant other relief. •.. 
(3) .•. On all issues raised by his motion, the person 
shall have the burden of proof. If the court finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the person is entitled 
to his release from custody, either conditional or 
unconditional, a change in the conditions of his release, 
or other relief, the court shall enter such order as may 
appear appropriate .... 
(5) A court shall not be required to entertain a 2nd 
or successive motion for relief under this section more 
often than once every 6 months. A court for good cause 
shown may in its discretion entertain such a motion more 
often than once every 6 months." 
• !,. ' 
6. 
himself or others. §21-545(b) . 6 He may be released at 
any time upon certification of recovery by the hospital 
chief of service. §§21-546, 21-548. Alternatively, the 
patient is entitled after the first 90 days, and 
subsequently at 6-month intervals, to request a judicial 
hearing at which he may gain his release by proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is no longer 
mentally ill or dangerous. §21-546, 21-547: see Dixon v. 
Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 598 (CADC 1970). 
II 
6section 24-545(b) provides in relevant part: 
"If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally 
ill and, because of that illness, likely to injure himself 
or other persons if allowed to remain at liberty, the 
court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate 
period, or order any other alternative course of treatment 
which the court believes will be in the best interests of 
the person or of the public." 
See In re Nelson, 408 A.2d 1233 (DC 1979) (reading into 
the statute the due process requirement of "clear and 
convincing" proof) . 
7 
7. 
On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested for 
attempting to steal a jacket from a department store. The 
next day he was arraigned in the District of Columbia 
Superior Court on a charge of attempted petit larceny, a 
misdemeanor punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one 
year. D.C. Code §§22-103, 22-2202 (1981). The court 
)t!l- ·~~~~~ 
ordered petitioner committed to St. Elizabeths for a d-l 1 , 
determination of his competency to stana trial. 7 On March 
2, 1976, a hospital psychologist submitted a report to the 
court stating that petitioner was competent to stand 
trial, that petitioner suffered from "Schizophrenia, 
7section 24-301 (a) authorizes the court to "order 
the accused committed to the District of Columbia General 
Hospital or other mental hospital designated by the court, 
for such reasonable period as the court may determine for 
examination and observation and for care and treatment if 
such is necessary by the psychiatric staff of said 
hospital." 
7 
~-~~~ ~ ~ 
/4~ ~ ~1-u.:k;/. 4 ~ -? 
8. 
ul.w- t--1" ~P-1 ~ ~~ !' Lt/_.._ 
~~~~.If/Ip~~~~~ ----------------____:~ 
and that petitioner's alleged offense was 
"the product of his mental disease." Record 51. The 
court ruled that petitioner was competent to stand trial. 
Petitioner and the Government then stipulated that 
petitioner had committed the attempted larceny bv reason 
of insanity. On March 12, 1976, the Superior Court found 
petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity and committed 
him to St. Elizabeths pursuant to §24-30l(d) (1). 
On May 25, 1976, the court held the 50-day hearing 
required by §24-30l(d) (2) (A). A psychologist from St. 
Elizabeths testified on behalf of the Government that, in 
the opinion of the staff, petitioner continued to suffer 
from paranoid schizophrenia and that "because his illness 
is still quite active, he is still a danger to himself and 
to others." Record 9. Petitioner's counsel conducted a 
9. 
brief cross-examination, and presented no evidence. 8 The 
court then found that "the defendant-patient is mentally 
ill and as a result of his mental illness, at this time, 
he constitutes a danger to himself and others." Id., at 
13. Petitioner was returned to St. Elizabeths. 
Petitioner obtained new counsel and, following some 
procedural confusion, a release hearing pursuant to §24-
30l(k) (2) was held on February 22, 1977. Petitioner 
demanded release or recommitment pursuant to the civil 
commitment standards/in §21-545(b), including a jury trial 
~ 
and proof by clear and convincing evidence of ~etitioRer 1s -
illness and dangerousness. The Superior Court denied 
8Petitioner's 
about obtaining a 
restrictive wing of 
concerned primarily 
petitioner to a less 
See Record 10-11. 
counsel seemed 
trans fer for 
the hospital. 
10. 
petitioner's request for a civil commitment hearing, 
reaffirmed its findings at the May 25 hearing, and 
continued petitioner's commitment to St. Elizabeths. 
d-1-D 
Petitioner bro~~l,-1; --a-n appeal -H'l the District of 
"' 
Columbia Court of Appeals. A panel of the court affirmed 
the Superior Court, 396 A.2d 183 (1978), but then granted 
rehearing and reversed, 411 A.2d 624 (1980). Finally, the 
court heard the case en bane and affirmed the judgment of 
the Superior Court. 432 A.2d 364 (1981). The Court of 
Appeals rejected the argument "that the length of the 
prison sentence [petitioner] might have received 
determines when he is entitled to release or civil 
commitment under Title 24 of the D.C. Code." Id., at 368. 
It then held that the various differences between civil 
commitment and commitment of insanity acquittees were 
11. 
justified under the equal-protection component of the 
Fifth Amendment. Id., at 371-376. 
We granted certiorari, 454 U.S. 1141 (1982), and now 
affirm. 
RIDER G 
I ~he:,~ ~ a f · · ~ · f · · n argnrng t 1n e 1n1te commitment o 1nsan1ty 
I\ A 
a~ees, petitioner also ~ that t~-1,---
~ tl-- ~~., 
~ t demonstrates onlv past, not'\ presen:C insaoi t,¥, and 
that the commission of one criminal act does not suffice 
to establish dangerousness. 
.... ' 
RIDER C 
We therefore conclude that a verdict of not guilty by 
reason of insanity is a sufficient foundation for 
commitment of an insanity acquittee for the purposes of 
treatment and the protection of society. 1(# 
RIDER C.F 
16Pet i tioner also has raised an equal-protect ion 
challenge to the fact that a jury is available at a civil 
commitment hearing, see §21-544, but not at the 50-day 
hearing for a committed insanity acquittee. We agree with 
the Court of Appeals that "this difference is justified by 
the fact that the acqui ttee has had a right to a jury 
determination of his sanity at the time of the offense." 
432 A.2d, at 373. 
RIDER D 
Petitioner's principal argument is that, whatever the 
validity of automatic commitment following an insanity 
acquital, the acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence 
provides the constitutional limit for his commitment. We 
do not agree that the permissible duration of such a 
commitment is affected by the criminal penalties the 
acquittee might have received. 
RIDER F 
IV 
We hold that when a criminal defendant establishes by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a 
crime by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the 
, 
government, on the basis of the insanity ~~rdiet, to 
confine him to a mental institution until such time as he 
has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to 
himself or society. This holding accords with the widely 
and reasonably held view that insanity acquittees 
constitute a special class that should be treated 
differently from other candidates for commitment. 1 We have 
observed before that" [w]hen Congress undertakes to act in 
areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, 
2 . 
legislative options must be especially broad and courts 
should be cautious not to rewrite legislation. " 
Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974). This 
admonition has particular force in the context of 
legislative efforts to deal with the special problems 
raised by the insanity defense. 
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals is affirmed. 
So ordered. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. ~ 
<S Tod«y~ Court holds that petitioner, who was r>,bbe>--. 
~ -
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reason of insanity of a criminal offense, must be re~ 
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because he has been hospitalized for a period longer tha;o/7 4 
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he might have served in prison had he been convicted. If · 
the Government seeks to recommit petitioner, it must offer 
him a jury trial and comply with the civil-commitment 
standards set forth in Addington 
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2. 
unique problems raised by the insanity defense. I 
therefore dissent. 
I 
In the District of Columbia, an individual may be 
committed civilly upon clear and convincing proof by the 
Government that ~e is mentally ill and likely to injure 
himself or others. D.C. Code Ann. §21-545 (1981): see In 
re Nelson, 408 A.2d 1233 (DC 1979). He may be released 
upon certification by the hospital chief of service. §21-
546. Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the 
first 90 days, and subsequently at six-month intervals, to 
request a judicial hearing at which he may gain his 
release by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 











A second type of involuntary commitment follows from 
successful invocation of the insanity defense. If a 
criminal defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity--a 
verdict that requires that his insanity be "affirmatively 
established by a preponderance of the evidence," §24-
30l(j)--he automatically is committed to a mental 
hospital. § 24-301 ( d) ( 1) • He may be released, with court 
approval, upon certification of the hospital chief of 
service. §301 (e). Alternatively, within 50 days, and 
thereafter at six-month intervals, the committed insanity 
acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing at which he · 
may prove, in the same manner as a civilly committed 
person, that he is entitled to release. §§24-301 (d) (2), 





Petitioner was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital 
upon being acquitted by reason of insanity of attempted 
petit larceny. At two subsequent hearings the District of 
Columbia Superior Court found that he remained mentally 
ill and dangerous. The correctness of those findings, 
~-f d-c-.ll~f 
.A\w..bJt,Qh petitioner n~ ~s challenged on appeal, 1 is not 
"\ 
before us. Nor are we asked to decide whether the 
District's procedures for release from confinement are 
constitutional. 2 Instead, petitioner argues that he is 
1 I'b Is- ~4-i-~ of --tais ea-se- that ~ ti tioner, wh9 
urges that he has been confined unconstitutionally since 
1977, seeks his release solely on the legal arguments 
raised in this case. Petitioner has not sought judicial 
review of the Superior Court's findings in 1976 and 1977 
that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, nor does the 
record indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a 
release hearing--a hearing to which he was entitled every 
"A 
2As <liscussed above, the basic standard for release 
is the same under either civil commitment or commitment 
following acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he no 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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5. 
being detained in violation of the Constitution, and 
therefore that he need not go through release procedures 
at all. 
II. 
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose 
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that 
requires due process protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 
U.S. 418, 425 (1979). The initial question is whether the 
State has a "constitutionally adequate purpose for the 
longer is dangerous or mentally ill. There is on~ 
important difference, however, in the release provisions 
for these two groups. A patient who was committed civilly 
is entitled to unconditional release upon certification of 
his recovery by the hospital chief of service, §21-546, 
whereas a committed insanity acqui ttee may be released 
upon such certification only with court approval. 
§30l(e). Neither of these provisions is before the Court, 
however, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy 
of the release standards generally nor the disparity in 
treatment of insanity acquittees and other committed 
persons. 
6. 
confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 
(1975). A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity 
establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act 
that would constitute a criminal offense, and (ii) he 
committed the act because of mental illness. In my 
judgment it was reasonable for Congress to determine that 
a person as to whom those two findings were made is 
mentally ill and dangerous and therefore should be 
committed to a mental institution for treatment and the 
protection of society. See Addington, supra, at 426 
(commitment for these purposes justified under States' 
parens patriae and police powers); O'Connor, supra, at 
575-576. 
I am not persuaded by petitioner's suggestion that 





larceny is an insufficient indication of dangerousness. 
We never have held that "violence," however that term 
might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitutional 
commitment. 3 Nor am~ ~e-ru,.illoed th~F i ~Jwas J unreasonable 
for Congress to determine that the insanity acquittal 
suppor ;:--~ resen \')mental 
A 7 
illness. The Due 
3see Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861 
(CADC 196 2) (Burger, J.) (" [T] o describe the theft of 
watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to confuse 
, P.. danger with violence. Larceny 1 s usually less violent V ~~ than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the 
lY' purpose of the statute is the same as to both."). The r ~~ relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual of 
~ . course should be a consideration at the release hearings. 
In this context, it is noteworthy that petitioner's 
f" ~ continuing commitment apparently does not rest solely on 
: the eviden e relating to his acquittal by reason ·of 
~_.)--$ insanit the crime of attempted larceny. In December 
~· 1-~9 medical officer at St. Elizabeth's reported that 
v-1" N ti titioner "has a history of attempted suicide." Record 
,V. 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was transferred 
d~. ~ CJ{ to the civil division of the hospital, but was transferred 
U'1 ~ back to the forensic division becau,~e of disruptiv~ _,,___ 
~~t ~~~~vio:fter
432 
p:ti;f~neart w~s Fr;:;;e~e:es~~~~~~i½f~~~~~~ ~ 
following the second panel decision below, he had to 
recommitted on an emergency civil basis two weeks later 
~  for conduct unrelated to the original commitment. See M f"'. ~ Brief for Respondent at 15 n.18. 
~ ~;'~ . IJ IL-µ r- . ~ ~ 1--
~ ~ ~ 
8. 
Process Clause does not require Congress to make 
classifications that fit every individual with the same 
degree of relevance. 4 ("Normally there will be only a 
limited period of delay between the act and the insanity 
and Congress has provided a hearing only 50 
days after the commitment so that every acquittee has an 
immediate opportunity to obtain release if he has 
recovered. 
The Court concedes, though with seeming reluctance, 
4.For example, in Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 
417 {1974), we upheld a congressional dec1son to exclude 
from a program of discretionary rehabilitative commitment, 
in lieu of penal incarceration, drug addicts with two or 
more prior felony convictions. The Court noted that the 
legislative decision had a "rational basis," id., at, and 
rejected the dissent's reliance on the fact that the 
statutory distinction deprived every addict in that 
particular class "of the opportunity even to be considered 
for treatment for his disease." Id., at 427 {MARSHALL, 
J., dissenting). We recognized that a discretionary 
system would have been permissible, but concluded that 
"legislative classifications need not be perfect or 
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9. 
that an insanity acquittal "is not irrelevant" to whether 
an individual is mentally ill and dangerous. Ante, at 14. 
1-t.-~ 
Nonetheless, µ suggests that the Government lacks a 
A 
legitimate reason for committing insanity acquittees 




.9 ~-t ~ 
insanity acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civil 
commitment proceeding. See id., at 17. This argument 
~ - _n a ~:J misses the point. 
~ ~ automatic commitment is the only means of using the 
The Government does not contend that 
wt!!;~ 
~· finding of acquittal by reason of insanity, but rather 
that "due regard for considerations of judicial economy · 
and integrity justify the assignment of the burden of 
[:- hs>~a..~ 
proving recovery to the insanity acquittee who ~has ~~ 
;: al s t a .... >( .. ~ 
successfully established his past insanity." Brief for ~ 
~ Tk ~-1-~ ~ ~ ~ 
Respondent at 47. ~ the Government ie-fi reed to conduct 






a de novo commitment hearing following every insanity 
acquittal--[ hearing at which a jury must be availabJj', -zr"; _z 
A 
§21-546, and at which the Government must demonstrate the 
acquittee's mental illness and dangerousness by clear and 
convincing evidence, see Addington, supra, at 431-433 
( 19 7 9) :--4-J' t;...--\ln-:l:-i:--ee--...J.€~_e.d--t..()--at'S8~e-l:f'e~s-i-c~~r±-e--o-t:H'-€1-efl-;;--\, 
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~~evidence placed before the criminal factfinder W¼,l..l.. 
m•e& tu be reintroduced. Instead t using on the critical/ 
question of whether the acquittee has recovered since he 
committed the criminal act by reason of insanity, the new 
commitment proceeding likely will ~~~Be same 
1 
d" gron-n~rfl-ap:! exl.<ta1:,1i..t h·ery, =t!'t the er iminal 
~ ~rtt<LLu.s1- G,,- 1.4-, ~-
trial.)~ ~~-k.d-a.----, ~~ 
~ N!lf.-J4AL  a,• ..lv ~ ~a~•·4 L,i.-,1 
These concerns about potentially duplicative 
~ ~/J-4t., 
proceedings give the Government an important interest in ~ 
11. 
automatic commitment. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 348 (1976} {"[T]he Government's interest, and hence 
that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and 
administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed. 
At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to 
the individual affected by the administrative action and 
to society in terms of increased assurance that the action 
is just, may be outweighed by the cost."}. The remaining 
question is whether, in light of this interest, the 
procedural safeguards that accompany automatic commitment 
satisfy the Due Process Clause. Certainly there is no 
doubt that the criminal trial, with the availability of a 
jury, counsel, and the like, provides the criminal 
defendant with an acceptable forum in which to resolve the 
question of whether he committed a criminal act by reason 
12. 
of insanity. Nor do I believe that commitment following a 
verdict based on a preponderance of the evidence is 
impermissible in light of Addington's requirement for 
civil commitment of proof by clear and convincing 
evidence. "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), 
and in my view the important differences between the class 
of potential civil commitment candidates and the class of 
insanity acquittees justify differing standards of proof. 
The Court in Addington expressed particular concern· 
that members of the public could be confined on the basis 
of "some abnormal behavior which might be perceived by 
some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but 
which is in fact within a range of conduct that is 
13. 
generally acceptable." 441 o.s., at 426-427. See also 
O'Connor, 422 o.s., at 575. In view of this concern, we 
deemed it inappropriate to ask the individual "to share 
equally with society the risk of error." Addington, 441 
o.s., at 427. But since automatic commitment under 
§30l(d) follows only if the acquittee himself argues and 
proves that the act was a product of his mental illness, 
see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 O.S. 705 (1962), there is 
good reason for diminished concern as to the risk of 
error. 5 More important, the proof that he committed a 
5That petitioner raised the insanity defense also 
somewhat diminishes the significance of the deprivation. 
The Addington Court noted that the social stigma of civil 
commitment "can have a very significant impact on the 
individual." 441 o.s., at 426. A criminal defendant who 
successfully raises the insanity defense, however, 
necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and thus 
the commitment causes little additional harm in this 
respect. 
14. 
criminal act as a result of mental illness eliminates the 
risk that he is being commmited for mere "idiosyncratic 
behavior." Addington, supra, at 427. A criminal act by 
definition is not "within a range of conduct that is 
generally acceptable." Id., at 426-427. I therefore 
would hold that the Due Process Clause is not violated 
when a verdict of acquittal by reason of insanity, 
supported by a preponderance of the evidence, 6 is used to 
support commitment to a mental institution. 
III 
6 It also should be noted that a defendant could be 
required to prove his insanity by a higher standard than a 
preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U.S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement 
hardly would benefit a er iminal defendant who wants to 
raise the insanity defense, yet imposition of a higher 
standard would be the likely result of a holding that an 
insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only 




The critical question in this case is how long an 
insanity acquittee may be committed. Although the Court 
does not foreclose the possibility that the Government has 
a-
;1'° legitimate interest in automatic commitment of insanity 
committees, see ante, at 22 n.36, it holds today only that 
"indefinite commitment" is forbidden. Id. , at 21. The 
Court declares that automatic commitment of insanity 
acquittees may be justified for a "limited period of time, 
in no event exceeding the term for which an insanity 
acquittee could have been incarcerated had he been 
convicted of the crime with which he was charged." Ibid. 
I do not agree either that an indefinite commitment is 
invalid or that the acquittee's hypothetical prison 
sentence has any relevance to the length of his 
commitment. 
• J' t ~ 
16. 
A 
In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), we 
held that the Due Process Clause requires that "the nature 
and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation 
to the purpose for which the individual is committed." 
The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, 
like that of civil commitment, is to treat the 
individual's mental illness and protect him and society 
from his potential dangerousness. See 432 A. 2d, at I\ 
(§30l(d) is designed for "the treatment and recovery of 
the patient" and "the protection of society and the 
patient"). The committed acquittee is entitled to release 
when he has recovered his sanity or when he no longer is 
dangerous. See id., at And because it is impossible 
to predict how long it will take for any given individual 
17. 
~ 
to recover--or indeed whether the individual will recover 
~ 
"'ft &~!--Congress responsibly has chosen to leave the 
length of commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic 
~ 
review of the patient's suitability .0-f release. 
~ 
The Court suggests that the insanity acquittal 
constitutionally may support only a limited commitment 
because "the passage of time erodes the likelihood" that 
the acquittee will repeat his dangerous act. Ante, at 16. 
That is equally true, however, with respect to T one 
committed civilly pursuant to Addington. The dangerous 
acts that led to his civil commitment at some point may ho 
longer justify continued confinement. For this reason, 
Congress has provided that the person must be released 
hearings. 
... 18 • 
)~A;~~, 
S" 
The Court goes cm, -~er; -t:o cas ~ doubt on the 
'l 
constitutional sufficiency of these procedures: "[W]e 
cannot ignore the adverse effect extended 
institutionalization may have on an individual's ability 
to prove that he is no longer mentally ill and dangerous, 
both because it deprives him of the economic wherewithal 
to obtain independent medical judgments and because the 
treatment he receives may make it difficult for him to 
show he has recovered." Ibid. The Court thus appears to 
imply that the Constitution requires that every committed 
~
patient be released at some definite point without regar"d 
H 
~~~~dk:./.J.1u,,.;t-~~ 
to his recovery. Tl:ie uaJ ir~ity of such a drastic holding , 
riu-~ 
i ~ , and at the very least~ should await a case 
"' 
in which the issue is presented. Petitioner has 
challenged neither the constitutionality of the District's 







~I-~ ~ ~ -
;JJ; ~ release procedures nor the Superior 
ti)&~~ he remained mentally i 11 and 
~r 
~ . there is no basis 
findings that 
On this record, 
i definite commitment, subject to regular hearings 
p tient's fitness for release, fails to protect 
B 
~~~ ~~4,4.-( 
Even if the CourtX" rQ corFeet that the length of a 
commitment following an insanity acquittal ::::t:{ not be 
indefinite, the acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence 
would not provide a sound constitutional basis on which to 
limit the commitment. A particular sentence of 
incarceration is chosen to reflect society's view of the 
proper response to commission of a particular criminal 
offense, based on a variety of considerations such as 
Different considerations underlie commitment of an 
insanity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not 
be punished. 7 His confinement rests on his continuing 
illness and dangerousness. Thus, under the District of 
Columbia statute, no matter how heinous the act committed 
by the acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his 
acquittal if he has recovered. In contrast, someone who 
~ ~ 
___ 7_r __ f_l_t_td--it dlffletilt t o be it@ oaJl-that the Court 
actually believes, as it professes to do for purposes of 
argument, that "the Government conceivably has an interest 
in confining insanity acquittees to punish them for their 
er iminal acts." Ante, at 12. As the Court of Appeals 
held, "[s] ociety may not excuse a defendant's er iminal 
behavior because of his insanity and at the same time 
punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432 A. 2d, 
at 
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committed a less serious act may be confined for a longer ¼ 
period if he remains ill and dangerous. There simply is~ 
no necessary correlation between severity of the offense ~ 
~ 
and length of time necessary for recovery. The length of 
the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore 
is irrelevant. 8 
IV 
8The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may 
be treated involuntarily for particular psychiatric 
problems, but that upon expiration of his prison sentence 
he may be committed only as would any other candidate for 
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent 
Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972): Humphrey v. Cady, 405 
U.S . . 504 (1972): Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) •. 
None of those cases involved an insanity acqui ttee, and 
none suggested that a person whose non-criminal commitment 
was based on possibly criminal conduct could not be 
confined in excess of the period for which he could have 
served in prison if convicted for those acts. Similarly, 
despite the fact that the petitioner in Addington had 
engaged in "conduct that could have been the basis for 
criminal charges had the State chosen to prosecute," ante, 
at 15, the Court did not intimate that his commitment 
might have to be limited to the period of incarceration 








The Court holds that petitioner must be released 
because he has been confined for longer than one vear, the 
time he might have served in prison for the act he 
committed. Yet the Court expressly declines "to hold that 
the interests asserted by the Government in this case do 
in fact justify commitment up to the date on which a 
sentence would have expired." Ante, at 22 n.36. This 
~
suggests that after some period of time the Government may 
"\ 
be required to release even the most violent insanity 
acquittees. In my view, the Constitution does not require 
any fixed term of commitment for insanity acquittees, 
whether based on a criminal sentence or selected in some 
other arbitrary manner. I Fespectfully di~sent. 
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DRAFT NO. ' -- Jones v. United States, No. 81-5195 ¥1 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court holds that petitioner, who was committed to 
a mental hospital upon being acquitted by reason of 
insanity of a criminal offense, must be released becalISe 
he has been hospitalized for a period longer than he might 
have served in prison had he been convicted. If the 
Government seeks to recommit petitioner, it must 
comply with the civil-commitment standards set forth in 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). I do not think 
that the Constitution ~ he Government from 
"\ 
prescribing indefinite commitment as a means of dealing 
with the~ oblems raised hy the insanity defense. 
I therefore dissent. 
2. 
I 
In the District of Columbia, an individual may be 
committed civilly upon clear and convincing proof by the 
Government that he is mentally ill and likely to injure 
himself or others. D.C. Code Ann. §21-545 (1981) 1 see In 
re Nelson, 408 A.2d 1233 (DC 1979). He may be released 
upon certification by the hospital chief of service. §21-
546. Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the 
first 90 days, and subsequently at six-month intervals, to 
request a judicial hearing at which he may gain his 
release by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he no longer is mentally ill or dangerous. §§21-547, 21-
548. 
A second type of involuntary commitment follows from 
successful invocation of the insanity defense. If a 
3. 
criminal defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity--a 
verdict that requires that his insanity be "affirmatively 
established by a preponderance of the evidence," §24-
30l(j)--he 
hospital. 
a-u~i.:1:::a.l-ly is committed to a mental 
§24-30l(d) (1). He may be released, with court 
approval, upon certification by the hospital chief cf 
service. §30l(e). Alternatively, within 50 days, and 
thereafter at six-month intervals, the committed insanity 
acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing at which he 
may prove, in the same manner as a civilly committed 
person, that he is entitled to release. §§24-30l(d) (2), 
(k); see 432 A.2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (DC 1981) (en bane). 
Petitioner was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital 
upon being acquitted by reason of insanity of attempted 
petit larceny. At two subsequent hearings the District of 
4. 
Columbia Superior Court found that he remained mentally 
ill and dangerous. The correctness of those findings is 
not before us, as petitioner did not challenge them on 
appeal. 1 Nor are we asked to decide whether the 
District's procedures for release from confinement are 
constitutional. 2 Nor, indeed, does petitioner challenge 
1Peti tioner, who urges that he has been confined 
unconstitutionally since 1977, seeks his release solely on 
the legal arguments raised in this case. Petitioner has 
not sought judicial review of the Superior Court's 
findings in 1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill 
and dangerous, nor does the record indicate that since 
1977 he ever has sought a release hearing--a hearing to 
which he was entitled every six months. On this reco.rd 
there is nothing to suggest that petitioner now is any 
less ill or dangerous than he was in 1976. See n. 5 
infra. 
2As discussed above, the basic standard for release 
is the same under either civil commitment or commitment 
following acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he no 
longer is dangerous or mentally ill. There is one 
important difference, however, in the release provisions 
for these two groups. A patient who was committed civilly 
is entitled to unconditional release upon certification of 
his recovery by the hospital chief of service, §21-546, 
whereas a committed insanity acqui ttee may be released 
upon such certification only with court approval. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
5. 
his automatic commitment following his insanity acquittal. 
All petitioner contends is that he must be released 
because he has been committed for a period longer than the 
duration of his hypothetical maximum criminal sentence. 
II. 
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose 
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that 
requires due process protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 
U.S. 418, 425 (1979). Therefore, a State must have a 
"constitutionally adequate purpose for the confinement." 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 (1975). A 
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes 
§30l(e). Neither of these provisions is before the Court rf 
~~ as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy 
of the release standards generally nor the disparity in 
treatment of insanity acquittees and other committed 
persons. 
two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that would 
constitute a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the 
act because of mental illness. Congress has determined 
that a person as to whom those two findings were made is 
mentally ill and dangerous and therefore should be 
committed ~;7tieatJ Y to a mental institution for 
treatment and the protection of society. See H.R. Rep. 
No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970). Petitioner concedes that 
this was one of Congress' purposes, see Brief for 
Petitioner at 9 and n. 4, and he does not challenge his 
original commitment. 
6 • 
The Due Process Clause also requires that "the nature 
and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation 
to the purpose for which the individual is committed." 
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose 
7. 
of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that 
of civil commitment, is to treat the individual's mental 
illness and protect him and society from his potential 
dangerousness. See 432 A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of 
Columbia statutory scheme for commitment of insane 
criminals is a regulatory, prophylactic statute, based 
on a legitimate governmental interest in protecting 
society and rehabilitating mental patients."). The 
committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has 
recovered his sanity or when he no longer is dangerous. 
See id., at 372 and n.16; H.R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 
(1970). And because it is impossible to predict how long 
it will take for any given individual to recover--or 
indeed whether he ever will recover--Congress has chosen, 
as it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the 
8. 
length of commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic 
review of the patient's suitability for release. 
The Court holds, however, that such an "indefinite 
commitment" of insanity acquittees is unconstitutional. 
Ante, at 21. In the Court's view, automatic commitment of 
insanity acquittees may be justified at most for a 
"limited period of time, in no event exceeding the term 
for which an insanity acquittee could have been 
incarcerated had he been convicted of the crime with which 
he was charged." Ibid. I do not agree either that an 
indefinite commitment is invalid or that the acquittee's 
hypothetical prison sentence has any relevance to the 




In finding that an indefinite commitment is not 
constitutional, the Court emphasizes the difference 
between an insanity verdict based on a preponderance of 
the evidence and Addington's requirement for civil 
commitment of proof by clear and convincing evidence. See 
ante, at 14-15. It is not clear why this difference is 
relevant to the permissible duration of the commitment. 
If, as petitioner concedes in this case, an insanity 
acquittal based on a preponderance of the evidence may 
.-rt.AS)~~~.~ 
justify automatic commitment, /\I do not: 1111der-st:a~ why the ~ 
difference in level of proof for commitment has any 
further significance. The purposes of the commitment--
treatment of the patient and protection of the patient and 
, 
~ ~Hv ~~ 
society--are reasonably served by an indeterminate length 
~~~/Ud-~~ 
of confinement. Any i;:e'fl\f:d1,ina;- question as to the proper 
I"\ 
10. 
level of proof for determining release . is not r ai sed ~ 
In any event, I ~ the Court ignores important 
differences between the class of potential civil 
commitment candidates and the class of insanity acquittees 
that justify differing standards of proof. The Addington 
Court expressed particular concern that members of the 
public could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal 
behavior which might be perceived by some as symptomatic 
of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact 
within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 
441 U.S., at 426-427. 
~
See also ~ or:i. .tWr, 422 U.S., at 
575. In view of this concern, the Court deemed it 
inappropriate to ask the individual "to share equally with 
society the risk of error." Addington, 441 U.S., at 427. 
11. 
But since automatic commitment under §30l(d) follows only 
if the acquittee himself argues and proves that the act 
was a product of his mental illness, see Lynch v. 
Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962), there is good reason for 
diminished concern as to the risk of error. 3 More 
important, the proof that he committed a criminal act as a 
result of mental illness eliminates the risk that he is 
being committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior." 
Addington, supra, at 427. A criminal act by definition is 
not "within a range of conduct that is generally 
3That petitioner raised the insanity defense also 
somewhat d:i.mini shes the significance of the deprivation. 
The Addington Court noted that the social stigma of civil 
commitment "can have a very significant impact on the 
individual." 441 U.S., at 426. A criminal defend~~.: .. ~~o ~ 
success fully raises the insanity defense ,--("""'h~ 
necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and thus 




acceptable." Id., at 426-427. "[D]ue process is flexible 
and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
5~ 
U.S. 471, 481 (1972),.. and-1 beli-eue tbat .§30l(e) 's 
/} 
preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due 
process for commitment of insanity acquittees. 4 
B 
In rejecting indefinite commitment for insanity 
acquittees, the Court also contends that an insanity 
acquittal "is backward-looking, focusing only on one 
4A defendant could be required to prove his 
insanity by a higher standard than a preponderance of the 
evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952). 
Such an additional requirement hardly would benefit a 
criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity 
defense, yet imposition of a higher standard would be the 
likely result of a holding that an insanity acquittal 
could support automatic commitment only if the verdict 
were supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
13. 
moment in the past," ante, at 16, and that "§30l(d) fails 
to reflect the commonsense truth that some crimes are more 
indicative of dangerousness than others." Ibid. Again, 
I do not think these arguments bear on the validity of an 
indefinite commitment. If the insanity acquittal provides 
an insufficient foundation for a finding of mental illness 
and dangerousness, then any automatic commitment following 
an insanity acquittal would be precluded. If, on the 
other hand, the insanity acquittal may support automatic 
commitment, as petitioner has conceded in this case, then 
the duration of that commitment should be determined by 
reference to its purpose: treatment and confinement of a 
dangerously insane person until he has recovered. 
1it.n,-aAu.,9 
0~ th0 meries, c L mm -fte-t persuaded by the Court's 
'\ 
suggestion that commission of a nonviolent criminal act 
14. 
such as attempted larceny is an insufficient indication of 
~~~~ 
dangerousness. ~ never ~ held that "violence," 
however that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for 
a constitutional commitment. 5 Nor was it unreasonable for 
5see Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861 
(CADC 1962) (Burger, J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of 
watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to confuse 
danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent 
than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the 
purpose of the statute is the same as to both."). It also 
may be noted that crimes of theft frequently may result in 
violence from the efforts of the criminal to escape or the 
victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the 
fleeing criminal. 
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular 
individual of course should be a consideration at the 
release hearings. In this context, it is noteworthy t~at 
petitioner's continuing commitment apparently does not 
rest solely on the evidence relating to his acquittal by 
reason of insanity of the crime of attempted larceny. In 
December 1976 a medical officer at St. Elizabeth's 
reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted 
suicide." Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one 
point was transferred to the civil division of the 
hospital, but was transferred back to the forensic 
di vis ion because of disruptive behavior. 4 3 2 A. 2d, at 
368 n. 6. Respondent also advises that after petitioner 
was released unconditionally following the second panel 
decision below, he had to recommitted on an emergency 
civil basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to the 
original commitment. See Brief for Respondent at 15 n.18. 
15. 
Congress to determine that the insanity acquittal supports 
an inference of continuing mental illness. The Due 
Process Clause does not require Congress to make 
classifications that fit every individual with the same 
6 degree of relevance. By providing a hearing only 50 days 
after the commitment, Congress has ensured that every 
acquittee has an immediate opportunity to obtain release 
if he has recovered. 7 
6.For example, in Marshall v. United States, 414 o~s~ 
417 {1974), we upheld a congressional decison to exclude 
from a program of discretionary rehabilitative commitment, 
in lieu of penal incarceration, drug addicts with two or 
more prior felony convictions. The Court noted that the 
legislative decision was not "unreasonable or irrational," 
id., at 428, and rejected the dissent's reliance on the 
fact that the statutory distinction deprived every addict 
in that particular class "of the opportunity even to be 
considered for treatment for his disease." Id., at 427 
{.MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We recognized that a 
discretionary system would have been permissible, but 
concluded that "legislative classifications need not be 
perfect or ideal." Id., at 435. 
7The 
legitimate 
Court suggests that the Government lacks a 
reason for committing insanity acquittees 




LA.- ~I (.-r ~ 
~ 
C 
The Court compl tes its analysis by suggesting that 
there may be a consti utional problem with indefinite 
commitment generally. The Court states that an insanity 
acquittal constitutio ally may support only a limited 
commitment because "t e passage of time erodes the 
likelihood" that acquittee will repeat his dangerous 
act. Ante, at 16. )\~ie.; equally trueJ=. ~ with 
respect to a person committed civilly pursuant to 
automatically because the Government can introduce 
insanity acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civ iJ._ 
proceeding. See ante, at 17. This argument fails t~ 
consider the Government's strong interest in avoiding the 
need to conduct a de novo commitment hearing following 
every insanity acqu1ttal--a hearing at which a jury trial 
may be requested, §21-546, and at which the Government 
bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing 
evidence. Instead of focusing on the critical question of 
whether the acqui ttee has recovered, the new proceeding 
likely would have to relitigate the criminal trial. These 
problems give the Government an important interest in 
automatic commitment. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 348 (1976). 
17. 
Addington. The dangerous acts that led to his civil 
commitment at some point may no longer justify continued 
confinement. For this reason, Congress has provided 
periodic release hearings to ensure that the person is 
released upon recovery. The Court, however, without a 
specific holding, casts doubt on the constitutional 
sufficiency of these procedures: "[W]e cannot ignore the 
adverse effect extended institutionalization may have on 
an individual's ability to prove that he is no longer 
mentally ill and dangerous, both because it deprives him 
of the economic wherewithal to obtain independent medical 
judgments and because the treatment he receives may make 
it difficult for him to show he has recovered." Ibid. 
The Court thus appears to imply that the Constitution 




some unspecified point without regard to his recovery. No 
~-~ 
authority is cited that would support this dr.eti~ 
A 
~~.b2.-~J ~ ~~ ~ ~ L,.... 
 , .and ~ '¥ J..e.a-s..t_ th.e --Seu r-t- ch ou ld await a 
~~ ~ t ~ ~ /4,~ ~ ~ 
Petitioner has 
challenged neither the constitutionality of the District's 
release procedures nor the Superior Court's findings that 
he remained mentally ill and dangerous. See supra, at 
In suggesting that an indefinite commitment may be 
unconstitutional because of the inadequacy of release 
~ 
procedures, the Court ~ y has r...eached~t to addressA an 
issue not before us. 
IV 
The error in the Court's conclusion that the duration 
of a commitment following an insanity acquittal must be 
"definite" is highlighted by its reliance on the 
19. 
acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence as a 
constitutional basis on which to limit the commitment. A 
particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to reflect 
society's view of the proper response to commission of a 
particular criminal offense, based on a variety of 
considerations such as retribution, deterrence, and 
rehabilitation. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 183-186 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and 
STEVENS, JJ.); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 248-249 
(1949). The State may punish a person convicted of a 
crime even if satisfied that he is unlikely to commit 
further crimes. 
Different considerations underlie commitment of an 
insanity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not 
be punished. 8 His confinement rests on his continuing 
Footnote(s) 8 will appear on following pages. 
2 
20. 
illness and dangerousness. Thus, under the District of 
~ 
Columbia statute, no matter how l+e-i-n-eus the act committed 
by the acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his 
acquittal if he has recovered. In contrast, r one who 
committed a less serious act may be confined for a longer 
period if he remains ill and dangerous. There simply is 
no necessary correlation between severity of the offense 
and length of time necessary for recovery. The length of 
the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore 
is irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment. 9 
A~~ 
8:rl aoubt that the Court actually believes, as it 
professes to do for purposes of argument, that "the 
Government conceivably has an interest in confining 
insanity acquittees to punish them for their criminal 
acts." Ante, at 12. As the Court of Appeals held, 
"[s]ociety may not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior 
because of his insanity and at the same time punish him 
for invoking an insanity defense." 432 A. 2d, at 369. 
9The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may 
be treated involuntarily for particular psychiatric 
Footnote continued on next page. 
21. 
The i.nherent~:;1f relying on a criminal 
sanction to determine the length of a therapeutic 
confinement is manifested by the Court's failure to 
provide guidance as to what lawfully may be done. The 
Court finds it easy to order petitioner's release because 
he has been confined for longer than one year, the maximum 
time he might have served in prison for the act he 
committed. At the same time, however, the Court leaves 
problems, but that upon expiration of his prison sentence 
he may be committed only as would any other candidate for 
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent 
Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 
U.S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
None of those cases 1nvol ved an 1nsani ty acquit tee, and 
none suggested that a person whose non-criminal commitment 
was based on possibly criminal conduct could not be 
confined in excess of the period for which he could have 
served in prison if convicted for those acts. Similarly, 
despite the fact that the petitioner in Addington had 
engaged in "conduct that could have been the basis for 
criminal charges had the State chosen to prosecute," ante, 
at 15, the Court did not intimate that his commitment 
might have to be limited to the period of incarceration 
that could have resulted had he been charged and 
convicted. 
22. 
open the possibility that "statutory sentence reductions 
or other sentencing factors" might need to be taken into 
account. Ante, at 24 n. 38. Today's decision, therefore, 
does not say whether the Due Process Clause requires 
States to limit commitment of insanity acquittees to 
maximum sentences, minimum sentences, or likely sentences. 
Nor does it suggest whether account must be taken of the 
availability of release time or the possibility of parole. 
And the Court ignores the fact that a criminal sentence 
does not always correspond to a "limited period of time." 
Id., at 22. The States are left to speculate how they may 
deal constitutionally with acquittees who might have 
received life imprisonment, life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole, or the death penalty. 
IV 
23. 
The Court's decision will cause E}-l'eat uncertainty in 
the many States that commit insanity acquittees 
automatically or under lower standards than used for civil 
~LA_, 
commitment,lO for the Court simply has failed to annou;-~r1 
6i:-
a f.4rm constitutional p ~ l~ e~ i ~ e~~¼. 
I\ 
been ordered because his hypothetical criminal sentence 
has expired. Yet criminal sentences may prove irrelevant, 
as the Court pointedly refuses "to hold that the interests 
asserted by the Government in this case do in fact justify 
lOA recent survey of commitment statutes reported 
that 14 jurisdictions provide automatic commitment for at 
least some insanity acquittees, while many other States 
have a variety of unique methods of commit ing insanity 
acquittees. See Note, Commitment .Following an Insanity 
Acquittal, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606 and nn. 4-6 
( 1981) . ~ 19 States commit insanity acqui ttees under 
the same procedures used for civil commitment. Id., at 
605 n. 4. It appears that only one State has enacted into 
law the Court's new requirement that a committed insanity 
acquittee be released following expiration of his maximum 
criminal sentence. See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §53a-47(b) 
(West Supp. 1982). 
24. 
commitment up to the date on which a sentence would have 
expired." Ante, at 22 n. 36. The possibility thus 
remains that after some unspecified period of commitment 
the Government will be required to release even the most 
violent insanity acquittees. Indeed, under its opinion 
today, the Court conceivably could conclude that automatic 
commitment of insanity acquittees itself is 
unconstitutional. 
In short, this decision casts serious doubt on 
government's authority to act upon the widely and 
reasonably held view that insanity acquittees constitute a 
special class that should be treated differently from 
other candidates for commitment. In my view, these 
problems confirm the wisdom of our observation that 
"[w)hen Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with 
25. 
medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options 
must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not 
to rewrite legislation II Marshall v. United States, 
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DRAFT NO. 1 (Court op.)Jones v. United States, No. 81-5195 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether petitioner, who was 
committed to a mental hospital upon being acquitted of a 
criminal offense by reason of insanity, must be released 
because he has been hospitalized for a period longer than 
he might have served in prison had he been convicted. 
I 
In the District of Columbia a criminal defendant may 
not be acquitted by reason of insanity unless his insanity 
is "affirmatively established by a preponderance of the 
evidence." D.C. Code §24-30l(j) (1981) •1 If he 
1section 24-30l(j) provides: 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Zlf 
2. 
successfully invokes the insanity defense, he is committed 
to a mental hospital. §24-30l(d) (1) • 2 The statute 
provides several ways of obtaining release. Within 50 
r;t.,ra:;e. 
days of commitment the acquittee is entitled to a hearing v 
I\ 
"Insanity shall not be a defense in any criminal 
proceeding in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia or in the Superior Court of the 
District of Columbia, unless the accused or his attorney 
in such proceeding, at the time the accused enters his 
plea of not guilty or within fifteen days thereafter or at 
such later time as the court may for good cause permit, 
files with the court and serves upon the prosecuting 
attorney written notice of his intention to rely on such 
defense. No person accused of an offense shall be 
acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time of 
its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who 
raises the issue, is affirmatively established by a 
preponderance of the evidence." 
2section 24-301 (d) (1) provides: 
"If any person tried upon an indictment or information 
for an offense raises the defense of insanity and is 
acquitted solely on the ground that he was insane at the 
time of its commission, he shall be committed to a 
hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is 
eligible for release pursuant to this subsection or 
subsection (e) ." 
Under this provision, automatic commitment is permissible 
only if the defendant himself raised the insanity defense. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 91-907, p. 74 (1970); Lynch v. 
Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962). 
3. 
to determine his eligibility for release, at which he has 
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous. §24-
30l(d) (2) . 3 If he fails to meet this burden at the 50-day 
hearing, the committed acquittee subsequently may be 
3section 24-30l(d) (2) provides in relevant part: 
"(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) shall 
have a hearing, unless waived, within 50 days of his 
confinement to determine whether he is entitled to release 
from custody •••• 
(B) If the hearing is not waived, the court shall cause 
notice of the hearing to be served upon the person, his 
counsel, and the prosecuting attorney and hold the 
hearing. Within ten days from the date the hearing was 
begun, the court shall determine the issues and make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect 
thereto. The per son confined shall have the burden o'f 
proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the person confined is entitled to his 
release from custody, either conditional or unconditional, 
the court shall enter such order as may appear 
appropriate. " 
The statute does not specify the standard for determining 
release, but the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
held in this case that, as in release proceedings under 
§24-301 (e) and §21-545 (b), the confined person must show 
that he is either no longer mentally ill or no longer 
dangerous to himself or others. See 432 A.2d 364, 372 and 
n. 16 (1981) (en bane). 
4. 
released, with court approval, upon certification of his 
recovery by the hospital chief of service. §24-30l(e) • 4 
Alternatively, the acquittee is entitled to a judicial 
4section 24-30l(e) provides in relevant part: 
"Where any per son has been confined in a hospital for 
the mentally ill pursuant to subsection (d) of this 
section, and the superintendent of such hospital certifies 
(1) that such person has recovered his sanity, (2) that, 
in the opinion of the superintendent, such person will not 
in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or 
others, and (3) in the opinion of the superintendent, the 
person is entitled to unconditional release from the 
hospital, and such certificate is filed with the clerk of 
the court in which the per son was tried, and a copy 
thereof served on the United States Attorney or the 
Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, whichever 
office prosecuted the accused, such certificate shall be 
sufficient to authorize the court to order the 
unconditional release of the person so confined from 
further hospitalization at the expiration of fifteen days 
from the time said certificate was filed and served as 
above; but the court in its discretion may, or upon the 
objection of the United States or the District of Columbia 
shall, after due notice, hold a hearing at which evidence 
as to the mental condition of the person so confined may 
be submitted, including the testimony of one or more 
psychiatrists from said hospital. The court shall weigh 
the evidence and, if the court finds that such person has 
recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future 
be dangerous to himself or others, the court shall order 
such person unconditionally released from further 
confinement in said hospital. If the court does not so 
find, the court shall order such person returned to said 
hospital. • •• " 
5. 
hearing every six months at which he may establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to 
release. §24-30l{k). 5 
Independent of its provision for the commitment of 
insanity acquittees, the District of Columbia also has 
adopted a civil-commitment procedure, under which an 
5section 24-30l{k) provides in relevant part: 
"{l) A person in custody or conditionally released from 
custody, pursuant to the prov1s1ons of this section, 
claiming the right to be released from custody, the right 
to any change in the conditions of his release, or other 
relief concerning his custody, may move the court having 
jurisdiction to order his release, to release him from 
custody, to change the conditions of his release, or to 
grant other relief •••• 
(3) ••• On all issues raised by his motion, the person 
shall have the burden of proof. If the court finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the person is entitled 
to his release from custody, either conditional or 
unconditional, a change in the conditions of his release, 
or other relief, the court shall enter such order as may 
appear appropriate •••• 
(5) A court shall not be required to entertain a 2nd or 
successive motion for relief under this section more often 
than once every 6 months. A court for good cause shown 
may in its discretion entertain such a motion more often 
than once every 6 months." 
6. 
individual may be committed upon clear and convincing 
proof by the Government that he is mentally ill and likely 
to injure himself or others. §21-545(b) •6 The individual 
may demand a jury in the civil-commitment proceeding. 
§21-544. Once committed, a patient may be released at any 
time upon certification of recovery by the hospital chief 
of service. §§21-546, 21-548. Alternatively, the patient 
is entitled after the first 90 days, and subsequently at 
6-month intervals, to request a judicial hearing at which 
6section 24-545(b) provides in relevant part: 
"If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally 
ill and, because of that illness, likely to injure himself 
or other persons if allowed to remain at liberty, the 
court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate 
period, or order any other alternative course of treatment 
which the court believes will be in the best interests of 
the person or of the public." 
See In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 1233 (DC 1979) (reading into 
the statute the due process requirement of "clear and 
convincing" proof). 
7. 
he may gain his release by proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or 
dangerous. §21-546, 21-547: see Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 
5 8 9 , 5 9 8 ( CADC 19 7 0 } • 
II 
On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested for 
attempting to steal a jacket from a department store. The 
next day he was arraigned in the District of Columbia 
Superior Court on a charge of attempted petit larceny, a 
misdemeanor punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one 
year. §§22-103, 22-2202. The court ordered petitioner 
committed to St. Elizabeths, a public hospital for the 
mentally ill, for a determination of his competency to 
stand trial. 7 On March 2, 1976, a hospital psychologist 
Footnote(s} 7 will appear on following pages. 
'• 
8. 
submitted a report to the court stating that petitioner 
was competent to stand trial, that petitioner suffered 
from "Schizophrenia, paranoid type," and that petitioner's 
alleged offense was "the product of his mental disease." 
Record 51. The court ruled that petitioner was competent 
to stand trial. Petitioner subsequently decided to plead 
not guilty by reason of insanity. The Government did not 
contest the plea, and it entered into a stipulation of 
facts with petitioner. On March 12, 1976, the Superior 
Court found petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity 
and committed him to St. Elizabeths pursuant to §24-
7 Section 2 4-301 {a) authorizes the court to "order 
the accused committed to the District of Columbia General 
Hospital or other mental hospital designated by the court, 
for such reasonable period as the court may determine for 
examination and observation and for care and treatment if 





301 (d) (1). 
On May 25, 1976, the court held the 50-day hearing 
required by §24-30l(d) (2) (A). A psychologist from St. 
Elizabeths testified on behalf of the Government that, in 
the opinion of the staff, petitioner continued to suffer 
from paranoid schizophrenia and that "because his illness 
is still quite active, he is still a danger to himself and 
to others." Record 9. Petitioner's counsel conducted a 
brief cross-examination, and presented no evidence. 8 The 
court then found that "the defendant-patient is mentally 
ill and as a result of his mental illness, at this time, 
he constitutes a danger to himself and others." Id., at 
8Petitioner's counsel seemed 
about obtaining a transfer for 
restrictive wing of the hospital. 
concerned primarily 
petitioner to a less 




13. Petitioner was returned to St. Elizabeths. 
Petitioner obtained new counsel and, following some 
~ t sd: fe l n· 
procedural confusion, a release hearing purstlanl Lo 
:ait-
3~as held on February 22, 1977. Petitioner 
demanded that he be released unconditionally or 
recommitted pursuant to the civil-commitment standards in 
§21-545(b), including a jury trial and proof by clear and 
convincing evidence of his mental illness and 
dangerousness. The Superior Court denied petitioner's 
request for a civil-commitment hearing, reaffirmed the 
1q7~ 
findings made at the May 25, hearing, and continued 
I\ 
petitioner's commitment to St. Elizabeths. 
Petitioner appealed to the District of Colu bia Court 
of Appeals. A panel of the court affirmre Superior 
.,. 
, .. / 
Court, 396 A.2d 183 (1978), but the · ·granted rehearing and 
11. 
reversed, 411 A.2d 624 (1980). Finally, the court heard 
the case en bane and affirmed the judgment of the Superior 
Court. 432 A.2d 364 (1981). The Court of Appeals 
rejected the argument "that the length of the prison 
sentence [petitioner] might have received determines when 
he is entitled to release or civil commitment under Title 
24 of the D.C. Code." Id., at 368. It then held that the 
various differences between civil commitment and 
commitment of insanity acquittees were justified under the 
equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Id., 
at 371-376. 




It is clear that "commitment for any purpose 
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that 
requires due process protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 
u.s. 418, 425 (1979). Therefore, a State must have "a 
constitutionally adequate purpose for the confinement." ~ 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 (1975). Congress 
has determined that a person found not guilty by reason of 
insanity is mentally ill and dangerous and therefore 
should be committed indefinitely to a mental institution 
for treatment and the protection of society. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970); Jones v. United States, 
432 A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory 
scheme for commitment of insane criminals is ••• a 
regulatory, prophylactic statute, based on a legitimate 
governmental interest in protecting society and 
, . '
13. 
rehabilitating mental patients"). Petitioner does not 
contest the Government's authority to commit a mentally 
ill and dangerous person indefinitely to a mental 
institution, but rather contends that "the petitioner's 
trial was not a constitutionally adequate hearing to 
justify an indefinite commitment." Brief for Petitioner 
14. 
Petitioner's argument rests principally on Addington 
v. Texas, supra, in which the Court held that the Due 
Process Clause requires the Government in a civil-
commitment proceeding to demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill 
and dangerous. 441 U.S., at 426-427. Petitioner contends 
that these due-process standards were not met in his case 
because the judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity 
' ~ . 
14. 
did not constitute a finding of present mental illness and 
dangerousness and because it was established only by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 9 Petitioner then concludes 
9 rn the Court of Appeals petitioner apparently 
based these arguments on equal protection rather than due 
process, arguing that it was irrational for the Government 
to deny him a civil-commitment hearing at which the 
Government bore the burden of proof by clear and 
convincing evidence. See 432 A.2d, at 371. Both 
petitioner and the Government acknowledge that this equal 
protection argument essentially duplicates petitioner's 
due process argument. That is, if the Due Process Clause 
does not require that an insanity acquittee be given the 
particular procedural safeguards provided in a civil-
commitment hearing under Addington, then there necessarily 
is a rational basis for equal protection purposes for 
distinguishing between civil commitment and commitment of 
insanity acquittees. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 22-
23; Brief for Government 55. We agree, and therefore 
address petitioner's arguments in terms of the Due Process 
Clause. 
Petitioner does raise one additional equal protection 
argument that stands on its own. The District of Columbia 
provides for a jury at civil-commitment hearings, see §21-
544, and petitioner contends that equal protection 
requires that insanity acquittees also be permitted to 
demand a jury at the 50-day hearing. Because we determine 
that an acquittee's commitment is based on the judgment of 
insanity at the criminal trial, rather than solely on the 
findings at the 50-day hearing, see infra, at __ , the 
relevant equal protection comparison concerns the 
procedures available at the criminal trial and at a civil-
commitment hearing. We therefore agree with the Court of 
Appeals that the absence of a jury at the 50-day hearing 
"is justified by the fact that the acqui ttee has had a 
Footnote continued on next page. 
' ' 
15. 
that the Government's only conceivably legitimate 
justification for automatic commitment is to ensure that 
insanity acquittees do not escape confinement entirely, 
and that this interest can justify commitment at most for 
a period equal to the maximum prison sentence the 
acquittee could have received if convicted. Because 
petitioner has been hospitalized for longer than the one 
year he might have served in prison, he asserts that he 
should be released unconditionally or recommitted under 
the civil-commitment procedures. 10 
right to a jury determination of his sanity at the time of 
the offense." 432 A.2d, at 373. 
10 rt is important to note what issues are not raised 
in this case. Petitioner has not sought appellate review 
of the Superior Court's findings in 1976 and 1977 that he 
remained mentally ill and dangerous, and, indeed, the 
record does not indicate that since 1977 he ever has 
sought a release hearing--a hearing to which he was 
entitled every six months 
or are w as e to decide whether the District's 
Footnote continued on next page. 
16. 
A 
We turn first to the question whether the finding of 
insanity at the criminal trial is sufficiently probative 
of mental illness and dangerousness to justify commitment. 
A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes 
two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that 
constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the 
procedures for release are constitutional. As noted 
above, see supra, at 2-4, the basic standard for release 
is the same under either civil commitment or commitment 
following acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual 
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he no 
longer is dangerous or mentally ill. There is an 
important difference, however, in the release provisions 
for these two groups. A patient who was committed civilly 
is entitled to unconditional release upon certification of 
his recovery by the hospital chief of service, see §21-
546, whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be 
released upon such certification only with court approval, 
see §24-30l(e). Neither of these provisions is before the 
Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy 
of the release standards generally nor the disparity in 
treatment of insanity acquittees and other committed 
persons. See Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d, at 373, n. 
19. 
act because of mental illness. Congress has determined 
that these findings constitute an adequate basis for 
7 
17. 
hospitalizing the acquittee as a dang~rous and mentally 7 
ill person. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, at 73 
("Where [the] accused has pleaded insanity as a defense to 
a crime, and the jury has found that the defendant was, in 
fact, insane at the time the crime was committed, it is 
just and reasonable in the Committee's opinion that the 
insanity, once established, should be presumed to continue 
and that the accused should automatically be confined for 
treatment until it can be shown that he has recovered. S. 
Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955); H. Rept 
No. 892, 84th Congress, 1st Sess. 13 (1955) ."). We cannot 
say that it was unreasonable and therefore 
unconstitutional for Congress to make this determination. 
' 
The fact that a person has been found, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act 




concrete evidence generally may be at least as persuasive 
as any predictions about dangerousness that might be made 
in a civil-commitment proceeding. 12 We do not agree with 
11The proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 1 
acquittee committed a criminal act distinguishes this case ~ 
from Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972}, in which the ~ 
Court held that a person found incompetent to stand trial \ 
could not be committed indefinitely solely on the basis of 
1 the finding of incompetency. In Jackson there never was any affirmative proof that the accused had committed criminal acts or otherwise was dangerous. ~ 
12 In attacking the predictive value of the insanity i 
acquittal, petitioner complains that '[w]hen Congress 
enacted the present statutory scheme, it did not cite any 
empirical evidence indicating that mentally ill persons 
who have committed a er iminal act are likely to commit 
additional dangerous acts in the future." Reply Brief for .j 
Petitioner 13. He further argues that the available 
research fails to support the predictive value of prior 
dangerous acts. See id., at 13-14. We do not agree with 
the suggestion that Congress' power to legislate in this 
area depends on the research conducted by the psychiatric 
community. We have recognized repeatedly the "uncertainty 
of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of 
professional judgment. The only thing that can be said 
Footnote continued on next page. 
J 
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petitioner's suggestion that the requisite dangerousness 
is not established by proof that a person committed a 
nonviolent crime against property constitutes a danger to 
society. This Court never has held that "violence," 
however that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for 
a constitutional commitment. 13 
about the present state of knowledge and therapy regarding 
mental disease is that science has not reached finality of 
judgment •••• " Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 
375 (1956). See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 472 
(1981); Addington, 441 U.S., at 429-430; Powell v. Texas, 
392 U.S. 514, 535-537 (1968) (opinion of MARSHALL, J.). 
The lesson we have drawn is not that government may not 
act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that we 
should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative 
judgments. 
13see Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861 
(CADC 1961) (Burger, J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of 
watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to confuse 
danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent 
than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the 
purpose of the statute is the same as to both.") (footnote 
omitted). It also may be noted that er imes of theft 
frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the 
er iminal to escape or the victim to protect property or 
the police to apprehend the fleeing criminal. 
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular 
individual, of course, should be a consideration at the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Nor can we say that it was unreasonable for Congress 
to determine that the insanity acquittal supports an 
inference of continuing mental illness. It comports with 
common sense to conclude that someone whose mental illness 
was sufficient to lead ~mmit a criminal act is J/"" 
likely to remain ill and in need of treatment. The 
precise evidentiary force of the insanity acquittal, of 
course, may vary from case to case, but the Due Process 
release hearings. In this context, it is noteworthy that 
petitioner's continuing commitment may well rest in 
significant part on evidence independent of his acquittal 
by reason of insanity of the er ime of attempted larcel'.lY'• 
In December 1976 a medical officer at St. Elizabeth's 
reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted 
suicide." Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one 
point was transferred to the civil division of the 
hospital, but was transferred back to the forensic 
division because of disruptive behavior. 432 A. 2d, at 
368 n. 6. The Government also advises that after 
petitioner was released unconditionally following the 
second panel decision below, he had to be recommitted on 
an emergency civil basis two weeks later for conduct 
unrelated to the original commitment. See Brief for 
United States at 15 n. 18. 
21. 
Clause does not require Congress to make classifications 
that fit every individual with the same degree of 
relevance. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 
428 (1974). Because a hearing is provided within 50 days 
of the commitment, there is assurance that every acquittee 
has prompt opportunity to obtain release if he has 
recovered. 
Petitioner also argues that, whatever the evidentiary 
value of the insanity acquittal, the Government lacks a 
legitimate reason for committing insanity acquittees 
automatically because it can introduce the insanity 
acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding. 
This argument fails to consider the Government's strong 
interest in avoiding the need to conduct a de novo 
commitment hearing following every insanity acquittal--a 
22. 
hearing at which a jury trial may be demanded, §21-545, 
and at which the Government bears the burden of proof by 
clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing on the 
critical question of whether the acquittee has recovered, 
the new proceeding likely would have to relitigate much of 
~ ~ 
the criminal trial. These problems g-i,,,¥e the Government~ 
"1 
important interest in automatic commitment. See Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 u.s. 319, 348 (1976). We therefore 
conclude that a finding of not guilty by reason of 
insanity is a sufficient foundation for commitment of an 
insanity acquittee for the purposes of treatment and the 
protection of society. 
B 
Petitioner next contends that his indefinite 
commitment is unconstitutional because the proof of his 
23. 
insanity was based only on a preponderance of the 
evidence, as compared to Addington's civil-commitment 
requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence. ~ 
f;)"Believe thetj/,, equating these situations, petitioner 
ignores important differences between the class of 
potential civil commitment candidates and the class of 
insanity acquittees that justify differing standards of 
proof. The Addington Court expressed particular concern 
that members of the public could be confined on the basis 
of "some abnormal behavior which might be perceived by 
some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but 
which is in fact within a range of conduct that is 
generally acceptable." 441 U.S., at 426-427. See also 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S., at 575. In view of this 
concern, the Court deemed it inappropriate to ask the 
24. 
individual "to share equally society the risk of 
error." Addington, 441 U.S., But since automatic 
commitment under §24-30l(d) (i) 
0.JijiL4.,.._~c..11""1L.-,l aA,.. a.., ~/~c..4.--<_. I 
acguittee himself a-.gug~ and proves that t-l¼,e act was a 
product of his mental illness, 14 see Lynch v. Overholser, 
C 
-3-6~ U.&. 705 (1962), there is good reason for diminished 
concern as to the risk of error. 15 More important, the 
proof that he committed a criminal act as a result of 
mental illness eliminates the risk that he is being 
14see n. 2, supra. In this case petitioner 
stipulated that he had committed the offense by reason of 
insanity. 
15That petitioner raised the insanity defense also 
diminishes the significance of the deprivation. The 
Addington Court noted that the social stigma of civil 
commitment "can have a very significant impact on the 
individual." 441 U.S., at 426. A criminal defendant who 
successfully raises the insanity defense necessarily is 
stigmatized by the verdict itself, and thus the commitment 
causes little additional harm in this respect. 
25. 
committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior," Addington, 
supra, at 427. A criminal act by definition is not 
"within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 
Id., at 426-427. 
We therefore conclude that concerns critical to our 
decision in Addington are diminished or absent in the case 
of insanity acquittees. Accordingly, there is no reason 
for adopting the same standard of proof in both cases. 
"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands." 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The 
preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due 
process for commitment of insanity acquittees. 16 
16A defendant could be required to prove his 
insanity by a higher standard than a preponderance of the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
26. 
C 
The remaining question is whether petitioner 
nonetheless is entitled to his release because he has been 
hospitalized for a period longer than he could have been 
incarcerated if convicted. The Due Process Clause 
requires that "the nature and duration of commitment bear 
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the 
individual is committed." Jackson v. Indiana, 406 u.s. 
715, 738 (1972). The purpose of commitment following an 
insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to 
treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and 
evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952). 
Such an additional requirement hardly would benefit a 
criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity 
defense, yet imposition of a higher standard would be the 
likely legislative response to a holding that an insanity 
acquittal could support automatic commitment only if the 
verdict were supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
27. 
society from his potential dangerousness. The committed 
acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his 
sanity or when he is no longer dangerous. See O'Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U.S., at 575-576; Jones v. United States, 
432 A.2d, at 372, and n.16; H.R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-
74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how 
long it will take for any given individual to recover--or 
indeed whether he ever will recover--Congress has chosen, 
as it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the 
length of commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic 
review of the patient's suitability for release. 
In light of the congressional purposes underlying 
commitment of insanity acquittees, we think petitioner 
clearly errs in contending that an acquittee's 
hypothetical maximum sentence provides the constitutional 
28. 
limit for his commitment. A particular sentence of 
incarceration is chosen to reflect society's view of the 
proper response to commission of a particular criminal 
offense, based on a variety of considerations such as 
retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. See, e.g., 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-186 {1976) {opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 {1963); Williams v. New York, 
337 U.S. 241, 248-249 {1949). The State may punish a 
person convicted of a crime even if satisfied that he is 
unlikely to commit further crimes. 
Different considerations underlie commitment of an 
insanity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not 
be punishea. 17 His confinement rests on his continuing 
Footnote{s) 17 will appear on following pages. 
29. 
illness and dangerousness. Thus, under the District of 
Columbia statute, no matter how serious the act committed 
by the acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his 
acquittal if he has recovered. In contrast, one who 
committed a less serious act may be confined for a longer 
period if he remains ill and dangerous. There simply is 
no necessary correlation between severity of the offense 
and length of time necessary for recovery. The length of 
the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore 
is irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment. 18 
17As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]ociety may 
not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior because of his 
insanity and at the same time punish him for invoking an 
insanity defense." 432 A. 2d, at 369. 
18The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may 
be treated involuntarily for particular psychiatric 
problems, but that upon expiration of his prison sentence 
he may be committed only as would any other candidate for 
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent 
Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972}; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 





We hold that when a criminal defendant establishes by 
a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a 
crime by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the 
Government, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to 
U.S. 504 (1972): Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
None of those cases involved an insanity acqui ttee, and 
none suggested that a person under non-criminal 
confinement could not be confined in excess of the period 
for which he could have served in prison if convicted for 
the dangerous acts he had committed. 
The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal 
sanction to determine the length of a therapeutic 
confinement is manifested by petitioner's failure to 
suggest any clear guidelines for deciding when a patient 
must be released. For example, he does not suggest 
whether the Due Process Clause would require States to 
limit commitment of insanity acquittees to maximum 
sentences or minimum sentences. Nor does he explain what 
should be done in the case of indeterminate sentencing or 
suggest whether account would have to be taken of the 
availability of release time or the possibility of parole. 
And petitioner avoids entirely the important question of 
how his theory would apply to those persons who committed 
especially serious er iminal acts. Petitioner thus would 
leave the States to speculate how they may deal 
constitutionally with acqui ttees who might have received 
life imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility 
of parole, or the death penalty. 
31. 
confine him to a mental institution until such time as 
~~ 
has regained his sanity 9-l" is no longer a danger to 
" 
himself or society. This holding accords with the widely 
and reasonably held view that insanity acquittees 
constitute a special class that should be treated 
differently from other candidates for commitment. 19 We 
have observed before that "[w]hen Congress undertakes to 
act in areas fraught with medical and scientific 
uncertainties, legislative options must be especially 
19A recent survey of commitment statutes reported 
that 14 jurisdictions provide auto~atic commitment for at 
least some insanity acqui ttees, while many other States 
have a variety of special methods of commiting insanity 
acqui ttees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity 
Acquittal, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606, and nn. 4-6 
(1981). Nineteen States commit insanity acquittees under 
the same procedures used for civil commitment. Id., at 
605 n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into 
law petitioner's suggested requirement that a committed 
insanity acquittee be released following expiration of his 
maximum criminal sentence. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a-
47 (b) (Supp. 1981). 
32. 
broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite 
legislation. " Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 
417, 427 {1974). This admonition has particular force in 
the context of legislative efforts to deal with the 
special problems raised by the insanity defense. 
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court holds that petitioner, who was committed to a 
mental hospital upon being acquitted of a criminal offense by 
reason of insanity , must be released because he has been 
hospitalized for a period longer than he might have served in 
prison had he been convicted. If the Government seeks to 
recommit petitioner, it must comply with the civil-commit-
ment standards set forth in Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 
418 (1979). I do not think that the Constitution forbids w / 
~ vernm,ent ±o--~l"98eribe indefinite commitment as a means 
CJ of dealing with the special problems raised by the insanity de-
fense. I therefore dissent. 
I 
In the District of Columbia, an individual may be commit-
ted civilly upon clear and convincing proof by the Govern-
ment that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or oth-
ers. D.C. Code Ann. § 21-545 (1981); see In re Nelson, 408 
A. 2d 1233 (DC 1979). He may be released upon certification 
by the hospital chief of service. § 21-546. Alternatively, 
the patient is entitled after the first 90 days, and subse-
quently at six-month intervals, to request a judicial hearing 
at which he may gain his release by proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that he no longer is mentally ill or dan-
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A second type of involuntary commitment follows success-
ful invocation of the insanity defense. If a criminal defend-
ant is acquitted by reason of insanity-a verdict that requires 
that his insanity be "affirmatively established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence," § 24-301(j}-he is committed to a 
mental hospital. § 24-301(d)(l). He may be released, with 
court approval, upon certification by the hospital chief of 
service. § 24-301(e). Alternatively, the committed insanity 
acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing within 50 days, and 
thereafter at six-month intervals, at which he may prove, in 
the same manner as a civilly committed person, that he is en-
titled to release. §§ 24-30l(d)(2), (k); see Jones v. United 
States, 432 A. 2d 364, 372, and n. 16 (DC 1981) (en bane). 
Petitioner was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital upon 
being acquitted of attempted petit larceny by reason of insan-
ity. At two subsequent hearings the District of Columbia 
Superior Court found that he remained mentally ill and dan-
gerous. The correctness of those findings is not before us, 
as petitioner did not challenge them on appeal. 1 Nor are we 
asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release 
from confinement are constitutional. 2 Nor, indeed, does pe-
1 Petitioner, who urges that he has been confined unconstitutionally 
since 1977, seeks his release solely on the legal arguments raised in this 
case. Petitioner has not sought judicial review of the Superior Court's 
findings in 1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, nor 
does the record indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release hear-
ing-a hearing to which he was entitled every six months. On this record 
there is nothing to suggest that petitioner now is any less ill or dangerous 
than he was in 1976. See n. 5 infra. 
2 As discussed above, the basic standard for release is the same under 
either civil commitment or commitment following acquittal by reason of in-
sanity: the individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he no longer is dangerous or mentally ill. There is one important differ-
ence, however, in the release provisions for these two groups. A patient 
who was committed civilly is entitled to unconditional release upon certi-
fication of his recovery by the hospital chief of service, § 21-546, whereas a 
committed insanity acquittee may be released upon such certification only 
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titioner challenge his automatic commitment following his in-
sanity acquittal. All petitioner contends is that he must be 
released because he has been committed for a period longer 
than the duration of his hypothetical maximum criminal 
sentence. 
II 
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 425. There-
fore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate purpose 
for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 
563, 57 4 (1975). A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity 
establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that 
would constitute a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the 
act because of mental illness. Congress has determined that 
a person as to whom those two findings were made is men-
tally ill and dangerous and therefore should be committed to 
a mental institution for treatment and the protection of soci-
ety. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970). Peti-
tioner concedes that this was one congressional purpose, see 
Brief for Petitioner at 9, and n. 4, and he does not challenge 
his original commitment. 
The Due Process Clause also requires that "the nature and 
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the 
purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of commit-
ment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commit-
ment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect 
him and society from his potential dangerousness. See 432 
A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory scheme 
for commitment of insane· criminals is . . . · a regulatory, pro-
with court approval. § 24--301(e). Neither of these provisions is before 
the Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy of the release 
standards generally nor the disparity in treatment of insanity acquittees 
and other committed persons. 
4 
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phylactic statute, based on a legitimate governmental inter-
est in protecting society and rehabilitating mental pa-
tients."). The committed acquittee is entitled to release 
when he has recovered his sanity or when he is no longer dan-
gerous. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575-576; 
432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 
73-74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how 
long it will take for any given individual to recover-or in-
deed whether he ever will recover-Congress has chosen, as 
it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of 
commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the 
patient's suitability for release. 
The Court holds, however, that such an "indefinite commit-
ment" of insanity acquittees is unconstitutional. Ante, at 21. 
In the Court's view, automatic commitment of insanity 
acquittees may be justified at most "for a limited period of 
time, in no event exceeding the term for which an insanity 
acquittee could have been incarcerated had he been convicted 
of the crime with which he was charged." Id., at 22 (foot-
note omitted). I do not agree either that an indefinite com-
mitment is invalid or that the acquittee's hypothetical prison 
sentence has any relevance to the length of his commitment. 
III 
A 
In finding that an indefinite commitment is not constitu-
tional, the Court emphasizes the difference between an insan-
ity verdict based on a preponderance of the evidence and 
Addington's requirement for civil commitment of proof by 
clear and convincing evidence. See ante, at 14-16. It is not 
clear why this difference is relevant to the permissible dura-
tion of the commitment. If, as petitioner concedes in this 
case, an insanity acquittal based on a preponderance of the 
evidence may justify automatic commitment, no reason has 
been suggested why the difference in level of proof for com-
81-5195---DISSENT 
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mitment has any further significance. The purposes of the 
commitment-treatment of the patient and protection of the 
patient and society-are reasonably served in both situations 
by an indeterminate length of confinement. This case does 
not present the question as to the proper level of proof for 
determining release. 
In any event, the Court ignores important differences be-
tween the class of potential civil commitment candidates and 
the class of insanity acquittees that justify differing stand-
ards of proof. The Addington Court expressed particular 
concern that members of the public could be confined on the 
basis of "some abnormal behavior which might be perceived 
by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, 
but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is generally 
acceptable." 441 U. S., at 426-427. See also O'Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575. In view of this concern, the 
Court deemed it inappropriate to ask the individual "to share 
equally with society the risk of error." Addington, 441 
U. S., at 427. But since automatic commitment under 
§ 24-301(d)(i) follows only if the acquittee himself argues and 
proves that the act was a product of his mental illness, see 
Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962), there is good rea-
son for diminished concern as to the risk of error. 3 More im-
portant, the proof that he committed a criminal act as a result 
of mental illness eliminates the risk that he is being commit-
ted for mere "idiosyncratic behavior," Addington, supra, at 
427. A criminal act by definition is not "within a range of 
conduct that is generally acceptable." Id., at 426-427. 
"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protec-
3 That petitioner raised the insanity defense also diminishes the signifi-
cance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social 
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the indi-
vidual." 441 U. S., at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises 
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and 
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect. 
6 
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tions as the particular situation demands," Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of 
the evidence standard comports with due process for commit-
ment of insanity acquittees. 4 
B 
In rejecting indefinite commitment for insanity acquittees, 
the Court also contends that an insanity acquittal "is back-
ward-looking, focusing only on one moment in the past," 
ante, at 16, and that "§ 301 fails to reflect the commonsense 
truth that some crimes are more indicative of dangerousness 
than others." Ibid. Again, I do not think these arguments 
bear on the validity of an indefinite commitment. If the in-
sanity acquittal provides an insufficient foundation for a find-
ing of mental illness and dangerousness, then any automatic 
commitment following an insanity acquittal would be pre-
cluded. If, on the other hand, the insanity acquittal may 
support automatic commitment, as petitioner has conceded in 
this case, then the duration of that commitment should be de-
termined by reference to its purpose: treatment and confine-
ment of a dangerously insane person until he has recovered. 
Nor am I persuaded by the Court's suggestion that com-
mission of a nonviolent criminal act such as attempted lar-
ceny is an insufficient indication of dangerousness. This 
Court never has held that "violence," however that term 
might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitutional com-
mitment. 5 Nor was it unreasonable for Congress to deter-
• A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher stand-
ard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an ,additional requirement hardly would bene-
fit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet impo-
sition of a higher standard would be the likely result of a holding that an 
insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only if the verdict 
were supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
• See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F. 2d 852, 861 (CADC 1961) (Burger, 
J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to 
confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder 
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mine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference of con-
tinuing mental illness. The Due Process Clause does not 
require Congress to make classifications that fit every indi-
vidual with the same degree of relevance. 6 By providing a 
hearing only 50 days after the commitment, Congress has en-
sured that every acquittee has an immediate opportunity to 
obtain release if he has recovered. 7 
or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the 
same as to both.") (footnote omitted). It also may be noted that crimes of 
theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the criminal to 
escape or the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the flee-
ing criminal. 
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual of course should 
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is notewor-
thy that petitioner's continuing commitment apparently does not rest 
solely on the evidence relating to his acquittal by reason of insanity of the 
crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St. 
Elizabeth's reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide." 
Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was transferred to the civil 
division of the hospital, but was transferred back to the forensic division 
because of disruptive behavior. 432 A. 2d, at 368 n. 6. The Government 
also advises that after petitioner was released unconditionally following the 
second panel decision below, he had to recommitted on an emergency civil 
basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to the original commitment. 
See Brief for United States at 15 n. 18. 
•For example, in Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974), we 
upheld a congressional decison to exclude from a program of discretionary 
rehabilitative commitment, in lieu of penal incarceration, drug addicts with 
two or more prior felony convictions. The Court noted that the legislative 
decision was not "unreasonable or irrational," id., at 428, and rejected the 
dissent's reliance on the fact that the statutory distinction deprived every 
addict in that particular class "of the opportunity even to be considered for 
treatment for his disease." Id., at 432 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We 
recognized that a discretionary' system would have been permissible, but 
concluded that "legislative classifications need not be perfect or ideal." 
Id., at 428. 
1 The Court suggests that the Government lacks a legitimate reason for 
committing insanity acquittees automatically because the Government can 
introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civil proceed-
ing. See ante, at 17. This argument fails to consider the Government's 
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C 
The Court completes its analysis by suggesting that there 
may be a constitutional problem with indefinite commitment 
generally. The Court states that an insanity acquittal con-
stitutionally may support only a limited commitment because 
"the passage of time erodes the likelihood" that the acquittee 
will repeat his dangerous act. Ante, at 15-16. To the ex-
tent this is likely, it would be equally true with respect to a 
person committed civilly pursuant to Addington. The dan-
gerous acts that led to his civil commitment at some point 
may no longer justify continued confinement. For this rea-
son, Congress has provided periodic release hearings to en-
sure that the person is released upon recovery. The Court, 
however, without a specific holding, casts doubt on the con-
stitutional sufficiency of these procedures: "[W]e cannot ig-
nore the adverse effect extended institutionalization may 
have on an individual's ability to prove that he is no longer 
mentally ill and dangerous, both because it deprives him of 
the economic wherewithal to obtain independent medical 
judgments and because the treatment he receives may make 
it difficult for him to show he has recovered." Id., at 16 
(footnote omitted). 
The Court thus appears to imply that the Constitution may 
require that every committed patient be released at some un-
specified point without regard to his recovery. No authority 
is cited that would support this far-reaching suggestion, and 
until the issue is presented the Court should intimate no 
view. Petitioner has challenged neither the constitutionality 
ing following every insanity acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may 
be demanded, § 21-545, and at which the Government bears the burden of 
proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing on the critical 
question of whether the acquittee has recovered, the new proceeding likely 
would have to relitigate the criminal trial. These problems give the Gov-
ernment an important interest in automatic commitment. See Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976) . 
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of the District's release procedures nor the Superior Court's 
findings that he remained mentally ill and dangerous. See 
supra, at --, and n. 1. In suggesting that an indefinite 
commitment may be unconstitutional because of the inade-
quacy of release procedures, the Court has addressed an 
issue not before us. 
IV 
The error in the Court's conclusion that the duration of a 
commitment following an insanity acquittal must be "defi-
nite" is highlighted by its reliance on the acquittee's hypo-
thetical maximum sentence as a constitutional basis on which 
to limit the commitment. A particular sentence of incarcera-
tion is chosen to reflect society's view of the proper response 
to commission of a particular criminal offense, based on a va-
riety of considerations such as retribution, deterrence, and 
rehabilitation. See, e. g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 
183-186 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, 
JJ.); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 248-249 (1949). 
The State may punish a person convicted of a crime even if 
satisfied that he is unlikely to commit further crimes. 
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insan-
ity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be pun-
ished. 8 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and 
dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia stat-
ute, no matter how serious the act committed by the 
acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal 
if he has recovered. In contrast, one who committed a less 
serious act may be confined for a longer period if he remains 
8 One may doubt that the Court actually believes, as it professes to do 
for purposes of argument, that f'the Government conceivably has an inter-
est in confining insanity acquittees to punish them for their criminal acts." 
Ante, at 12 (footnote omitted). As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]o-
ciety may not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior because of his insan-
ity and at the same time punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432 
A. 2d, at 369. 
10 
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ill and dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation 
between severity of the offense and length of time necessary 
for recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical 
criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of 
his commitment. 9 
The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to de-
termine the length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested 
by the Court's failure to provide ~idance as to what lawfully 
( 
may be do~. The Court finds it easy to order petitioner's 
release because he has been confined for longer than one 
year, the maximum time he might have served in prison for 
I the act he committed. At the same time, however, the 
I Court leaves open the possibility that "statutory sentence re-
ductions or other sentencing factors" might need to be taken ---
1-t,;;..i..c~-v..--, ! r::.~:;:t42~:u~;::~~:::i/:~ii~;s / ~ 
mum sentences. minimum sentences.,.~ r likely sentences] 
' Nor does it suggest whether account must be taken of the ~ 
-------- availability of release time or the possibility of parole. And 
the Court ignores the fact that a criminal sentence does not 
always correspond to a "limited period of time ' 1 d., at 22. 
The States e left to speculate how they may deal constitu-
• The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involun-
tarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his 
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for 
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. 
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity 
acquittee, and none suggested that a person whose non-criminal commit-
ment was based on possibly criminal conduct could not be confined in ex-
cess of the period for which he could have served in prison if convicted for 
those acts. Similarly, despite the fact that the petitioner in Addington 
had engaged in "conduct that could have been the basis for criminal charges 
had the State chosen to prosecute," ante, at 15, the Court did not intimate 
that his commitment might have to be limited to the period of incarceration 
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tionally with acquittees who might have received life impris-
onment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or 
the death penalty. 
IV 
The Court's decision will cause uncertainty in the many 
States that commit insanity acquittees automatically or 
under lower standards than used for civil commitment, 10 for 
the Court simply has failed to identify a constitutional princi-
ple that can be applied consistently. --Petitione~s--reiease has 
been ordered because his hypothetical criminal sentence has 
expired. Yet criminal sentences may prove irrelevant, as 
the ourt pointedly refuses "to hold that the interests as-
erted by the Government in this case do in fact justify com-
mitment up to the date on which a sentence would have ex-
---pired." Ante, at 22 n. 36. The possibility thus remains that 
after some unspecified period of commitment the Govern-
ment will be required to release even the most violent insan-
ity acquittees. Indeed, under its opinion today, the Court 
conceivably could conclude that automatic commitment of in-
sanity acquittees itself is unconstitutional. 
n short, this decision casts serious doubt on government's 
authority to act upon the widely and reasonably held view 
that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should 
be treated differently from other candidates for commitment. 
In my view, these problems confirm the wisdom of our ob-
servation that "[ w ]hen Congress undertakes to act in areas 
10 A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions 
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while 
many other States have a variety of unique methods of commiting insanity 
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605--606, and nn. 4--6 (1981). Nineteen States commit 
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment. 
Id. , at 605 n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law the 
Court's new requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be released 
following expiration of his maximum criminal sentence. See Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 53a-47(b) (Supp. 1981) . 
12 
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fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative 
options must be especially broad and courts should be cau-
tious not to rewrite legislation .... " Marshall v. United 
States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). The Court should have 
heeded this admonition. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court holds that petitioner, who was committed to a 
mental hospital upon being acquitted of a criminal offense 
by reason of insanity, must be released because he has been 
hospitalized for a period longer than he might have 
served in prison had he been convicted. If the Government 
seeks to recommit petitioner, it must comply with the civil-
ommitment standards set forth in Addington v. Texas, 441 
U. S. 418 (1979). I do not think that the Constitution 
forbids indefinite commitment as a means of dealing with the 
special problems raised by the insanity defense. I there-
fore dissent. 
I 
In the District of Columbia, an individual may be commit-
ted civilly upon clear and, convincing proof by the Govern-
ment that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or oth-
ers. D.C. Code § 21-545 (1981); see In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 
1233 (DC 1979). He may be released upon certification of re-
covery by the hospital chief of service. §§ 21-546, 21-548. 
Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the first 90 days, 
and subsequently at six-month intervals, to request a judicial 
hearing at which he may gain his release by proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or 
dangerous. §§ 21-546, 21-547; see Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F. 
2 
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2d 589, 598 (CADC 1970). 
A second type of involuntary commitment follows success-
ful invocation of the insanity defense. If a criminal defend-
ant is acquitted by reason of insanity-a verdict that requires 
that his insanity be "affirmatively established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence," §24-301(j)-he is committed to a 
mental hospital. § 24-301(d)(l). He may be released, with 
court approval, upon certification by the hospital chief of 
service. § 24-301(e). Alternatively, the committed insanity 
acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing within 50 days, and 
thereafter at six-month intervals, at which he may prove, in 
the same manner as a civilly committed person, that he is en-
titled to release. §§ 24-301(d)(2), (k); see Jones v. United 
States, 432 A. 2d 364, 372, and n. 16 (DC 1981) (en bane). 
Petitioner was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital upon 
being acquitted of attempted petit larceny by reason of insan-
ity. At two subsequent hearings the District of Columbia 
Superior Court found that he remained mentally ill and dan-
gerous. The correctness of those findings is not before us, 
as petitioner did not challenge them on appeal. 1 Nor are we 
asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release 
from confinement are constitutional. 2 Nor, indeed, does pe-
1 Petitioner, who urges that he has been confined unconstitutionally 
since 1977, seeks his release solely on the legal arguments raised in this 
case. Petitioner has not sought judicial review of the Superior Court's 
findings in 1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, nor 
does the record indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release hear-
ing-a hearing to which he is entitled every six months. On this record 
there is nothing to suggest that petitioner now is any Jess ill or dangerous 
than he was in 1976. See n. 5, infra. 
2 As discussed above, the basic standard for release is the same under 
either civil commitment or commitment following acquittal by reason of in-
sanity: the individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he is no longer dangerous or mentally ill. There is one important differ-
ence, however, in the release provisions for these two groups. A patient 
who was committed civilly is entitled to unconditional release upon certi-
fication of his recovery by the hospital chief of service, §§ 21-546, 21-548 
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titioner challenge his automatic commitment following his in-
sanity acquittal. All petitioner contends is that he must be 
released because he has been committed for a period longer 
than the duration of his hypothetical maximum criminal 
sentence. 
II 
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 425. There-
fore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate purpose 
for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 
563, 574 (1975). A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity 
establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that 
would constitute a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the 
act because of mental illness. Congress has determined that 
a person as to whom those two findings were made is men-
tally ill and dangerous and therefore should be committed to 
a mental institution for treatment and the protection of soci-
ety. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970). Peti-
tioner concedes that this was a congressional purpose, see 
Brief for Petitioner at 9, and n. 4, and he does not challenge 
his original commitment. 
The Due Process Clause also requires that "the nature and 
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the 
purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of commit-
ment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commit-
ment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect 
him and society from his potential dangerousness. See 432 
A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory scheme 
whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be released upon such certi-
fication only with court approval. § 24-301(e). Neither of these provi-
sions is before the Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy 
of the release standards generally nor the disparity in treatment of insanity 
acquittees and other committed persons. 
I I ·~' 
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for commitment of insane criminals is ... a regulatory, pro-
phylactic statute, based on a legitimate governmental inter-
est in protecting society and rehabilitating mental pa-
tients."). The committed acquittee is entitled to release 
when he has recovered his sanity or when he is no longer dan-
gerous. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575-576; 
432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 
7~74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how 
long it will take for any given individual to recover-or in-
deed whether he ever will recover-Congress has chosen, as 
it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of 
commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the 
patient's suitability for release. 
The Court holds, however, that such an "indefinite commit-
ment" of insanity acquittees is unconstitutional. Ante, at 21. 
In the Court's view, automatic commitment of insanity 
acquittees may be justified at most "for a limited period of 
time, in no event exceeding the term for which an insanity 
acquittee could have been incarcerated had he been convicted 
of the crime with which he was charged." Id., at 22 (foot-
note omitted). I do not agree either that an indefinite com-
mitment is invalid or that the acquittee's hypothetical prison 
sentence has any relevance to the length of his commitment. 
III 
A 
In finding that an indefinite commitment is not constitu-
tional, the Court emphasizes the difference between an insan-
ity verdict based on a preponderance of the evidence and 
Addington's requirement for civil commitment of proof by 
clear and convincing evidence. See ante, at 1~17. It is not 
clear why this difference is relevant to the permissible dura-
tion of the commitment. If, as petitioner concedes in this 
case, an insanity acquittal based on a preponderance of the 
evidence may justify automatic commitment, no reason has 
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been suggested why the difference in level of proof for com-
mitment has any further significance. The purposes of the 
commitment-treatment of the patient and protection of the 
patient and society-are reasonably served in both situations 
by an indeterminate length of confinement. This case does 
not present the question as to the proper level of proof for 
determining release. 
To the extent the Court suggests that the commitment it-
self is invalid if based on a showing of insanity by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, I disagree. In my view, there are 
important differences between the class of potential civil 
commitment candidates and the class of insanity acquittees 
that justify differing standards of proof. The Addington 
Court expressed particular concern that members of the pub-
lic could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal behavior 
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a men-
tal or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a range 
of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S., at 
426-427. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 
575. In view of this concern, the Court deemed it inappro-
priate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the 
risk of error." Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. But since 
automatic commitment under § 24---301(d)(l) follows only if 
the acquittee himself argues and proves that the act was a 
product of his mental illness, see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 
U. S. 705 (1962), there is good reason for diminished concern 
as to the risk of error. 3 More important, the proof that he 
committed a criminal act as a result of mental illness elimi-
nates the risk that he is being committed for mere "idiosyn-
• That petitioner raised the ini,anity defense also diminishes the signifi-
cance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social 
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the indi-
vidual." 441 U. S., at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises 
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and 
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cratic behavior," Addington, supra, at 427. A criminal act 
by definition is not "within a range of conduct that is gener-
ally acceptable." 441 U. S., at 426--427. "[D]ue process is 
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the par-
ticular situation demands," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of the evidence stand-
ard comports with due process for commitment of insanity 
acquittees. 4 
B 
In rejecting indefinite commitment for insanity acquittees, 
the Court also contends that an insanity acquittal "is back-
ward-looking, focusing only on one moment in the past," 
ante, at 16, and that "§ 301 fails to reflect the commonsense 
truth that some crimes are more indicative of dangerousness 
than others." Ibid. Again, I do not think these arguments 
bear on the validity of an indefinite commitment. If the in-
sanity acquittal provides an insufficient foundation for a find-
ing of mental illness and dangerousness, then any automatic 
commitment following an insanity acquittal would be pre-
cluded. If, on the other hand, the insanity acquittal may 
support automatic commitment, as petitioner has conceded in 
this case, then the duration of that commitment should be de-
termined by reference to its purpose: treatment and confine-
ment of a dangerously insane person until he has recovered. 
In any event, I am not persuaded by the Court's sugges-
tion that commission of a nonviolent criminal act such as at-
tempted larceny is an insufficient indication of dangerous-
• A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher stand-
ard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement hardly would bene-
fit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet impo-
sition of a higher standard would be the likely result of a holding that an 
insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only if the verdict 
were supported by clear and convincing evidence . 
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ness. This Court never has held that "violence," however 
that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitu-
tional commitment. 5 Nor was it unreasonable for Congress 
to determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference 
of continuing mental illness. The Due Process Clause does 
not require Congress to make classifications that fit every in-
dividual with the same degree of relevance. 6 By providing a 
6 See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F. 2d 852, 861 (CADC 1961) (Burger, 
J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to 
confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder 
or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the 
same as to both.") (footnote omitted). It also may be noted that crimes of 
theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the criminal to 
escape or the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the flee-
ing criminal. 
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual of course should 
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is notewor-
thy that petitioner's continuing commitment apparently does not rest 
solely on the evidence relating to his acquittal by reason of insanity of the 
crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St. 
Elizabeth's reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide by 
cutting his wrists." Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was 
transferred to the civil division of the hospital, but was transferred back to 
the forensic division because of disruptive behavior. 432 A. 2d, at 368, n. 
6. The Government also advises that after petitioner was released uncon-
ditionally following the second panel decision below, he had to be recom-
mitted on an emergency civil basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to 
the original commitment. See Brief for United States, at 15, n. 18. 
6 For example, in Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417 (1974), we 
upheld a congressional decison to exclude from a program of discretionary 
rehabilitative commitment, in lieu of penal incarceration, drug addicts with 
two or more prior felony convictions. The Court noted that the legislative 
decision was not "unreasonable or irrational," id., at 428, and rejected the 
dissent's reliance on the fact that the statutory distinction deprived every 
addict in that particular class "of the opportunity even to be considered for 
treatment for his disease." Id., at 432 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We 
recognized that a discretionary system would have been permissible, but 
concluded that "legislative classifications need not be perfect or ideal." 
8 
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hearing only 50 days after the commitment, Congress has en-
sured that every acquittee has an immediate opportunity to 
obtain release if he has recovered. 7 
C 
The Court completes its analysis by suggesting that there 
may be a constitutional problem with indefinite commitment 
generally. The Court states that an insanity acquittal con-
stitutionally may support only a limited commitment because 
"the passage of time erodes the likelihood" that the acquittee 
will repeat his dangerous act. Ante, at 15-16. To the ex-
tent this is likely, it would be equally true with respect to a 
person committed civilly pursuant to Addington. The dan-
gerous acts that led to his civil commitment may at some 
point no longer justify continued confinement. For this rea-
son, Congress has provided periodic release hearings to en-
sure that the person is released upon recovery. The Court, 
however, without a specific holding, casts doubt on the con-
stitutional sufficiency of these procedures: "[W]e cannot ig-
nore the adverse effect extended institutionalization may 
have on an individual's ability to prove that he is no longer 
mentally ill and dangerous, both because it deprives him of 
the economic wherewithal to obtain independent medical 
judgments and because the treatment he receives may make 
Id., at 428. 
7 The Court suggests that the Government lacks a legitimate reason for 
committing insanity acquittees automatically because the Government can 
introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civil proceed-
ing. See ante, at 17. This argument fails to consider the Government's 
strong interest in avoiding the need to conduct a de novo commitment hear-
ing following every insanity acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may 
be demanded, §§ 21-545, 21-545, and at which the Government bears the 
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing on 
the critical question of whether the acquittee has recovered, the new pro-
ceeding likely would have to relitigate the criminal trial. These problems 
give the Government an important interest in automatic commitment. 
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976). 
,. 
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it difficult for him to show he has recovered." Id., at 16 
(footnote omitted). 
The Court thus appears to imply that the Constitution may 
require that every committed patient be released at some un-
specified point without regard to his recovery. No authority 
is cited that would support this far-reaching suggestion, and 
until the issue is presented the Court should intimate no 
view. Petitioner has challenged neither the constitutionality 
of the District's release procedures nor the Superior Court's 
findings that he remained mentally ill and dangerous. See 
supra, at 2, and n. 1. In suggesting that an indefinite com-
mitment may be unconstitutional because of the inadequacy 
of release procedures, the Court has addressed an issue not 
before us. 
IV 
The error in the Court's conclusion that the duration of a 
commitment following an insanity acquittal must be "defi-
nite" is highlighted by its reliance on the acquittee's hypo-
thetical maximum sentence as a constitutional basis on which 
to limit the commitment. A particular sentence of incarcera-
tion is chosen to reflect society's view of the proper response 
to commission of a particular criminal offense, based on a va-
riety of considerations such as retribution, deterrence, and 
rehabilitation. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 
183--186 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, 
JJ.); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 248-249 (1949). 
The State may punish a person convicted of a crime even if 
satisfied that he is unlikely to commit further crimes. 
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insan-
ity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be pun-
ished. 8 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and 
8 One may doubt that the Court actually believes, as it professes to do 
for purposes of argument, that "the Government conceivably has an inter-
est in confining insanity acquittees to punish them for their criminal acts." 
Ante, at 12 (footnote omitted). As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]o-
10 
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dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia stat-
ute, no matter how serious the act committed by the 
acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal 
if he has recovered. In contrast, one who commits a less se-
rious act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill 
and dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation be-
tween severity of the offense and length of time necessary for 
recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical crimi-
nal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his 
commitment. 9 
The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to de-
termine the length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested 
by the Court's failure to provide a guiding principle as to 
what lawfully may be done in the variety of sentencing and 
post-sentencing situations. The Court finds it easy to order 
petitioner's release because he has been confined for longer 
than one year, the maximum time he might have served in 
prison for the act he committed. At the same time, how-
ever, the Court leaves open the possibility that "statutory 
sentence reductions or other sentencing factors" might need 
ciety may not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior because of his insan-
ity and at the same time punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432 
A. 2d, at 369. 
9 The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involun-
tarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his 
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for 
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. 
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity 
acquittee, and none suggested that a person whose noncriminal commit-
ment was based on possibly criminal conduct could not be confined in ex-
cess of the period for which he could have served in prison if convicted for 
those acts. Similarly, despite the fact that the petitioner in Addington 
had engaged in "conduct that could have been the basis for criminal charges 
had the State chosen to prosecute," ante, at 15, the Court did not intimate 
that his commitment might have to be limited to the period of incarceration 
that could have resulted had he been charged and convicted. 
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to be taken into account. Ante, at 24, n. 38. Today's deci-
sion does not say whether the Due Process Clause requires 
States to limit commitment of insanity acquittees to maxi-
mum sentences or minimum sentences. Nor does it state 
what should be done in the case of indeterminate sentencing 
or suggest whether account must be taken of the availability 
of release time or the possibility of parole. And the Court 
ignores the fact that a criminal sentence does not always cor-
respond to a "limited period of time." Id., at 22. The 
States are left to speculate how they may deal constitution-
ally with acquittees who might have received life imprison-
ment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or the 
death penalty. 
V 
The Court's decision will cause uncertainty in the many 
States that commit insanity acquittees automatically or 
under lower standards than used for civil commitment, 10 for 
the Court has failed to identify a constitutional principle that 
can be applied consistently. Moreover, the reasoning in the 
Court's opinion casts serious doubt on government's author-
ity to act upon the widely and reasonably held view that in-
sanity acquittees constitute a special class that should be 
treated differently from other candidates for commitment. 11 
10 A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions 
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while 
many other States have a variety of special methods of committing insanity 
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606, and nn. 4-6 (1981). Nineteen States commit 
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment. 
Id., at 605, n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law the 
Court's new requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be released 
following expiration of his maximum criminal sentence. See Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 53a-47(b) (Supp. 1981). 
11 Indeed, although expiration of petitioner's hypothetical maximum sen-
tence is decisive in this case, the Court refuses "to hold that the interests 
asserted by the Government in this case do in fact justify commitment up 
12 
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In my view, these problems confirm the wisdom of our ob-
servation that "[ w ]hen Congress undertakes to act in areas 
fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative 
options must be especially broad and courts should be cau-
tious not to rewrite legislation .... " Marshall v. United 
States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). The Court should have 
heeded this admonition. 
to the date on which a sentence would have expired." Ante at 22, n. 36. 
Thus, the Court does not even admit that the Government has legitimate 
interests in automatic commitment of insanity acquittees. 
Pf , , g 
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST and 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting. 
The Court holds that petitioner, who was committed to a 
mental hospital upon being acquitted of a criminal offense 
by reason of insanity, must be released because he has been 
hospitalized for a period longer than he ·might have 
served in prison had he been convicted. If the Government 
seeks to recommit petitioner, it must comply with the civil-
ommitment standards set forth in Addington v. Texas, 441 
U. S. 418 (1979). I do not think that the Constitution 
forbids indefinite commitment as a means of dealing with the 
special problems raised by the insanity defense. I there-
fore dissent. 
I 
In the District of Columbia, an individual may be commit-
. ted civilly upon clear and convincing proof by the Govern-
ment that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or oth-
ers. D.C. Code § 21-545 (1981); see In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 
1233 (DC 1979). He may be released upon certification of re-
covery by the hospital chief of service. §§ 21-546, 21-548. 
Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the first 90 days, 
and subsequently at six-month intervals, to request a judicial 
hearing at which he may gain his release by proving by a pre-
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dangerous. §§ 21-546, 21-547; see Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F. 
2d 589, 598 (CADC 1970). 
A second type of involuntary commitment follows success-
ful invocation of the insanity defense. If a criminal defend-
ant is acquitted by reason of insanity-a verdict that requires 
that his insanity be "affirmatively established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence," § 24-301(j)-he is committed to a 
mental hospital. § 24-301(d)(l). He may be released, with 
court approval, upon certification by the hospital chief of 
service. § 24-301(e). Alternatively, the committed insanity 
acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing within 50 days, and 
thereafter at six-month intervals, at which he may prove, in 
the same manner as a civilly committed person, that he is en-
titled to release. §§ 24-301(d)(2), (k); see Jones v. United 
States, 432 A. 2d 364, 372, and n. 16 (DC 1981) (en bane). 
Petitioner was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital upon 
being acquitted of attempted petit larceny by reason of insan-
ity. At two subsequent hearings the District of Columbia 
Superior Court found that he remained mentally ill and dan-
gerous. The correctness of those findings is not before us, 
as petitioner did not challenge them on appeal. 1 Nor are we 
asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release 
from confinement are constitutional. 2 Nor, indeed, does pe-
1 Petitioner, who urges that he has been confined unconstitutionally 
since 1977, seeks his release solely on the legal arguments raised in this 
case. Petitioner has not sought judicial review of the Superior Court's 
findings in 1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, nor 
does the record indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release hear-
ing-a hearing to which he is entitled every six months. On this record 
there is nothing to suggest that petitioner now is any less ill or dangerous 
than he was in 1976. See n. 5, infra. 
2 As discussed above, the basic standard for release is the same under 
either civil commitment or commitment following acquittal by reason of in-
sanity: the individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he is no longer dangerous or mentally ill. There is one important differ-
ence, however, in the release provisions for these two groups. A patient 
who was committed civilly is entitled to unconditional release upon certi-
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titioner challenge his automatic commitment following his in-
sanity acquittal. All petitioner contends is that he must be 
released because he has been committed for a period longer 
than the duration of his hypothetical maximum criminal 
sentence. 
II 
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 425. There-
fore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate purpose 
for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 
563, 574 (1975). A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity 
establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that 
would constitute a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the 
act because of mental illness. Congress has determined that 
a person as to whom those two findings were made is men-
tally ill and dangerous and therefore should be committed to 
a mental institution for treatment and the protection of soci-
ety. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970). Peti-
tioner concedes that this was a congressional purpose, see 
Brief for Petitioner at 9, and n. 4, and he does not challenge 
his original commitment. 
The Due Process Clause also requires that "the nature and 
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the 
purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of commit-
ment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commit-
ment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect 
him and society from his potential dangerousness. See 432 
fication of his recovery by the hospital chief of service, §§ 21-546, 21-548 
whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be released upon such certi-
fication only with court approval. § 24-301(e). Neither of these provi-
sions is before the Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy 
of the release standards generally nor the disparity in treatment of insanity 
acquittees and other committed persons. 
4 
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A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory scheme 
for commitment of insane criminals is . . . a regulatory, pro-
phylactic statute, based on a legitimate governmental inter-
est in protecting society and rehabilitating mental pa-
tients."). The committed acquittee is entitled to release 
when he has recovered his sanity or when he is no longer dan-
gerous. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575-576; 
432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 
73-74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how 
long it will take for any given individual to recover-or in-
deed whether he ever will recover-Congress has chosen, as 
it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of 
commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the 
patient's suitability for release. 
The Court holds, however, that such an "indefinite commit-
ment" of insanity acquittees is unconstitutional. Ante, at 21. 
In the Court's view, automatic commitment of insanity 
acquittees may be justified at most "for a limited period of 
time, in no event exceeding the term for which an insanity 
acquittee could have been incarcerated had he been convicted 
of the crime with which he was charged." Id., at 22 (foot-
note omitted). I do not agree either that an indefinite com-
mitment is invalid or that the acquittee's hypothetical prison 
sentence has any relevance to the length of his commitment. 
III 
A 
In finding that an indefinite commitment is not constitu-
tional, the Court emphasizes the difference between an insan-
ity verdict based on a preponderance of the evidence and 
Addington's requirement for civil commitment of proof by 
clear and convincing evidence. See ante, at 13-17. It is not 
clear why this difference is relevant to the permissible dura-
tion of the commitment. If, as petitioner concedes in this 
case, an insanity acquittal based on a preponderance of the 
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evidence may justify automatic commitment, no reason has 
been suggested why the difference in level of proof for com-
mitment has any further significance. The purposes of the 
commitment-treatment of the patient and protection of the 
patient and society-are reasonably served in both situations 
by an indeterminate length of confinement. This case does 
not present the question as to the proper level of proof for 
determining release. 
To the extent the Court suggests that the commitment it-
self is invalid if based on a showing of insanity by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, I disagree. In my view, there are 
important differences between the class of potential civil 
commitment candidates and the class of insanity acquittees 
that justify differing standards of proof. The Addington 
Court expressed particular concern that members of the pub-
lic could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal behavior 
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a men-
tal or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a range 
of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S., at 
426-427. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 
575. In view of this concern, the Court deemed it inappro-
priate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the 
risk of error." Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. But since 
automatic commitment under § 24-301(d)(l) follows only if 
the acquittee himself argues and proves that the act was a 
product of his mental illness, see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 
U. S. 705 (1962), there is good reason for diminished concern 
as to the risk of error. 3 More important, the proof that he 
committed a criminal act as a result of mental illness elimi-
8 That petitioner raised the insanity defense also diminishes the signifi-
cance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social 
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the indi-
vidual." 441 U. S., at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises 
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and 
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect. 
6 
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nates the risk that he is being committed for mere "idiosyn-
cratic behavior," Addington, supra, at 427. A criminal act 
by definition is not "within a range of conduct that is gener-
ally acceptable." 441 U. S., at 426-427. "[D]ue process is 
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the par-
ticular situation demands," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of the evidence stand-
ard comports with due process for commitment of insanity 
acquittees. 4 
B 
In rejecting indefinite commitment for insanity acquittees, 
the Court also contends that an insanity acquittal "is back-
ward-looking, focusing only on one moment in the past," 
ante, at 16, and that "§ 301 fails to reflect the commonsense 
truth that some crimes are more indicative of dangerousness 
than others." Ibid. Again, I do not think these arguments 
bear on the validity of an indefinite commitment. If the in-
sanity acquittal provides an insufficient foundation for a find-
ing of mental illness and dangerousness, then any automatic 
commitment following an insanity acquittal would be pre-
cluded. If, on the other hand, the insanity acquittal may 
support automatic commitment, as petitioner has conceded in 
this case, then the duration of that commitment should be de-
termined by reference to its purpose: treatment and confine-
ment of a dangerously insane person until he has recovered. 
In any event, I am not persuaded by the Court's sugges-
tion that commission of a nonviolent criminal act such as at-
tempted larceny is an insufficient indication of dangerous-
• A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher stand-
ard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement hardly would bene-
fit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet impo-
sition of a higher standard would be the likely result of a holding that an 
insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only if the verdict 
were supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
,. 
81-519~DISSENT 
JONES v. UNITED STATES 7 
ness. This Court never has held that "violence," however 
that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitu-
tional commitment. 5 Nor was it unreasonable for Congress 
to determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference 
of continuing mental illness. The Due Process Clause does 
not require Congress to make classifications that fit every in-
dividual with the same degree of relevance. 6 By providing a 
5 See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F. 2d 852, 861 (CADC 1961) (Burger, 
J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to 
confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder 
or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the 
same as to both.") (footnote omitted). It also may be noted that crimes of 
theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the criminal to 
escape or the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the flee-
ing criminal. 
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual of course should 
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is notewor-
thy that petitioner's continuing commitment apparently does not rest 
solely on the evidence relating to his acquittal by reason of insanity of the 
crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St. 
Elizabeth's reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide by 
cutting his wrists." Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was 
transferred to the civil division of the hospital, but was transferred back to 
the forensic division because of disruptive behavior. 432 A. 2d, at 368, n. 
6. The Government also advises that after petitioner was released uncon-
ditionally following the second panel decision below, he had to be recom-
mitted on an emergency civil basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to 
the original commitment. See Brief for United States, at 15, n. 18. 
6 For example, in Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417 (1974), we 
upheld a congressional decison to exclude from a program of discretionary 
rehabilitative commitment, in lieu of penal incarceration, drug addicts with 
two or more prior felony convictions. The Court noted that the legislative 
decision was not "unreasonable or irrational," id., at 428, and rejected the 
dissent's reliance on the fact that the statutory distinction deprived every 
addict in that particular class "of the opportunity even to be considered for 
treatment for his disease." Id., at 432 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We 
recognized that a discretionary system would have been permissible, but 
concluded that "legislative classifi~ations need not be perfect or ideal." 
Id., at 428. 
8 
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hearing only 50 days after the commitment, Congress has en-
sured that every acquittee has an immediate opportunity to 
obtain release if he has recovered. 7 
C 
The Court completes its analysis by suggesting that there 
may be a constitutional problem with indefinite commitment 
generally. The Court states that an insanity acquittal con-
stitutionally may support only a limited commitment because 
"the passage of time erodes the likelihood" that the acquittee 
will repeat his dangerous act. Ante, at 11>-16. To the ex-
tent this is likely, it would be equally true with respect to a 
person committed civilly pursuant to Addington. The dan-
gerous acts that led to his civil commitment may at some 
point no longer justify continued confinement. For this rea-
son, Congress has provided periodic release hearings to en-
sure that the person is released upon recovery. The Court, 
however, without a specific holding, casts doubt on the con-
stitutional sufficiency of these procedures: "[W]e cannot ig-
nore the adverse effect extended institutionalization may 
have on an individual's ability to prove that he is no longer 
mentally ill and dangerous, both because it deprives him of 
the economic wherewithal to obtain independent medical 
judgments and because the treatment he receives may make 
7 The Court suggests that the Government lacks a legitimate reason for 
committing insanity acquittees automatically because the Government can 
introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civil proceed-
ing. See ante, at 17. This argument fails to consider the Government's 
strong interest in avoiding the need to conduct a de novo commitment hear-
ing following every insanity acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may 
be demanded, §§ 21-544, 21-545, and at which the Government bears the 
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing on 
the critical question of whether the acquittee has recovered, the new pro-
ceeding likely would have to relitigate the criminal trial. These problems 
give the Government an important interest in automatic commitment. 
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976). 
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it difficult for him to show he has recovered." Id., at 16 
(footnote omitted). 
The Court thus appears to imply that the Constitution may 
require that every committed patient be released at some un-
specified point without regard to his recovery. No authority 
is cited that would support this far-reaching suggestion, and 
until the issue is presented the Court should intimate no 
view. Petitioner has challenged neither the constitutionality 
of the District's release procedures nor the Superior Court's 
findings that he remained mentally ill and dangerous. See 
supra, at 2, and n. 1. In suggesting that an indefinite com-
mitment may be unconstitutional because of the inadequacy 
of release procedures, the Court has addressed an issue not 
before us. 
IV 
The error in the Court's conclusion that the duration of a 
commitment following an insanity acquittal must be "defi-
nite" is highlighted by its reliance on the acquittee's hypo-
thetical maximum sentence as a constitutional basis on which 
to limit the commitment. A particular sentence of incarcera-
tion is chosen to reflect society's view of the proper response 
to commission of a particular criminal offense, based on a va-
riety of considerations such as retribution, deterrence, and 
rehabilitation. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 
183-186 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, 
JJ.); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 24&-249 (1949). 
The State may punish a person convicted of a crime even if 
satisfied that he is unlikely to commit further crimes. 
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insan-
ity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be pun-
ished. 8 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and 
8 One may doubt that the Court actually believes, as it professes to do 
for purposes of argument, that "the Government conceivably has an inter-
est in confining insanity acquittees to punish them for their criminal acts." 
Ante, at 12 (footnote omitted). As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]o-
10 
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dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia stat-
ute, no matter how serious the act committed by the 
acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal 
if he has recovered. In contrast, one who commits a less se-
rious act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill 
and dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation be-
tween severity of the offense and length of time necessary for 
recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical crimi-
nal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his 
commitment. 9 
The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to de-
termine the length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested 
by the Court's failure to provide a guiding principle as to 
what lawfully may be done in the variety of sentencing and 
post-sentencing situations. The Court finds it easy to order 
petitioner's release because he has been confined for longer 
than one year, the maximum time he might have served in 
prison for the act he committed. At the same time, how-
ever, the Court leaves open the possibility that "statutory 
sentence reductions or other sentencing factors" might need 
ciety may not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior because of his insan-
ity and at the same time punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432 
A. 2d, at 369. 
9 The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involun-
tarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his 
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for 
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. 
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity 
acquittee, and none suggested that a person whose noncriminal commit-
ment was based on possibly criminal conduct could not be confined in ex-
cess of the period for which he could have served in prison if convicted for 
those acts. Similarly, despite the fact that the petitioner in Addington 
had engaged in "conduct that could have been the basis for criminal charges 
had the State chosen to prosecute," ante, at 15, the Court did not intimate 
that his commitment might have to be limited to the period of incarceration 
that could have resulted had he been charged and convicted. 
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to be taken into account. Ante, at 24, n. 38. Today's deci-
sion does not say whether the Due Process Clause requires 
States to limit commitment of insanity acquittees to maxi-
mum sentences or minimum sentences. Nor does it state 
what should be done in the case of indeterminate sentencing 
or suggest whether account must be taken of the availability 
of release time or the possibility of parole. And the Court 
ignores the fact that a criminal sentence does not always cor-
respond to a "limited period of time." Id., at 22. The 
States are left to speculate how they may deal constitution-
ally with acquittees who might have received life imprison-
ment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or the 
death penalty. 
V 
The Court's decision will cause uncertainty in the many 
States that commit insanity acquittees automatically or 
under lower standards than used for civil commitment, 10 for 
the Court has failed to identify a constitutional principle that 
can be applied consistently. Moreover, the reasoning in the 
Court's opinion casts serious doubt on government's author-
ity to act upon the widely and reasonably held view that in-
sanity acquittees constitute a special class that should be 
treated differently from other candidates for commitment. 11 
10 A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions 
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while 
many other States have a variety of special methods of committing insanity 
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606, and nn. 4-6 (1981). Nineteen States commit 
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment. 
Id., at 605, n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law the 
Court's new requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be released 
following expiration of his maximum criminal sentence. See Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 53a-47(b) (Supp. 1981). 
11 Indeed, although expiration of petitioner's hypothetical maximum sen-
tence is decisive in this case, the Court refuses ''to hold that the interests 
asserted by the Government in this case do in fact justify commitment up 
12 
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In my view, these problems confirm the wisdom of our ob-
servation that "[ w ]hen Congress undertakes to act in areas 
fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative 
options must be especially broad and courts should be cau-
tious not to rewrite legislation .... " Marshall v. United 
States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). The Court should have 
heeded this admonition. 
to the date on which a sentence would have expired." Ante at 22, n. 36. 
Thus, the Court does not even admit that the Government has legitimate 
interests in automatic commitment of insanity acquittees. 
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MICHAEL JONES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 
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[March - , 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST and 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting. 
The Court holds that petitioner, who was committed to a 
mental hospital upon being acquitted of a criminal offense 
by reason of insanity, must be released because he has been 
hospitalized for a period longer than he might have 
served in prison had he been convicted. If the Government 
seeks to recommit petitioner, it must comply with the civil-
ommitment standards set forth in Addington v. Texas, 441 
U. S. 418 (1979). I do not think that the Constitution 
forbids indefinite commitment as a means of dealing with the 
special problems raised by the insanity defense. I there-
fore dissent. 
I 
In the District of Columbia, an individual may be commit-
ted civilly upon clear and convincing proof by the Govern-
ment that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or oth-
ers. D.C. Code §21-545 (1981); see In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 
1233 (DC 1979). He may be released upon certification of re-
covery by the hospital chief of service. §§ 21-546, 21-548. 
Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the first 90 days, 
and subsequently at six-month intervals, to request a judicial 
hearing at which he may gain his release by proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or 
2 
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dangerous. §§21-546, 21-547; see Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F. 
2d 589, 598 (CADC 1970). 
A second type of involuntary commitment follows success-
ful invocation of the insanity defense. If a criminal defend-
ant is acquitted by reason of insanity-a verdict that requires 
that his insanity be "affirmatively established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence," § 24-301(j)-he is committed to a 
mental hospital. § 24-301(d)(l). He may be released, with 
court approval, upon certification by the hospital chief of 
service. § 24-301(e). Alternatively, the committed insanity 
acquittee is entitled to a judicial hearing within 50 days, and 
thereafter at six-month intervals, at which he may prove, in 
the same manner as a civilly committed person, that he is en-
titled to release. §§ 24-301(d)(2), (k); see Jones v. United 
States, 432 A. 2d 364, 372, and n. 16 (DC 1981) (en bane). 
Petitioner was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital upon 
being acquitted of attempted petit larceny by reason of insan-
ity. At two subsequent hearings the District of Columbia 
Superior Court found that he remained mentally ill and dan-
gerous. The correctness of those findings is not before us, 
as petitioner did not challenge them on appeal. 1 Nor are we 
asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release 
from confinement are constitutional. 2 Nor, indeed, does pe-
'Petitioner, who urges that he has been confined unconstitutionally 
since 1977, seeks his release solely on the legal arguments raised in this 
case. Petitioner has not sought judicial review of the Superior Court's 
findings in 1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, nor 
does the record indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release hear-
ing-a hearing to which he is entitled every six months. On this record 
there is nothing to suggest that petitioner now is any less ill or dangerous 
than he was in 1976. See n. 5, infra. 
2 As discussed above, the basic standard for release is the same under 
either civil commitment or commitment following acquittal by reason of in-
sanity: the individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he is no longer dangerous or mentally ill. There is one important differ-
ence, however, in the release provisions for these two groups. A patient 
who was committed civilly is entitled to unconditional release upon certi-
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titioner challenge his automatic commitment following his in-
sanity acquittal. All petitioner contends is that he must be 
released because he has been committed for a period longer 
than the duration of his hypothetical maximum criminal 
sentence. 
II 
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 425. There-
fore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate purpose 
for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 
563, 574 (1975). A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity 
establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that 
would constitute a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the 
act because of mental illness. Congress has determined that 
a person as to whom those two findings were made is men-
tally ill and dangerous and therefore should be committed to 
a mental institution for treatment and the protection of soci-
ety. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970). Peti-
tioner concedes that this was a congressional purpose, see 
Brief for Petitioner at 9, and n. 4, and he does not challenge 
his original commitment. 
The Due Process Clause also requires that "the nature and 
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the 
purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of commit-
ment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commit-
ment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect 
him and society from his potential dangerousness. See 432 
fication of his recovery by the hospital chief of service, §§ 21-546, 21-548 
whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be released upon such certi-
fication only with court approval. § 24-301(e). Neither of these provi-
sions is before the Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy 
of the release standards generally nor the disparity in treatment of insanity 
acquittees and other committed persons. 
4 
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A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory scheme 
for commitment of insane criminals is ... a regulatory, pro-
phylactic statute, based on a legitimate governmental inter-
est in protecting society and rehabilitating mental pa-
tients."). The committed acquittee is entitled to release 
when he has recovered his sanity or when he is no longer dan-
gerous. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575-576; 
432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 
73-74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how 
long it will take for any given individual to recover-or in-
deed whether he ever will recover-Congress has chosen, as 
it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of 
commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the 
patient's suitability for release. 
The Court holds, however, that such an "indefinite commit-
ment" of insanity acquittees is unconstitutional. Ante, at 21. 
In the Court's view, automatic commitment of insanity 
acquittees may be justified at most "for a limited period of 
time, in no event exceeding the term for which an insanity 
acquittee could have been incarcerated had he been convicted 
of the crime with which he was charged." Id., at 22 (foot-
note omitted). I do not agree either that an indefinite com-
mitment is invalid or that the acquittee's hypothetical prison 
sentence has any relevance to the length of his commitment. 
III 
A 
In finding that an indefinite commitment is not constitu-
tional, the Court emphasizes the difference between an insan-
ity verdict based on a preponderance of the evidence and 
Addington's requirement for civil commitment of proof by 
clear and convincing evidence. See ante, at 13-17. It is not 
clear why this difference is relevant to the permissible dura-
tion of the commitment. If, as petitioner concedes in this 
case, an insanity acquittal based on a preponderance of the 
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evidence may justify automatic commitment, no reason has 
been suggested why the difference in level of proof for com-
mitment has any further significance. The purposes of the 
commitment-treatment of the patient and protection of the 
patient and society-are reasonably served in both situations 
by an indeterminate length of confinement. This case does 
not present the question as to the proper level of proof for 
determining release. 
To the extent the Court suggests that the commitment it-
self is invalid if based on a showing of insanity by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, I disagree. In my view, there are 
important differences between the class of potential civil 
commitment candidates and the class of insanity acquittees 
that justify differing standards of proof. The Addington 
Court expressed particular concern that members of the pub-
lic could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal behavior 
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a men-
tal or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a range 
of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S., at 
426--427. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 
575. In view of this concern, the Court deemed it inappro-
priate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the 
risk of error." Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. But since 
automatic commitment under § 24-301(d)(l) follows only if 
the acquittee himself argues and proves that the act was a 
product of his mental illness, see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 
U. S. 705 (1962), there is good reason for diminished concern 
as to the risk of error. 3 More important, the proof that he 
committed a criminal act as a result of mental illness elimi-
3 That petitioner raised the insanity defense also diminishes the signifi-
cance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social 
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the indi-
vidual." 441 U. S., at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises 
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and 
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect. 
6 
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nates the risk that he is being committed for mere "idiosyn-
cratic behavior," Addington, supra, at 427. A criminal act 
by definition is not "within a range of conduct that is gener-
ally acceptable." 441 U. S., at 426-427. "[D]ue process is 
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the par-
ticular situation demands," Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of the evidence stand-
ard comports with due process for commitment of insanity 
acquittees. 4 
B 
In rejecting indefinite commitment for insanity acquittees, 
the Court also contends that an insanity acquittal "is back-
ward-looking, focusing only on one moment in the past," 
ante, at 16, and that "§ 301 fails to reflect the commonsense 
truth that some crimes are more indicative of dangerousness 
than others." Ibid. Again, I do not think these arguments 
bear on the validity of an indefinite commitment. If the in-
sanity acquittal provides an insufficient foundation for a find-
ing of mental illness and dangerousness, then any automatic 
commitment following an insanity acquittal would be pre-
cluded. If, on the other hand, the insanity acquittal may 
support automatic commitment, as petitioner has conceded in 
this case, then the duration of that commitment should be de-
termined by reference to its purpose: treatment and confine-
ment of a dangerously insane person until he has recovered. 
In any event, I am not persuaded by the Court's sugges-
tion that commission of a nonviolent criminal act such as at-
tempted larceny is an insufficient indication of dangerous-
'A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher stand-
ard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement hardly would bene-
fit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet impo-
sition of a higher standard would be the likely result of a holding that an 
insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only if the verdict 
were supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
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ness. This Court never has held that "violence," however 
that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitu-
tional commitment. 5 Nor was it unreasonable for Congress 
to determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference 
of continuing mental illness. The Due Process Clause does 
not require Congress to make classifications that fit every in-
dividual with the same degree of relevance. 6 By providing a 
5 See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F. 2d 852, 861 (CADC 1961) (Burger, 
J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to 
confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder 
or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the 
same as to both.") (footnote omitted). It also may be noted that crimes of 
theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the criminal to 
escape or the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the flee-
ing criminal. 
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual of course should 
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is notewor-
thy that petitioner's continuing commitment apparently does not rest 
solely on the evidence relating to his acquittal by reason of insanity of the 
crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St. 
Elizabeth's reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide by 
cutting his wrists." Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was 
transferred to the civil division of the hospital, but was transferred back to 
the forensic division because of disruptive behavior. 432 A. 2d, at 368, n. 
6. The Government also advises that after petitioner was released uncon-
ditionally following the second panel decision below, he had to be recom-
mitted on an emergency civil basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to 
the original commitment. See Brief for United States, at 15, n. 18. 
"For example, in Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417 (1974), we 
upheld a congressional decison to exclude from a program of discretionary 
rehabilitative commitment, in lieu of penal incarceration, drug addicts with 
two or more prior felony convictions. The Court noted that the legislative 
decision was not "unreasonable or irrational," id., at 428, and rejected the 
dissent's reliance on the fact that the statutory distinction deprived every 
addict in that particular class "of the opportunity even to be considered for 
treatment for his disease." Id., at 432 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We 
recognized that a discretionary system would have been permissible, but 
concluded that "legislative classifications need not be perfect or ideal." 
Id., at 428. 
In rejecting the predictive value of the insanity acquittal, the Court re-
8 
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hearing only 50 days after the commitment, Congress has en-
sured that every acquittee has an immediate opportunity to 
obtain release if he has recovered. 7 
C 
The Court completes its analysis by suggesting that there 
may be a constitutional problem with indefinite commitment 
generally. The Court states that an insanity acquittal con-
stitutionally may support only a limited commitment because 
lies on the fact that "research on the relationship of non-violent criminal 
behavior . . . to future dangerousness is scarce. We do not even know 
whether it is statistically valid as a predictor of similar non-violent behav-
ior, much less of behavior posing more serious risks to self or others." 
Ante, at 14 (emphasis in original). The Court also undertakes its own 
analysis of the meaning of the available psychiatric evidence. See id., at 
14-17, nn. 26-29. I cannot agree with the notion that Congress' power to 
legislate in this area depends on the research conducted by the psychiatric 
community. We have recognized co~irmaHy the "uncertainty of diagnosis 
in this field and the tentativeness of professional judgment. The only 
thing that can be said about the present state of knowledge and therapy 
regarding mental disease is that science has not reached finality of judg-
ment . . . . " Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S. 366, 375 (1956). See 
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 472 (1981); Addington, 441 U. S., at 
429-430; Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 535-537 (1968) (opinion of MAR-
SHALL, J.). The lesson we have drawn is not that government may not act 
in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that we should pay particular def-
erence to reasonable legislative judgments. 
7 The Court suggests that the Government lacks a legitimate reason for 
committing insanity acquittees automatically because the Government can 
introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civil proceed-
ing. See ante, at 17. This argument fails to consider the Government's 
strong interest in avoiding the need to conduct a de novo commitment hear-
ing following every insanity acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may 
be demanded, §§ 21-544, 21-545, and at which the Government bears the 
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing on 
the critical question of whether the acquittee has recovered, the new pro-
ceeding likely would have to relitigate the criminal trial. These problems 
give the Government an important interest in automatic commitment. 
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976). 
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"the passage of time erodes the likelihood" that the acquittee 
will repeat his dangerous act. Ante, at 15--16. To the ex-
tent this is likely, it would be equally true with respect to a 
person committed civilly pursuant to Addington. The dan-
gerous acts that led to his civil commitment may at some 
point no longer justify continued confinement. For this rea-
son, Congress has provided periodic release hearings to en-
sure that the person is released upon recovery. The Court, 
however, without a specific holding, casts doubt on the con-
stitutional sufficiency of these procedures: "[W]e cannot ig-
nore the adverse effect extended institutionalization may 
have on an individual's ability to prove that he is no longer 
mentally ill and dangerous, both because it deprives him of 
the economic wherewithal to obtain independent medical 
judgments and because the treatment he receives may make 
it difficult for him to show he has recovered." Id., at 16 
(footnote omitted). 
The Court thus appears to imply that the Constitution may 
require that every committed patient be released at some un-
specified point without regard to his recovery. No authority 
is cited that would support this far-reaching suggestion, and 
until the issue is presented the Court should intimate no 
view. Petitioner has challenged neither the constitutionality 
of the District's release procedures nor the Superior Court's 
findings that he remained mentally ill and dangerous. See 
supra, at 2, and n. 1. In suggesting that an indefinite com-
mitment may be unconstitutional because of the inadequacy 
of release procedures, the Court has addressed an issue not 
before us. 
IV 
The error in the Court's conclusion that the duration of a 
commitment following an insanity acquittal must be "defi-
nite" is highlighted by its reliance on the acquittee's hypo-
thetical maximum sentence as a constitutional basis on which 
to limit the commitment. A particular sentence of incarcera-
10 
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tion is chosen to reflect society's view of the proper response 
to commission of a particular criminal offense, based on a va-
riety of considerations such as retribution, deterrence, and 
rehabilitation. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 
183--186 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, 
JJ.); Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 248-249 (1949). 
The State may punish a person convicted of a crime even if 
satisfied that he is unlikely to commit further crimes. 
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insan-
ity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be pun-
ished. 8 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and 
dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia stat-
ute, no matter how serious the act committed by the 
acquittee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal 
if he has recovered. In contrast, one who commits a less se-
rious act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill 
and dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation be-
tween severity of the offense and length of time necessary for 
recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical crimi-
nal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his 
commitment. 9 
8 One may doubt that the Court actually believes, as it professes to do 
for purposes of argument, that "the Government conceivably has an inter-
est in confining insanity acquittees to punish them for their criminal acts." 
Ante, at 12 (footnote omitted). As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]o-
ciety may not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior because of his insan-
ity and at the same time punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432 
A. 2d, at 369. 
9 The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involun-
tarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his 
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for 
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. 
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity 
acquittee, and none suggested that a person whose noncriminal commit-
ment was based on possibly criminal conduct could not be confined in ex-
cess of the period for which he could have served in prison if convicted for 
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The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to de-
termine the length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested 
by the Court's failure to provide a guiding principle as to 
what lawfully may be done in the variety of sentencing and 
post-sentencing situations. The Court finds it easy to order 
petitioner's release because he has been confined for longer 
than one year, the maximum time he might have served in 
prison for the act he committed. At the same time, how-
ever, the Court leaves open the possibility that "statutory 
sentence reductions or other sentencing factors" might need 
to be taken into account. Ante, at 24, n. 38. Today's deci-
sion does not say whether the Due Process Clause requires 
States to limit commitment of insanity acquittees to maxi-
mum sentences or minimum sentences. Nor does it state 
what should be done in the case of indeterminate sentencing 
or suggest whether account must be taken of the availability 
of release time or the possibility of parole. And the Court 
ignores the fact that a criminal sentence does not always cor-
respond to a "limited period of time." Id., at 22. The 
States are left to speculate how they may deal constitution-
ally with acquittees who might have received life imprison-
ment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or the 
death penalty. 
V 
The Court's decision will cause uncertainty in the many 
States that commit insanity acquittees automatically or 
under lower standards than used for civil commitment, 10 for 
those acts. Similarly, despite the fact that the petitioner in Addington 
had engaged in "conduct that could have been the basis for criminal charges 
had the State chosen to prosecute," ante, at 15, the Court did not intimate 
that his commitment might have to be limited to the period of incarceration 
that could have resulted had he been charged and convicted. 
10 A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions 
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while 
many other States have a variety of special methods of committing insanity 
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 
12 
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the Court has failed to identify a constitutional principle that 
can be applied consistently. Moreover, the reasoning in the 
Court's opinion casts serious doubt on government's author-
ity to act upon the widely and reasonably held view that in-
sanity acquittees constitute a special class that should be 
treated differently from other candidates for commitment. 11 
In my view, these problems confirm the wisdom of our ob-
servation that "[ w ]hen Congress undertakes to act in areas 
fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative 
options must be especially broad and courts should be cau-
tious not to rewrite legislation .... " Marshall v. United 
States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). The Court should have 
heeded this admonition. 
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606, and nn. 4--6 (1981). Nineteen States commit 
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment. 
Id., at 605, n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law the 
Court's new requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be released 
following expiration of his maximum criminal sentence. See Conn. Gen. A~ _ /. . . 
Stat. §53a-47(b) (Supp. 1981). ---------~ 
11 Indeed, although expiration of petitioner's h othetical maximum sen- ' 
tence is ecisive in this case, the Court r~ o hold that the interests 
asserte by the Government in this case do "in fact justify commitment 
without clear and convincing evidence up to the date on which his sentence 
would have expired." Ante at 22, n. 36. Thus, the Court does not even 
' ~ that the Government has legitimate interests in automatic commit-
,y,< ~ ment of insanity acquittees. 
,an :t i 
titioner challenge dire y his automatic commitment follow-
ing his insanity acqui tal. Rather, his argument is that an 
insanity acquittal pr vides an inadequate basis for an indefi-
nite commitment. pecifically, he contends that he must be 
released because he has been committed for a period longer 
than the duration of his hypothetical maximum sentence. 
We do not agree either that an indefinite commitment is in-
valid or that the acquittee's hypothetical maximum prison 
sentence has any relevance to the length of his commitment. 
III 
A 
In arguing that an indefinite commitment is unconstitu-
tional, petitioner emphasizes the difference between an inc,-
sa~ based on a preponderance of the evidence and 
Addington's requirement of proof by clear and convincing ev-
idence for civil commitment. It is not self-evident why this 
difference is relevant to the permissible duration of the com-
mitment. If, as petitioner concedes, an insanity acquittal 
based on a preponderance of the evidence may justify auto-
matic commitment, no reason has been suggested why the 
difference in level of proof for commitment has any further 
significance. The purposes of the commitment-treatment 
of the patient and protection of the patient and society-are 
reasonably served in both situations by an indeterminate 
length of confinement. 
To the extent petitioner suggests that the commitment it-
self is invalid if based on a showing of insanity by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, we disagree. There are important 
differences between the class of potential civil commitment 
candidates and the class of insanity acquittees that justify dif-
fering standards of proof. The Addington Court expressed 
before the Court, as petitioner has challenged neither the adequacy of the 
release standards generally nor the disparity in treatment of insanity ac-
quittees and other committed persons. 
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particular concern that members of the public could be con-
fined on the basis of "some abnormal behavior which might be 
perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional 
disorder, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is 
generally acceptable." 441 U. S., at 426-427. See also 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575. In view of this 
concern, the Court deemed it inappropriate to ask the indi-
vidual "to share equally with society the risk of error." 
Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. But since automatic commit-~ 
ment under § 24-301(d)(l) follows only if the acquittee himsezv -~ ~,,/  
. ~ proves that the act was a product of his mental ~ ~r - : . 
Y-- ill~ess, 11 see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962), there u-j 
is good reason for diminished concern as to the risk of error. 12 ~ ~ ~ 
More important, the proof that he committed a criminal act 
as a result of mental illness eliminates the risk that he is ~ 
being committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior," Adding-
ton, supra, at 427. A criminal act by definition is not "within 
a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 ,U. S., 
at 426-427. "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such pro-
cedural protections as the particular situation demands," 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). The pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard comports with due proc-
ess for commitment of insanity acquittees. 13 
11 In this case petitioner stipulated that he had committed the offense by 
reason of insanity. 
12 That the aquittee raised the insanity defense also diminishes the sig-
nificance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social 
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the indi-
vidual." 441 U. S., at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises 
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and 
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect. 
13 A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher stand-
ard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement hardly would bene-
fit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet impo-
sition of a higher standard would be the likely result of a holding that an 
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B 
In asserting the invalidity of indefinite commitment of in-
sanity acquittees, petitioner also argues that the judgment of 
insanity ¥et'dtet- demonstrates only a past, not a present, con-
dition, and that the commission of one criminal act does not 
suffice to establish dangerousness. Again, we do not think 
these arguments bear on the validity of an indefinite commit-
ment. If the insanity acquittal provides an insufficient foun-
dation for a finding of mental illness and dangerousness, then 
any automatic commitment following an insanity acquittal 
would be precluded. If, on the other hand, the insanity ac-
quittal may support~ utomatic commitment, as petitioner has 
conceded iR thii' ca"~ then the duration of that commitment 
should be determined by reference to its purpose: treatment 
and confinement of a dangerously insane person until he has 
recovered. 
We also reject petitioner's implicit challenge to any com-
mitment on the basis of the finding of insanity at the criminal 
trial. We are not persuaded by petitioner's contention that 
commission of a single, nonviolent criminal act is an insuffi-
cient indication of dangerousness. This Court never has 
held that "violence," however that term might be defined, is 
a prerequisite for a constitutional commitment. 14 Nor was it 
were supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
1
• See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F. 2d 852, 861 (CADC 1961) (Burger, 
J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to 
confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder 
or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the 
same as to both.") (footnote omitted). It also may be noted that crimes of 
theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the criminal to 
escape or the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the flee-
ing criminal. 
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual of course should 
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is notewor-
thy that petitioner's continuing commitment apparently does not rest 
solely on the evidence relating to his acquittal by reason of insanity of the 
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unreasonable for Congress to determine that the insanity ac-
quittal supports an inference of continuing mental illness. 
The Due Process Clause does not require Congress to make 
classifications that fit every individual with the same degree 
of relevance. 15 Because a hearing is provided within 50 days 
crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St. 
Elizabeth's reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide by 
cutting his wrists." Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was 
transferred to the civil division of the hospital, but was transferred back to 
the forensic division because of disruptive behavior. 432 A. 2d, at 368, 
n. 6. The Government also advises that after petitioner was released un-
conditionally following the second panel decision below, he had to be re-
committed on an emergency civil basis two weeks later for conduct unre-
lated to the original commitment. See Brief for United States, at 15, 
n. 18. ~ 
15 For example, Jll. Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974), we 
eld a congressional decison to exclude from a program of discretionary 
rehabilitative commitment, in lieu of penal incarceration, drug addicts with 
two or more prior felony convictions. The Court noted that the legislative 
decision was not "unreasonable or irrational," id., at 428, and rejected the 
dissent's reliance on the fact that the statutory distinction deprived every 
addict in that particular class "of the opportunity even to be considered for 
treatment for his disease." Id., at 432 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). We 
recognized that a discretionary system would have been permissible, but 
concluded that "legislative classifications need not be perfect or ideal." 
d., at 428. 
In rejecting the predictive value of the insanity acquittal, petitioner com-
plains that "[ w ]hen Congress enacted the present statutory scheme, it did 
not cite any empirical evidence indicating that mentally ill persons who 
have committed a criminal act are likely to commit additional dangerous 
acts in the future." Reply Brief for Petitioner 13. Petitioner further ar-
gues that the available research fails to support the predictive value of 
prior dangerous acts. See id., at 13-14. _We do rn,t &g:F-ee ~
__ ____.tlM.t-Congr~ powed,Q lee:isl.ttotQ iJl- this-,a.rQa eepel'l~B-tha reseaPeh een- ..,,.---
~---~eiffl~a-bTttttri:rs:vrtrr.· mrc· :-eeffM'~~-~- We have recognized repeatedly the 
"uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional 
judgment. The only thing that can be said about the present state of 
knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not 
reached finality of judgment .... " Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S. 
366, 375 (1956). See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 472 (1981); Adding-
12 
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of the commitment, there is assurance that every acquittee 
has prompt opportunity to obtain release if he has recov-
ered. 16 We therefore conclude that a ~t of not guilty by 
reason of insanity is a sufficient foundation for commitment of 
an insanity acquittee for the purposes of treatment and the 
protection of society. 17 
C 
Petitioner's principal argument is that, whatever the valid-
ity of automatic commitment following an insanity acquital, 
the acquittee's hypothetical maximum sentence provides the 
constitutional limit for his commitment. We do not agree 
that the permissible duration of such a commitment is af-
fected by the criminal penalties the acquittee might have re-
ceived. A particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to 
reflect society's view of the proper response to commission of 
a particular criminal offense, based on a variety of consider-
ton, 441 U. S., at 429--430; Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 535-537 (1968) 
(opinion of MARSHALL, J.). The lesson we have drawn is not that govern-
ment may not act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that we should 
pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments. 
1
• Petitioner suggests that the Government lacks a legitimate reason for 
committing insanity acquittees automatically because the Government can 
introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a subsequent civil proceed-
ing. This argument fails to consider the Government's strong interest in 
avoiding the need to conduct a de novo commitment hearing following 
every insanity acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may be demanded, 
§§ 21-544, 21-545, and at which the Government bears the burden of proof 
by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing on the critical ques-
tion of whether the acquittee has recovered, the new proceeding likely 
would have to relitigate the criminal trial. These problems give the Gov-
ernment an important interest in automatic commitment. See Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976). 
17 Petitioner also has raised an equal-protection challenge to the fact that 
a jury is available at a civil commitment hearing, see § 21-544, but not at 
the 50-day hearing for a committed insanity acquittee. We agree with the 
Court of Appeals that "this difference is justified by the fact that the 
acquittee has had a right to a jury determination of his sanity at the time of 
the offense." 432 A. 2d, at 373. 
81-5195-DISSENT 
JONES v. UNITED STATES 13 
ations such as retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. 
See, e. g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 183-186 (1976) 
(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Williams 
v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 248-249 (1949). The State may 
punish a person convicted of a crime even if satisfied that he 
is unlikely to commit further crimes. 
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insan-
ity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be pun-
ished. 18 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and 
dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia stat-
ute, no matter how serious the act committed by the acquit-
tee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal if he 
has recovered. In contrast, one who commits a less serious 
act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill and 
dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation be-
tween severity of the offense and length of time necessary for 
recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical crimi-
nal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his 
commitment. 19 
IV 
We hold that when a criminal defendant establishes by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime 
by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the govern-
18 As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]ociety may not excuse a de-
fendant's criminal behavior because of his insanity and at the same time 
punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432 A. 2d, at 369. 
19 The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involun-
tarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his 
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for 
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. 
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity 
acquittee, and none suggested that a person whose noncriminal commit-
ment was based on possibly criminal conduct could not be confined in ex-
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ment, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to 
a mental institution until such time as he has regained his 
sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society. This 
holding accords with the widely and reasonably held view 
that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should 
be treated differently from other candidates for commit-
ment. 20 We have observed before that "[ w ]hen Congress un-
dertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific 
uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad 
and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation. . . . " 
Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). This 
admonition has particular force in the context of legislative 
efforts to deal with the special problems raised by the insan-
ity defense. 
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
is affirmed. 
So ordered. 
20 A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions 
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while 
many other States have a variety of special methods of committing insanity 
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606, and nn. 4-6 (1981). Nineteen States commit 
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment. 
Id., at 605, n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law a 
requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be released following ex-
piration of his maximum criminal sentence. See Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 53a~7(b) (Supp. 1981). 
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The question presented is whether petitioner, who was 
committed to a mental hospital upon being acquitted of a 
criminal offense by reason of insanity, must be released be-
cause he has been hospitalized for a period longer than he 
might have served in prison had he been convicted. 
I 
In the District of Columbia a criminal defendant may not 
be acquitted by reason of insanity unless his insanity is "affir-
matively established by a preponderance of the evidence." 
D.C. Code§ 24-301(j) (1981). 1 If he successfully invokes the 
insanity defense, he is committ~d to a mental hospital. 
1 Section 24-301(j) provides: 
"(j) Insanity shall not be a defense in any criminal proceeding in the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the Superior 
Court of the District of Columbia, unless the accused or his attorney in 
such proceeding, at the time the accused enters his plea of not guilty or 
within fifteen days thereafter or at such later time as the court may for 
good cause permit, files with the court and serves upon the prosecuting at-
torney written notice of his intention to rely on such defense. No person 
accused of an offense shall be acquitted on the ground that he was insane at 
the time of its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the 
issue, is affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence." 
3 
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§ 24-301(d)(l). 2 The statute provides several ways of ob-
taining release. Within 50 days of commitment the acquittee 
is entitled to a hearing to determine his eligibility for release, 
at which he has the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous. 
§ 24-301(d)(2). 3 If he fails to meet this burden at the 50-day 
hearing, the committed acquittee subsequently may be re-
leased, with court approval, upon certification of his recovery 
by the hospital chief of service. § 24-301(e). 4 Alterna-
2 Section 24-301(d)(l) provides: 
"(d)(l) If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an of-
fense raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground 
that he was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a 
hospital for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pur-
suant to this subsection or subsection (e)." 
Under this provision, automatic commitment is permissible only if the de-
fendant himself raised the insanity defense. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 
u. s. 705 (1962). 
3 Section 24-301(d)(2) provides in relevant part: 
"(2)(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) shall have a hear-
ing, unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to determine whether 
he is entitled to release from custody .... 
"(B) If the hearing is not waived, the court shall cause notice of the hear-
ing to be served upon the person, his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney 
and hold the hearing. Within ten days from the date the hearing was be-
gun, the court shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and con-
clusions of law with respect thereto. The person confined shall have the 
burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the person confined is entitled to his release from custody, either con-
ditional or unconditional, the court shall enter such order as may appear 
appropriate." 
The statute does not specify the standard for determining release, but the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals heid in this case that, as in release 
proceedings under § 24-301(e) and § 21-545(b), the confined person must 
show that he is either no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous to him-
self or others. See 432 A. 2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (1981) (en bane). 
'Section 24-301(e) provides in relevant part: 
"(e) Where any person has been confined in a hospital for the mentally ill 
pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, and the superintendent of such 
hospital certifies (1) that such person has recovered his sanity, (2) that, in 
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tively, the acquittee is entit d to a judicial hearing every six 
months at which he may stablish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he is ent" ed to release. § 24-301(k). 5 
Independent of its commitment of insanity acquittees, the 
District of Columbia also has adopted a civil-commitment pro-
cedure, under which an individual may be committed upon 
the opinion of the superintendent, such person will not in the reasonable 
future be dangerous to himself or others, and (3) in the opinion of the su-
perintendent, the person is entitled to unconditional release from the hos-
pital, and such certificate is filed with the clerk of the court in which the 
person was tried, and a copy thereof served on the United States Attorney 
or the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, whichever office 
prosecuted the accused, such certificate shall be sufficient to authorize the 
court to order the unconditional release of the person so confined from fur-
ther hospitalization at the expiration of fifteen days from the time said cer-
tificate was filed and served as above; but the court in its discretion may, 
or upon the objection of the United States or the District of Columbia shall, 
after due notice, hold a hearing at which evidence as to the mental condi-
tion of the person so confined may be submitted, including the testimony of 
one or more psychiatrists from said hospital. The court shall weigh the 
evidence and, if the court finds that such person has recovered his sanity 
and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others, the 
court shall order such person unconditionally released from further confine-
ment in said hospital. If the court does not so find, the court shall order 
such person returned to said hospital. ... " 
• Section 24-30l(k) provides in relevant part: 
"(k)(l) A person in custody or conditionally released from custody, pur-
suant to the provisions of this section, claiming the right to be released 
from custody, the right to any change in the conditions of his release, or 
other relief concerning his custody, may move the court having jurisdiction 
to order his release, to release him from custody, to change the conditions 
of his release, or to grant other relief .... 
"(3) ... On all issues raised by his motion, the person shall have the 
burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the person is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or 
unconditional, a change in the conditions of his release, or other relief, the 
court shall enter such order as may appear appropriate. . . . 
"(5) A court shall not be required to entertain a 2nd or successive motion 
for relief under this section more often than once every 6 months. A court 
for good cause shown may in its discretion entertain such a motion more 
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clear and convincing proof by the Government that he is men-
tally ill and likely to injure himself or others. § 21-545(b). 6 
The individual may demand a jury in the civil-commitment 
proceeding. § 21-544. Once committed, a person may be 
released at any time upon certification of recovery by the 
hospital chief of service. §§ 21-546, 21-548. Alternatively, 
the patient is entitled after the first 90 days, and subse-
quently at 6-month intervals, to request a judicial hearing at 
which he may gain his release by proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous. 
§ 21-546, 21-547; see Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F. 2d 589, 598 
(CADC 1970). 
II 
On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested for at-
tempting to steal a jacket from a department store. The 
next day he was arraigned in the District of Columbia Supe-
rior Court on a charge of attempted petit larceny, a misde-
meanor punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one 
year. D.C. Code §§ 22-103, 22-2202 (1981). The court or-
dered petitioner committed to St. Elizabeth's, a public hospi-
tal for the mentally ill, for a determination of his competency 
to stand trial. 7 On March 2, 1976, a hospital psychologist 
submitted a report to the court stating that petitioner was 
competent to stand trial, that petitioner suffered from 
6 Section 24-545(b) provides in relevant part: 
"If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally ill and, because of 
that illness, likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at 
liberty, the court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate pe-
riod, or order any other alternative course of treatment which the court 
believes will be in the best interests of the person or of the public." 
See In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 1233 (DC 1979) (reading into the statute the 
due process requirement of "clear and convincing" proof). 
7 Section 24-301(a) authorizes the court to "order the accused committed 
to the District of Columbia General Hospital or other mental hospital desig-
nated by the court, for such reasonable period as the court may determine 
for examination and observation and for care and treatment if such is nec-
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"Schizophrenia, paranoid type," and that petitioner's alleged 
offense was "the product of his mental disease." Record 51. 
The court ruled that petitioner was competent to stand trial. 
Petitioner subsequently decided to plead not guilty by reason 
of insanity. The Government did not contest the plea, and it 
entered into a stipulation of facts with petitioner. On March 
12, 1976, the Superior Court found petitioner not guilty by 
reason of insanity and committed him to St. Elizabeth's pur-
suant to § 24-301(d)(l). 
On May 25, 1976, the court held the 50-day hearing re-
quired by § 24-301(d)(2)(A). A psychologist from St. Eliza-
beth's testified on behalf of the Government that, in the opin-
ion of the staff, petitioner continued to suffer from paranoid 
schizophrenia and that "because his illness is still quite ac-
tive, he is still a d~nger to himself and to others." Record 9. 
Petitioner's counsel conducted a brief cross-examination, and 
presented no evidence. 8 The court then found that "the de-
fendant-patient is mentally ill and as a result of his mental ill-
ness, at this time, he constitutes a danger to himself and oth-
ers." Id., at 13. Petitioner was returned to St. Elizabeth's. 
Petitioner obtained new counsel and, following some proce-
dural confusion, a release hearing pursuant to § 24-301(k)(2) 
was held on February 22, 1977. Petitioner demanded that 
he be unconditionally released or recommitted pursuant to 
the civil commitment standards in § 21-545(b), including a 
jury trial and proof by clear and convincing evidence of his 
illness and dangerousness. The Superior Court denied peti-
tioner's request for a civil commitment hearing, reaffirmed 
its findings at the May 25 hearing, and continued petitioner's 
commitmiih to St. Elizabeth's. . 
Petitioner appealed to the District of Qolumbia Court of 
Appeals. A panel of the court ·affirmed the Superior Court, 
396 A. 2d 183 (1978), but then granted rehearing and re-
8 Petitioner's counsel seemed concerned primarily about obtaining a 
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versed, 411 A. 2d 624 (1980). Finally, the court heard the 
case en bane and affirmed the judgment of the Superior 
Court. 432 A. 2d 364 (1981). The Court of Appeals re-
jected the argument "that the length of the prison sentence 
[petitioner] might have received determines when he is enti-
tled to release or civil commitment under Title 24 of the D.C. 
Code." Id., at 368. It then held that _ the various differ-
ences between civil commitment and commitment of insanity 
acquittees were justified under the equal-protection compo-
nent of the Fifth Amendment. I d. 1 at 371-376. 
We granted certiorari, 454 U. S. 1141 (1982), and now 
affirm. 
III 
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S., at 425. There-
fore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate purpose 
for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 
563, 574 (1975). A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity 
establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that 
would constitute a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the 
act because of mental illness. Congress has determined that 
a person as to whom those two findings were made is men-
tally ill and dangerous and therefore should be committed to 
a mental institution for treatment and the protection of soci-
ety. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970). 
The Due Process Clause also requires that "the nature and 
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the 
purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson v. 
Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of commit-
ment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commit-
ment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect 
him and society from his potential dangerousness. See 432 
A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statutory scheme 
for commitment of insane criminals is ... a regulatory, pro-
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phylactic statute, based on a legitimate governmental inter-
est in protecting society and rehabilitating mental pa-
tients."). The committed acquittee is entitled to release 
when he has recovered his sanity or when he is no longer dan-
gerous. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575-576; 
432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 
73-74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how 
long it will take for any given individual to recover-or in-
deed whether he ever will recover-Congress has chosen, as 
it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of 
commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the 
patient's suitability for release. 
In this case petitioner was committed to St. Elizabeth's 
upon being acquitted of attempted larceny by reason of insan-
ity. At two subsequent hearings the District of Columbia 
Superior Court found that he remained mentally ill and dan-
gerous. The correctness of those findings is not before us, 
as petitioner did not challenge them on appeal. 9 Nor are we 
asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release 
from confinement are constitutional. 10 Nor, indeed, does pe-
9 Petitioner, who urges that he has been confined unconstitutionally 
since 1977, seeks his release solely on the legal arguments raised in this 
case. Petitioner has not sought judicial review of the Superior Court's 
findings in 1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, nor 
does the record indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release hear-
ing-a hearing to which he is entitled every six months. On this record 
there is nothing to suggest that petitioner now is any less ill or dangerous 
than he was in 1976. See n. 14, infra. · 
'
0 As discussed above, the basic standard for release is the same under 
either civil commitment or commitment following acquittal by reason of in-
sanity: the individual must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he is no longer dangerous or mentally ill. There is one important differ-
ence, however, in the release provisions for these two groups. A patient 
who was committed civilly is entitled to unconditional release upon certi-
fication of his recovery by the hospital chief of service, §§ 21-546, 21-548 
whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be released upon such certi-
fication only with court approval. § 24-301(e). These provisions are not 
t 
. , 
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The question presented is whether petitioner, who was 
committed to a mental hospital upon being acquitted of a 
criminal offense by reason of insanity, must be released be-
cause he has been hospitalized for a period longer than he 
might have served in prison had he been convicted. 
L1/ 
In the District of Columbia I a _ 1.,..· m""i~ns::;alllfd~e'..:.-f-endant may ~ 
~ acquitted by reason of insanity •m.i= his insanity is "affir-
matively established by a preponderance of the evidence." 
D. C. Code § 24-301(j) (1981). 1 If he successfully invokes 
the insanity defense, he is committed to a mental hospital. 
1 Section 24-301(j) provides: 
"Insanity shall not be a defense in any criminal proceeding in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the Superior Court 
of the District of Columbia, unless the accused or his attorney in such pro-
ceeding, at the time the accused enters his plea of not guilty or within fif-
teen days thereafter or at such later time as the court may for good cause 
permit, files with the court and serves upon the prosecuting attorney writ-
ten notice of his intention to rely on such defense. No person accused of 
an offense shall be acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time 
of its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is 
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§ 24-301(d)(l). 2 The statute provides several ways of ob-
taining release. Within 50 days of commitment the acquittee 
is entitled to a judicial hearing to determine his eligibility for 
release, at which he has the burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or 
dangerous. § 24-301(d)(2). 3 If he fails to meet this burden 
at the 50-day hearing, the committed acquittee subsequently 
may be released, with court approval, upon certification of 
his recovery by the hospital chief of service. § 24-301(e). 4 
Alternatively, the acquittee is entitled to a judicial hear-
2 Section 24--301(d)(l) provides: 
"If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense 
raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground that he 
was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a hospi-
tal for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant 
to this subsection or subsection (e)." 
Under this provision, automatic commitment is permissible only if the de-
fendant himself raised the insanity defense. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, 
p. 74 (1970); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962). 
3 Section 24--301(d)(2) provides in relevant part: 
"(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) shall have a hearing, 
unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to determine whether he 
is entitled to release from custody .... 
(B) If the hearing is not waived, the court shall cause notice of the hear-
ing to be served upon the person, his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney 
and hold the hearing. Within ten days from the date the hearing was 
begun, the court shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law with respect thereto. The person confined shall have 
the burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the person confined is entitled to his release from custody, either con-
ditional or unconditional, the court shall enter such order as may appear 
appropriate." 
The statute does not specify the standard for determining release, but the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in this case that, as in release 
proceedings under § 24--301(e) and § 21-545(b), the confined person must 
show that he is either no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous to him-
self or others. See 432 A. 2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (1981) (en bane). 
'Section 24--301(e) provides in relevant part: 
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ing every six months at which he may establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he is entitled to release. 
§ 24-301(k). 5 • 
"Where any person has been confined in a hospital for the mentally ill 
pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, and the superintendent of such 
hospital certifies (1) that such person has recovered his sanity, (2) that, in 
the opinion of the superintendent, such person will not in the reasonable 
future be dangerous to himself or others, and (3) in the opinion of the su-
perintendent, the person is entitled to unconditional release from the hos-
pital, and such certificate is filed with the clerk of the court in which the 
person was tried, and a copy thereof served on the United States Attorney 
or the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, whichever office 
prosecuted the accused, such certificate shall be sufficient to authorize the 
court to order the unconditional release of the person so confined from fur-
ther hospitalization at the expiration of fifteen days from the time said cer-
tificate was filed and served as above; but the court in its discretion may, 
or upon the objection of the United States or the District of Columbia shall, 
after due notice, hold a hearing at which evidence as to the mental condi-
tion of the person so confined may be submitted, including the testimony of 
one or more psychiatrists from said hospital. The court shall weigh the 
evidence and, if the court finds that such person has recovered his sanity 
and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others, the 
court shall order such person unconditionally released from further confine-
ment in said hospital. If the court does not so find, the court shall order 
such person returned to said hospital. ... " 
5 Section 24--301(k) provides in relevant part: 
"(1) A person in custody or conditionally released from custody, pursu-
ant to the provisions of this section, claiming the right to be released from 
custody, the right to any change in the conditions of his release, or other 
relief concerning his custody, may move the court having jurisdiction to 
order his release, to release him from custody, to change the conditions of 
his release, or to grant other relief .... 
(3) ... On all issues raised by his motion, the person shall have the bur-
den of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the person is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or un-
conditional, a change in the conditions of his release, or other relief, the 
court shall enter such order as may appear appropriate .... 
(5) A court shall not be required to entertain a 2nd or successive motion 
for relief under this section more often than once every 6 months. A court 
for good cause shown may in its discretion entertain such a motion more 
4 
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Independent of its provision for the commitment of insan-
ity acquittees, the District of Columbia also has adopted a 
civil-commitment procedure, under which an individual may 
be committed upon clear and convincing proof by the Govern-
ment that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or oth-
ers. § 21-545(b). 6 The individual may demand a jury in the 
civil-commitment proceeding. § 21-544. Once committed, a 
patient may be released at any time upon certification of re-
covery by the hospital chief of service. §§ 21-546, 21-548. 
Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the first 90 days, 
and subsequently at 6-month intervals, to request a judicial 
hearing at which he may gain his release by proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or 
dangerous. § 21-546, 21-547; see Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F. 2d 
589, 598 (CADC 1970). 
II 
On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested for at-
tempting to steal a jacket from a department store. The 
next day he was arraigned in the District of Columbia Supe-
rior Court on a charge of attempted petit larceny, a misde-
meanor punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one 
year. §§ 22-103, 22-2202. The court ordered petitioner 
committed to St. Elizabeths, a public hospital for the men-
tally ill, for a determination of his competency to stand trial. 7 
often than once every 6 months." 
6 Section 24-545(b) provides in relevant part: 
"If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally ill and, because of 
that illness, likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at 
liberty, the court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate pe-
riod, or order any other alternative course of treatment which the court 
believes will be in the best interests of the person or of the public." 
See In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 1233 (DC 1979) (reading into the statute the 
due process requirement of "clear and convincing" proof). 
7 Section 24-301(a) authorizes the court to "order the accused committed 
to the District of Columbia General Hospital or other mental hospital desig-
nated by the court, for such reasonable period as the court may determine 
81-519&-0PINION 
JONES v. UNITED STATES 5 
On March 2, 1976, a hospital psychologist submitted a report 
to the court stating that petitioner was competent to stand 
trial, that petitioner suffered from "Schizophrenia, paranoid 
type," and that petitioner's alleged offense was "the product 
of his mental disease." Record 51. The court ruled that pe-
titioner was competent to stand trial. Petitioner subse-
quently decided to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. 
The Government did not contest the plea, and it entered into 
a stipulation of facts with petitioner. On March 12, 1976, the 
Superior Court found petitioner not guilty by reason of in-
sanity and committed him to St. Elizabeths pursuant to 
§ 24-301(d)(l). 
On May 25, 1976, the court held the 50-day hearing re-
quired by § 24-301(d)(2)(A). A psychologist from St. Eliza-
beths testified on behalf of the Government that, in the opin-
ion of the staff, petitioner continued to suffer from paranoid 
schizophrenia and that "because his illness is still quite ac-
tive, he is still a danger to himself and to others." Record 9. 
Petitioner's counsel conducted a brief cross-examination, and 
presented no evidence. 8 The court then found that "the de-
fendant-patient is mentally ill and as a result of his mental ill-
ness, at this time, he constitutes a danger to himself and oth-
ers." Id., at 13. Petitioner was returned to St. Elizabeths. 
Petitioner obtained new counsel and, following some proce-
dural confusion, a second release hearing was held on Febru-
ary 22, 1977. Petitioner demanded that he be released un-
conditionally or recommitted pursuant to the civil-commit-
ment standards in § 21-545(b), including a jury trial and proof 
by clear and convincing evidence of his mental illness and 
dangerousness. The Superior Court denied petitioner's re-
for examination and observation and for care and treatment if such is nec-
essary by the psychiatric staff of said hospital." 
8 Petitioner's counsel seemed concerned primarily about obtaining a 




JONES v. UNITED STATES 
quest for a civil-commitment hearing, reaffirmed the findings 
made at the May 25, 1976, hearing, and continued petitioner's 
commitment to St. Elizabeths. 9 
Petitioner appealed to the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals. A panel of the court affirmed the Superior Court, 
396 A. 2d 183 (1978), but then granted rehearing and re-
versed, 411 A. 2d 624 (1980). Finally, the court heard the 
case en bane and affirmed the judgment of the Superior 
Court. 432 A. 2d 364 (1981). The Court of Appeals re-
jected the argument "that the length of the prison sentence 
[petitioner] might have received determines when he is enti-
tled to release or civil commitment under Title 24 of the D. C. 
Code." Id., at 368. It then held that the various differ-
ences between civil commitment and commitment of insanity 
acquittees were justified under the equal-protection compo-
nent of the Fifth Amendment. Id., at 371-376. 
We granted certiorari, 454 U. S. 1141 (1982), and now 
affirm. 
III 
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 425 (1979). 
Therefore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate 
purpose for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 
U. S. 563, 574 (1975). Congress has determined that a per-
son found not guilty by reason of insanity should be commit-
ted indefinitely to a mental institution for treatment and the 
protection of society. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73--74 
9 "A subsequent motion for unconditional release under § 301(k) was de-
nied in March of 1977. Three months later, however, [petitioner] was 
granted conditional release on terms recommended by St. Elizabeths' staff, 
allowing daytime and overnight visits into the community. He was also 
admitted into the civil division of the hospital, though as a result of disrup-
tive behavior, he was retransferred to the forensic division." Jones v. 
United States, 432 A. 2d 364, 368, n. 6 (1981) (en bane). 
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(1970); Jones v. United States, 432 A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he Dis-
trict of Columbia statutory scheme for commitment of insane 
criminals is ... a regulatory, prophylactic statute, based on 
a legitimate governmental interest in protecting society and 
rehabilitating mental patients"). Petitioner does not contest 
the Government's authority to commit a mentally ill and dan-
gerous person indefinitely to a mental institution, but rather 
contends that "the petitioner's trial was not a constitution-
ally adequate hearing to justify an indefinite commitment." 
Brief for Petitioner 14. 
Petitioner's argument rests principally on Addington v. 
Texas, supra, in which the Court held that the Due Process 
Clause requires the Government in a civil-commitment pro-
ceeding to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 
the individual is mentally ill and dangerous. 441 U. S., at 
426-427. Petitioner contends that these due-process stand-
ards were not met in his case because the judgment of not 
guilty by reason of insanity did not constitute a finding of 
present mental illness and dangerousness and because it was 
established only by a preponderance of the evidence. 10 Peti-
10 In the Court of Appeals petitioner apparently based these arguments 
on equal protection rather than due process, arguing that it was irrational 
for the Government to deny him a civil-commitment hearing at which the 
Government bore the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. 
See 432 A. 2d, at 371. Both petitioner and the Government acknowledge 
that this equal protection argument essentially duplicates petitioner's due 
process argument. That is, if the Due Process Clause does not require 
that an insanity acquittee be given the particular procedural safeguards 
provided in a civil-commitment hearing under Addington, then there nec-
essarily is a rational basis for equal protection purposes for distinguishing 
between civil commitment and commitment of insanity acquittees. See 
Reply Brief for Petitioner 22-23; Brief for Government 55. We agree, and 
therefore address petitioner's arguments in terms of the Due Process 
Clause. 
Petitioner does raise one additional equal protection argument that 
stands on its own. The District of Columbia provides for a jury at civil-
commitment hearings, see § 21-544, and petitioner contends that equal 
8 
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tioner then concludes that the Government's only conceivably 
legitimate justification for automatic commitment is to en-
sure that insanity acquittees do not escape confinement en-
tirely, and that this interest can justify commitment at most 
for a period equal to the maximum prison sentence the ac-
quittee could have received if convicted. Because petitioner 
has been hospitalized for longer than the one year he might 
have served in prison, he asserts that he should be released 
unconditionally or recommitted under the civil-commitment 
procedures. 11 
A 
We turn first to the question whether the finding of insan-
protection requires that insanity acquittees also be permitted to demand a 
jury at the 50-day hearing. Because we determine that an acquittee's 
commitment is based on the judgment of insanity at the criminal trial, 
rather than solely on the findings at the 50-day hearing, see infra, at--, 
the relevant equal protection comparison concerns the procedures available 
at the criminal trial and at a civil-commitment hearing. We therefore 
agree with the Court of Appeals that the absence of a jury at the 50-day 
hearing "is justified by the fact that the acquittee has had a right to a jury 
determination of his sanity at the time of the offense." 432 A. 2d, at 373. 
11 It is important to note what issues are not raised in this case. Peti-
tioner has not sought appellate review of the Superior Court's findings in 
1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, and, indeed, 
the record does not indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release 
hearing-a hearing to which he was entitled every six months. 
Nor are we asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release 
are constitutional. As noted above, see supra, at 2-4, the basic standard 
for release is the same under either civil commitment or commitment fol-
lowing acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual must prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he no longer is dangerous or mentally ill. 
There is an important difference, however, in the release provisions for 
these two groups. A patient who was committed civilly is entitled to un-
conditional release upon certification of his recovery by the hospital chief of 
service, see § 21-546, whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be re-
leased upon such certification only with court approval, see § 24-301(e). 
Neither of these provisions is before the Court, as petitioner has chal-
lenged neither the adequacy of the release standards generally nor the dis-
parity in treatment of insanity acquittees and other committed persons. 
See Jones v. United States, 432 A. 2d, at 373, n. 19. 
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ity at the criminal trial is sufficiently probative of mental ill-
ness and dangerousness to justify commitment. A verdict of 
not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the 
defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal of-
fense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness. 
Congress has determined that these findings constitute an 
adequate basis for hospitalizing the acquittee as a dangerous 
and mentally ill person. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, 
at 74 (expressing fear that "dangerous criminals, particularly 
psychopaths, [may] win acquittals of serious criminal charges 
on grounds of insanity" and yet "escape hospital commit-
ment"); S. Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955) 
("Where [the] accused has pleaded insanity as a defense to a 
crime, and the jury has found that the defendant was, in fact, 
insane at the time the crime was committed, it is just and 
reasonable in the Committee's opinion that the insanity, once 
established, should be presumed to continue and that the ac-
cused should automatically be confined for treatment until it 
can be shown that he has recovered"). We cannot say that it 
was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional for Con-
gress to make this determination. 
The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates 
dangerousness~2 [§ee Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705, 
f 714 (1962) (The fact that the accused was found to have com-mitted a criminal act is "strong evidence that his continued liberty could imperil 'the preservation of the peace"f} In-
deed, this concrete evidence generally may be at least as per-
12 The proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the acquittee committed a 
criminal act distinguishes this case from Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715 
(1972), in which the Court held that a person found incompetent to stand 
trial could not be committed indefinitely solely on the basis of the finding of 
incompetency. In Jackson there never was any affirmative proof that the 
accused had committed criminal acts or otherwise was dangerous. 
10 
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suasive as any predictions about dangerousness that might be 
made in a civil-commitment proceeding. 13 We do not agree 
with petitioner's suggestion that the requisite dangerousness 
is not established by proof that a person committed a non-
violent crime against property constitutes a danger to soci-
ety. This Court never has held that "violence," however 
that term might be defined, is a prerequisite for a constitu-
tional commitment. 14 
13 In attacking the predictive value of the insanity acquittal, petitioner 
complains that "[w]hen Congress enacted the present statutory scheme, it 
did not cite any empirical evidence indicating that mentally ill persons who 
have committed a criminal act are likely to commit additional dangerous 
acts in the future." Reply Brief for Petitioner 13. He further argues that 
the available research fails to support the predictive value of prior danger-
ous acts. See id., at 13-14. We do not agree with the suggestion that 
Congress' power to legislate in this area depends on the research con-
ducted by the psychiatric community. We have recognized repeatedly the 
"uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional 
judgment. The only thing that can be said about the present state of 
knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not 
reached finality of judgment .... " Greenwood v. United States, 350 
U. S. 366, 375 (1956). See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 472 (1981); 
Addington, 441 U. S., at 429-430; Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 53fr.537 
(1968) (opinion of MARSHALL, J.). The lesson we have drawn is not that 
government may not act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that we 
should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments. 
14 See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 302 F. 2d 852, 861 (CADC 1961) (Burger, 
J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to 
confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder 
or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the 
same as to both.") (footnote omitted). also may e no e a crimes o 
theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the criminal to 
escape or the victim to protect property or the police to apprehend the flee-
ing criminal. 
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual, of course, should 
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is note-
worthy that petitioner's continuing commitment may well rest in signifi-
cant part on evidence independent of his acquittal by reason of insanity of 
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Nor can we say that it was unreasonable for Congress to 
determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference of 
continuing mental illness. It comports with common sense 
to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient 
to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and 
in need of treatment. The precise evidentiary force of the 
insanity acquittal, of course, may vary from case to case, but 
the Due Process Clause does not require Congress to make 
classifications that fit every individual with the same degree 
of relevance. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 
428 (1974). Because a hearing is provided within 50 days of 
the commitment, there is assurance that every acquittee has 
prompt opportunity to obtain release if he has recovered. 
Petitioner also argues that, whatever the evidentiary value 
of the insanity acquittal, the Government lacks a legitimate 
reason for committing insanity acquittees automatically be-
cause it can introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a 
subsequent civil proceeding. This argument fails to consider 
the Government's strong interest in avoiding the need to con-
duct a de novo commitment hearing following every insanity 
acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may be demanded, 
§ 21-545, and at which the Government bears the burden of 
proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing 
on the critical question of whether the acquittee has recov-
ered, the new proceeding likely would have to relitigate 
much of the criminal trial. These problems accent the Gov-
ernment's important interest in automatic commitment. See 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976). We there-
Elizabeth's reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide." 
Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was transferred to the civil 
division of the hospital, but was transferred back to the forensic division 
because of disruptive behavior. Jones v. United States, 432 A. 2d, at 368, 
n. 6. The Government also advises that after petitioner was released un-
conditionally following the second panel decision below, he had to be re-
committed on an emergency civil basis two weeks later for conduct unre-
lated to the original commitment. See Brief for United States at 15 n. 18. 
12 
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fore conclude that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity 
is a sufficient foundation for commitment of an insanity ac-
quittee for the purposes of treatment and the protection of 
society. 
B 
Petitioner next contends that his indefinite commitment is 
unconstitutional because the proof of his insanity was based 
only on a preponderance of the evidence, as compared to 
Addington's civil-commitment requirement of proof by clear 
and convincing evidence. In equating these situations, peti-
tioner ignores important differences between the class of po-
tential civil commitment candidates and the class of insanity 
acquittees that justify differing standards of proof. The 
Addington Court expressed particular concern that members 
of the public could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal 
behavior which might be perceived by some as symptomatic 
of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within 
a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S., 
at 426-427. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 
575. In view of this concern, the Court deemed it inappro-
priate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the 
risk of error." Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. But since 
automatic commitment under § 24-301(d)(i) follows only if the 
acquittee himself advances insanity as a defense and proves 
that his criminal act was a product of his mental illness, 15 
there is good reason for diminished concern as to the risk of 
error. 16 More important, the proof that he committed a 
15 See n. 2, supra. In this case petitioner stipulated that he had commit-
ted the offense by reason of insanity. 
16 That petitioner raised the insanity defense also diminishes the sig-
nificance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social 
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the indi-
vidual." 441 U. S., at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises 
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and 
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect. 
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criminal act as a result of mental illness eliminates the risk 
that he is being committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior," 
Addington, supra, at 427. A criminal act by definition is not 
"within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 
Id. , at 426-427. 
We therefore conclude that concerns critical to our decision in 
Addington are diminished or absent in the case of insanity 
acquittees. Accordingly, there is no reason for adopting the 
same standard of proof in both cases. "[D]ue process is flex-
ible and calls for such procedural protections as the par-
ticular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of the evidence stand-
ard comports with due process for commitment of insanity 
acquittees. 17 
C 
The remaining question is whether petitioner nonetheless 
is entitled to his release because he has been hospitalized for 
a period longer than he could have been incarcerated if con-
victed. The Due Process Clause requires that "the nature 
and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to 
the purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson 
v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of com-
mitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil com-
mitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and pro-
tect him and society from his potential dangerousness. The 
committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recov-
ered his sanity or when he is no longer dangerous. See 
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575-576; Jones v. 
17 A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher stand-
ard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement hardly would bene-
fit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet impo-
sition of a higher standard would be the likely legislative response to a 
holding that an insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment 
only if the verdict were supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
14 
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United States, 432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 
91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970). And because it is impossible to 
predict how long it will take for any given individual to re-
cover-or indeed whether he ever will recover-Congress 
has chosen, as it has with respect to civil commitment, to 
leave the length of commitment indeterminate, subject to pe-
riodic review of the patient's suitability for release. 
In light of the congressional purposes underlying commit-
ment of insanity acquittees, we think petitioner clearly errs 
in contending that an acquittee's hypothetical maximum sen-
tence provides the constitutional limit for his commitment. 
A particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to reflect 
society's view of the proper response to commission of a par-
ticular criminal offense, based on a variety of considerations 
such as retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. See, 
e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 183-186 (1976) (opin-
ion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168 (1963); Williams v. 
New York, 337 U. S. 241, 24~249 (1949). The State may 
punish a person convicted of a crime even if satisfied that he 
is unlikely to commit further crimes. 
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insan-
ity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be pun-
ished. 18 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and 
dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia stat-
ute, no matter how serious the act committed by the acquit-
tee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal if he 
has recovered. In contrast, one who committed a less seri-
ous act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill 
and dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation be-
tween severity of the offense and length of time necessary for 
recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical crimi-
18 As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]ociety may not excuse a de-
fendant's criminal behavior because of his insanity and at the same time 
punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432 A. 2d, at 369. 
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nal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his 
commitment. 19 
V 
We hold that when a criminal defendant establishes by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime by 
reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the Government, 
on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to a 
mental institution until such time as he has regained his san-
ity or is no longer a danger to himself or society. This hold-
ing accords with the widely and reasonably held view that in-
sanity acquittees constitute a special class that should be 
treated differently from other candidates for commitment. 20 
1
• The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involun-
tarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his 
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for 
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. 
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity 
acquittee, and none suggested that a person under non-criminal confine-
ment could not be confined in excess of the period for which he could have 
served in prison if convicted for the dangerous acts he had committed. 
The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to determine the 
length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested by petitioner's failure to 
suggest any clear guidelines for deciding when a patient must be released. 
For example, he does not suggest whether the Due Process Clause would 
require States to limit commitment of insanity acquittees to maximum sen-
tences or minimum sentences. Nor does he explain what should be done in 
the case of indeterminate sentencing or suggest whether account would 
have to be taken of the availability of release time or the possibility of pa-
role. And petitioner avoids entirely the important question of how his 
theory would apply to those persons who committed especially serious 
criminal acts. Petitioner thus would leave the States to speculate how 
they may deal constitutionally with acquittees who might have received life 
imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or the death 
penalty. 
20 A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions 
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while 
many other States have a variety of special methods of commiting insanity 
16 
81-5195-OPINION 
JONES v. UNITED STATES 
We have observed before that "[ w ]hen Congress undertakes 
to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertain-
ties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts 
should be cautious not to rewrite legislation. . . . " Marshall 
v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). This admonition 
has particular force in the context of legislative efforts to deal 
with the special problems raised by the insanity defense. 
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606, and nn. 4-6 (1981). Nineteen States commit 
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment. 
Id., at 605 n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law peti-
tioner's suggested requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be re-
leased following expiration of his maximum criminal sentence. See Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 53a-47(b) (Supp. 1981). 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether petitioner, who was 
committed to a mental hospital upon being acquitted of a 
criminal offense by reason of insanity, must be released be-
cause he has been hospitalized for a period longer than he 
might have served in prison had he been convicted. 
I 
In the District of Columbia a criminal defendant may not 
be acquitted by reason of insanity unless his insanity is "affir-
matively established by a preponderance of the evidence." 
D. C. Code § 24-301(j) (1981). 1 If he successfully invokes 
the insanity defense, he is committed to a mental hospital. 
1 Section 24-30l(j) provides: 
"Insanity shall not be a defense in any criminal proceeding in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the Superior Court 
of the District of Columbia, unless the accused or his attorney in such pro-
ceeding, at the time the accused enters his plea of not guilty or within fif-
teen days thereafter or at such later time as the court may for good cause 
permit, files with the court and serves upon the prosecuting attorney writ-
ten notice of his intention to rely on such defense. No person accused of 
an offense shall be acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time 
of its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is 
affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence." 
2 
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§ 24-301(d)(l). 2 The statute provides several ways of ob-
taining release. Within 50 days of commitment the acquittee 
is entitled to a judicial hearing to determine his eligibility for 
release, at which he has the burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or 
dangerous. § 24-301(d)(2). 3 If he fails to meet this burden 
at the 50-day hearing, the committed acquittee subsequently 
may be released, with court approval, upon certification of 
his recovery by the hospital chief of service. § 24-301(e). 4 
Alternatively, the acquittee is entitled to a judicial hear-
2 Section 24--301(d)(l) provides: 
"If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense 
raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground that he 
was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a hospi-
tal for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant 
to this subsection or subsection (e)." 
Under this provision, automatic commitment is permissible only if the de-
fendant himself raised the insanity defense. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, 
p. 74 (1970); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962). 
3 Section 24--301(d)(2) provides in relevant part: 
"(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) shall have a hearing, 
unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to determine whether he 
is entitled to release from custody .... 
(B) If the hearing is not waived, the court shall cause notice of the hear-
ing to be served upon the person, his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney 
and hold the hearing. Within ten days from the date the hearing was 
begun, the court shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law with respect thereto. The person confined shall have 
the burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the person confined is entitled to his release from custody, either con-
ditional or unconditional, the court shall enter such order as may appear 
appropriate." 
The statute does not specify the standard for determining release, but the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in this case that, as in release 
proceedings under § 24--301(e) and § 21-545(b), the confined person must 
show that he is either no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous to him-
self or others. See 432 A. 2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (1981) (en bane). 
' Section 24--301(e) provides in relevant part: 
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ing every six months at which he may establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he is entitled to release. 
§24-301(k). 5 
"Where any person has been confined in a hospital for the mentally ill 
pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, and the superintendent of such 
hospital certifies (1) that such person has recovered his sanity, (2) that, in 
the opinion of the superintendent, such person will not in the reasonable 
future be dangerous to himself or others, and (3) in the opinion of the su-
perintendent, the person is entitled to unconditional release from the hos-
pital, and such certificate is filed with the clerk of the court in which the 
person was tried, and a copy thereof served on the United States Attorney 
or the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, whichever office 
prosecuted the accused, such certificate shall be sufficient to authorize the 
court to order the unconditional release of the person so confined from fur-
ther hospitalization at the expiration of fifteen days from the time said cer-
tificate was filed and served as above; but the court in its discretion may, 
or upon the objection of the United States or the District of Columbia shall, 
after due notice, hold a hearing at which evidence as to the mental condi-
tion of the person so confined may be submitted, including the testimony of 
one or more psychiatrists from said hospital. The court shall weigh the 
evidence and, if the court finds that such person has recovered his sanity 
and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others, the 
court shall order such person unconditionally released from further confine-
ment in said hospital. If the court does not so find, the court shall order 
such person returned to said hospital. ... " 
5 Section 24-301(k) provides in relevant part: 
"(1) A person in custody or conditionally released from custody, pursu-
ant to the provisions of this section, claiming the right to be released from 
custody, the right to any change in the conditions of his release, or other 
relief concerning his custody, may move the court having jurisdiction to 
order his release, to release him from custody, to change the conditions of 
his release, or to grant other relief .... 
(3) ... On all issues raised by his motion, the person shall have the bur-
den of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the person is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or un-
conditional, a change in the conditions of his release, or other relief, the 
court shall enter such order as may appear appropriate .... 
(5) A court shall not be required to entertain a 2nd or successive motion 
for relief under this section more often than once every 6 months. A court 
for good cause shown may in its discretion entertain such a motion more 
4 
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Independent of its provision for the commitment of insan-
ity acquittees, the District of Columbia also has adopted a 
civil-commitment procedure, under which an individual may 
be committed upon clear and convincing proof by the Govern-
ment that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or oth-
ers. §21-545(b). 6 The individual may demand a jury in the 
civil-commitment proceeding. § 21-544. Once committed, a 
patient may be released at any time upon certification of re-
covery by the hospital chief of service. §§ 21-546, 21-548. 
Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the first 90 days, 
and subsequently at 6-month intervals, to request a judicial 
hearing at which he may gain his release by proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or 
dangerous. § 21-546, 21-547; see Dixon v. Jacobs, --
U. S. App. D. C. -, -, 427 F. 2d 589, 598 (1970). 
II 
On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested for at-
tempting to steal a jacket from a department store. The 
next day he was arraigned in the District of Columbia Supe-
rior Court on a charge of attempted petit larceny, a misde-
meanor punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one 
year. §§ 22-103, 22-2202. The court ordered petitioner 
committed to St. Elizabeths, a public hospital for the men-
tally ill, for a determination of his competency to stand trial. 7 
often than once every 6 months." 
6 Section 24-545(b) provides in relevant part: 
"If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally ill and, because of 
that illness, likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at 
liberty, the court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate pe-
riod, or order any other alternative course of treatment which the court 
believes will be in the best interests of the person or of the public." 
See In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 1233 (DC 1979) (reading into the statute the 
due process requirement of "clear and convincing" proof). 
7 Section 24-301(a) authorizes the court to "order the accused committed 
to the District of Columbia General Hospital or other mental hospital desig-
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On March 2, 1976, a hospital psychologist submitted a report 
to the court stating that petitioner was competent to stand 
trial, that petitioner suffered from "Schizophrenia, paranoid 
type," and that petitioner's alleged offense was "the product 
of his mental disease." Record 51. The court ruled that pe-
titioner was competent to stand trial. Petitioner subse-
quently decided to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. 
The Government did not contest the plea, and it entered into 
a stipulation of facts with petitioner. On March 12, 1976, the 
Superior Court found petitioner not guilty by reason of in-
sanity and committed him to St. Elizabeths pursuant to 
§ 24-301(d)(l). 
On May 25, 1976, the court held the 50-day hearing re-
quired by § 24-301(d)(2)(A). A psychologist from St. Eliza-
beths testified on behalf of the Government that, in the opin-
ion of the staff, petitioner continued to suffer from paranoid 
schizophrenia and that "because his illness is still quite ac-
tive, he is still a danger to himself and to others." Tran-
script 9. Petitioner's counsel conducted a brief cross-exami-
nation, and presented no evidence. 8 The court then found 
that "the defendant-patient is mentally ill and as a result of 
his mental illness, at this time, he constitutes a danger to 
himself or others." Id., at 13. Petitioner was returned to 
St. Elizabeths. IPetitioner obtained new counsel and, follow-
ing some procect'ural confusion, a second release hearing was 
held on February 22, 1977. By that date petitioner had been 
hospitalized for more than one year, the maximum period he 
could have spent if prison if he had been convicted. On -Mt 
basis he demanded that he be released unconditionally or re-
nated by the court, for such reasonable period as the court may determine 
for examination and observation and for care and treatment if such is nec-
essary by the psychiatric staff of said hospital." 
8 Petitioner's counsel seemed concerned primarily about obtaining a 
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committed pursuant to the civil-commitment standards in 
§ 21-545(b), including a jury trial and proof by clear and con-
vincing evidence of his mental illness and dangerousness. 
The Superior Court denied petitioner's request for a civil-
commitment hearing, reaffirmed the findings made at the 
May 25, 1976, hearing, and continued petitioner's commit-
ment to St. Elizabeths. 9 
Petitioner appealed to the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals. A panel of the court affirmed the Superior Court, 
396 A. 2d 183 (1978), but then granted rehearing and re-
versed, 411 A. 2d 624 (1980). Finally, the court heard the 
case en bane and affirmed the judgment of the Superior 
Court. 432 A. 2d 364 (1981). The Court of Appeals re-
jected the argument "that the length of the prison sentence 
[petitioner] might have received determines when he is enti-
tled to release or civil commitment under Title 24 of the D. C. 
Code." Id., at 368. It then held that the various statutory 
differences between civil commitment and commitment of in-
sanity acquittees were justified under the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment. Id., at 371-376. 
We granted certiorari, 454 U. S. 1141 (1982), and now 
affirm. 
III 
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 425 (1979). 
Therefore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate 
purpose for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 
9 "A subsequent motion for unconditional release under § 301(k) was de-
nied in March of 1977. Three months later, however, [petitioner] was 
granted conditional release on terms recommended by St. Elizabeths' staff, 
allowing daytime and overnight visits into the community. He was also 
admitted into the civil division of the hospital, though as a result of disrup-
tive behavior, he was retransferred to the forensic division." 432 A. 2d, at 
368, n. 6. 
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U. S. 563, 574 (1975). Congress has determined that a crim-
inal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity in the 
District of Columbia should be committed indefinitely to a 
mental institution for treatment and the protection of society. 
See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970); Jones v. United 
States, 432 A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statu-
tory scheme for commitment of insane criminals is . . . a reg-
ulatory, prophylactic statute, based on a legitimate govern-
mental interest in protecting society and rehabilitating 
mental patients"). Petitioner does not contest the Govern-
ment's authority to commit a mentally ill and dangerous per-
son indefinitely to a mental institution, but rather contends 
that "the petitioner's trial was not a constitution-
ally adequate hearing to justify an indefinite commitment." 
Brief for Petitioner 14. 
Petitioner's argument rests principally on Addington v. 
Texas, supra, in which the Court held that the Due Process 
Clause requires the Government in a civil-commitment pro-
ceeding to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 
the individual is mentally ill and dangerous. 441 U. S., at 
426-427. Petitioner contends that these due process stand-
ards were not met in his case because the judgment of not 
guilty by reason of insanity did not constitute a finding of 
present mental illness and dangerousness and because it was 
established only by a preponderance of the evidence. 10 Peti-
10 In the Court of Appeals petitioner apparently based these arguments 
on equal protection rather than due process, arguing that it was irrational 
for the Government to deny him a civil-commitment hearing at which the 
Government bore the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. 
See 432 A. 2d, at 371. Both petitioner and the Government acknowledge 
that this equal protection argument essentially duplicates petitioner's due 
process argument. That is, if the Due Process Clause does not require 
that an insanity acquittee be given the particular procedural safeguards 
provided in a civil-commitment hearing under Addington, then there nec-
essarily is a rational basis for equal protection purposes for distinguishing 
between civil commitment and commitment of insanity acquittees. See 
8 
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tioner then concludes that the Government's only conceivably 
legitimate justification for automatic commitment is to en-
sure that insanity acquittees do not escape confinement en-
tirely, and that this interest can justify commitment at most 
for a period equal to the maximum prison sentence the ac-
quittee could have received if convicted. Because petitioner 
has been hospitalized for longer than the one year he might 
have served in prison, he asserts that he should be released 
unconditionally or recommitted under the District's civil-
commitment procedures. 11 
Reply Brief for Petitioner 22-23; Brief for Government 55. We agree, and 
therefore address petitioner's arguments in terms of the Due Process 
Clause. 
Petitioner does raise one additional equal protection argument that 
stands on its own. The District of Columbia provides for a jury at civil-
commitment hearings, see § 21-544, and petitioner contends that equal 
protection requires that insanity acquittees also be permitted to demand a 
jury at the 50-day hearing. Because we determine that an acquittee's 
commitment is based on the judgment of insanity at the criminal trial, 
rather than solely on the findings at the 50-day hearing, see infra, at 9-12, 
the relevant equal protection comparison concerns the procedures available 
at the criminal trial and at a civil-commitment hearing. We therefore 
agree with the Court of Appeals that the absence of a jury at the 50-day 
hearing "is justified by the fact that the acquittee has had a right to a jury 
determination of his sanity at the time of the offense." 432 A. 2d, at 373. 
11 It is important to note what issues are not raised in this case. Peti-
tioner has not sought appellate review of the Superior Court's findings in 
1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, and, indeed, 
the record does not indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release 
hearing-a hearing to which he was entitled every six months. 
Nor are we asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release 
are constitutional. As noted above, see supra, at 2-4, the basic standard 
for release is the same under either civil commitment or commitment fol-
lowing acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual must prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he is no longer dangerous or mentally ill. 
There is an important difference, however, in the release provisions for 
these two groups. A patient who is committed civilly is entitled to uncon-
ditional release upon certification of his recovery by the hospital chief of 
service, see § 21-546, whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be re-
81-5191>-OPINION 
JONES v. UNITED STATES 
A 
9 
We turn first to the question whether the finding of insan-
ity at the criminal trial is sufficiently probative of mental ill-
ness and dangerousness to justify commitment. A verdict of 
not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the 
defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal of-
fense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness. 
Congress has determined that these findings constitute an 
adequate basis for hospitalizing the acquittee as a dangerous 
and mentally ill person. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, 
at 74 (expressing fear that "dangerous criminals, particularly 
psychopaths, [may] win acquittals of serious criminal charges 
on grounds of insanity" and yet "escape hospital commit-
ment"); S. Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955) 
("Where [the] accused has pleaded insanity as a defense to a 
crime, and the jury has found that the defendant was, in fact, 
insane at the time the crime was committed, it is just and 
reasonable in the Committee's opinion that the insanity, once 
established, should be presumed to continue and that the ac-
cused should automatically be confined for treatment until it 
can be shown that he has recovered"). We cannot say that it 
was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional for Con-
gress to make this determination. 
The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates 
dangerousness. 12 See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705, 
leased upon such certification only with court approval, see § 24-301(e). 
Neither of these provisions is before the Court, as petitioner has chal-
lenged neither the adequacy of the release standards generally nor the dis-
parity in treatment of insanity acquittees and other committed persons. 
See 432 A. 2d, at 373, n. 19. 
12 The proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the acquittee committed a 
criminal act distinguishes this case from Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715 
(1972), in which the Court held that a person found incompetent to stand 
trial could not be committed indefinitely solely on the basis of the finding of 
incompetency. In Jackson there never was any affirmative proof that the 
10 
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714 (1962) (The fact that the accused was found to have com-
mitted a criminal act is "strong evidence that his continued 
liberty could imperil 'the preservation of the peace'"). In-
deed, this concrete evidence generally may be at least as per-
suasive as any predictions about dangerousness that might be 
made in a civil-commitment proceeding. 13 We do not agree 
with petitioner's suggestion that the requisite dangerousness 
is not established by proof that a person committed a non-
violent crime against property. This Court never has held 
that "violence," however that term might be defined, is a pre-
requisite for a constitutional commitment. 14 
accused had committed criminal acts or otherwise was dangerous. 
13 In attacking the predictive value of the insanity acquittal, petitioner 
complains that "[w]hen Congress enacted the present statutory scheme, it 
did not cite any empirical evidence indicating that mentally ill persons who 
have committed a criminal act are likely to commit additional dangerous 
acts in the future." Reply Brief for Petitioner 13. He further argues that 
the available research fails to support the predictive value of prior danger-
ous acts. See id., at 13-14. We do not agree with the suggestion that 
Congress' power to legislate in this area depends on the research con-
ducted by the psychiatric community. We have recognized repeatedly the 
"uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional 
judgment. The only certain thing that can be said about the present state 
of knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not 
reached finality of judgment .... " Greenwood v. United States, 350 
U. S. 366, 375 (1956). See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 472 (1981); 
Addington, 441 U. S., at 429--430; Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 53&--537 
(1968) (plurality opinion). The lesson we have drawn is not that govern-
ment may not act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that courts 
should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments. 
14 See Overholser v. O'Beirne, -- App. D. C. --, 302 F. 2d 852, 861 
(1961) (Burger, J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-
dangerous' is to confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less vio-
lent than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the 
statute is the same as to both.") (footnote omitted). It also may be noted 
that crimes of theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts of the 
criminal to escape or the victim to protect property or the police to appre-
hend the fleeing criminal. 
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual, of course, should 
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Nor can we say that it was unreasonable for Congress to 
determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference of 
continuing mental illness. It comports with common sense 
to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient 
to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and 
in need of treatment. The precise evidentiary force of the 
insanity acquittal, of course, may vary from case to case, but 
the Due Process Clause does not require Congress to make 
classifications that fit every individual with the same degree 
of relevance. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 
428 (1974). Because a hearing is provided within 50 days of 
the commitment, there is assurance that every acquittee has 
prompt opportunity to obtain release if he has recovered. 
Petitioner also argues that, whatever the evidentiary value 
of the insanity acquittal, the Government lacks a legitimate 
reason for committing insanity acquittees automatically be-
cause it can introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a 
subsequent civil proceeding. This argument fails to consider 
the Government's strong interest in avoiding the need to con-
duct a de novo commitment hearing following every insanity 
acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may be demanded, 
§ 21-544, and at which the Government bears the burden of 
proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing 
on the critical question whether the acquittee has recovered, 
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is note-
worthy that petitioner's continuing commitment may well rest in signifi-
cant part on evidence independent of his acquittal by reason of insanity of 
the crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St. 
Elizabeths reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide." 
Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was transferred to the civil 
division of the hospital, but was transferred back to the forensic division 
because of disruptive behavior. See n. 9, supra. The Government also 
advises that after petitioner was released unconditionally following the sec-
ond panel decision below, he had to be recommitted on an emergency civil 
basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to the original commitment. 
See Brief for United States at 15 n. 18. 
12 
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the new proceeding likely would have to relitigate much of 
the criminal trial. These problems accent the Government's 
important interest in automatic commitment. See Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976). We therefore con-
clude that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is a suf-
ficient foundation for commitment of an insanity acquittee for 
the purposes of treatment and the protection of society. 
B 
Petitioner next contends that his indefinite commitment is 
unconstitutional because the proof of his insanity was based 
only on a preponderance of the evidence, as compared to 
Addington's civil-commitment requirement of proof by clear 
and convincing evidence. In equating these situations, peti-
tioner ignores important differences between the class of po-
tential civil-commitment candidates and the class of insanity 
acquittees that justify differing standards of proof. The 
Addington Court expressed particular concern that members 
of the public could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal 
behavior which might be perceived by some as symptomatic 
of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within . 
a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S., 
at 426--427. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 
575. In view of this concern, the Court deemed it inappro-
priate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the 
risk of error." Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. But since 
automatic commitment under § 24-301(d)(l) follows only if 
the acquittee himself advances insanity as a defense and 
proves that his criminal act was a product of his mental ill-
ness, 15 there is good reason for diminished concern as to the 
risk of error. 16 More important, the proof that he committed 
1
• See n. 2, supra. In this case petitioner stipulated that he had commit-
ted the offense by reason of insanity. 
16 That petitioner raised the insanity defense also diminishes the sig-
nificance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social 
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a criminal act as a result of mental illness eliminates the risk 
that he is being committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior," 
Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. A criminal act by definition is 
not "within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 
Id., at 426--427. 
We therefore conclude that concerns critical to our decision 
in Addington are diminished or absent in the case of insanity 
acquittees. Accordingly, there is no reason for adopting the 
same standard of proof in both cases. "[D]ue process is flex-
ible and calls for such procedural protections as the par-
ticular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of the evidence stand-
ard comports with due process for commitment of insanity 
acquittees. 11 
C 
The remaining question is whether petitioner nonetheless 
is entitled to his release because he has been hospitalized for 
a period longer than he could have been incarcerated if con-
victed. The Due Process Clause "requires that the nature 
and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to 
the purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson 
v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of com-
:rpitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil com-
mitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and pro-
tect him and society from his potential dangerousness. The 
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the indi-
vidual." 441 U. S., at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises 
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and 
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect. 
11 A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher stand-
ard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement hardly would bene-
fit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet impo-
sition of a higher standard would be a likely legislative response to a hold-
ing that an insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only if 
the verdict were supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
14 
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committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recov-
ered his sanity or is no longer dangerous. See O'Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575-576; Jones v. United States, 
432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 
73--74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how 
long it will take for any given individual to recover-or in-
deed whether he ever will recover-Congress has chosen, as 
it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of 
commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the 
patient's suitability for release. 
In light of the congressional purposes underlying commit-
ment of insanity acquittees, we think petitioner clearly errs 
in contending that an acquittee's hypothetical maximum sen-
tence provides the constitutional limit for his commitment. 
A particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to reflect 
society's view of the proper response to commission of a par-
ticular criminal offense, based on a variety of considerations 
such as retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. See, 
e. g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 183--186 (1976) (opin-
ion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168 (1963); Williams v. 
New York, 337 U. S. 241, 248-249 (1949). The State may 
punish a person convicted of a crime even if satisfied that he 
is unlikely to commit further crimes. 
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insan-
ity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be pun-
ished. 18 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and 
dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia stat-
ute, no matter how serious the act committed by the acquit-
tee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal if he 
has recovered. In contrast, one who committed a less seri-
ous act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill 
18 As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]ociety may not excuse a 'de-
fendant's criminal behavior because of his insanity and at the same time 
punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432 A. 2d, at 369. 
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and dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation be-
tween severity of the offense and length of time necessary for 
recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical crimi-
nal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his 
commitment. 19 
IV 
We hold that when a criminal defendant establishes by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime 
by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the Govern-
ment, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to 
a mental institution until such time as he has regained his 
sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society. This 
holding accords with the widely and reasonably held view 
that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should 
be treated differently from other candidates for commit-
19 The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involun-
tarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his 
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for 
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. 
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity 
acquittee, and none suggested that a person under noncriminal confine-
ment could not be hospitalized in excess of the period for which he could 
have served in prison if convicted for the dangerous acts he had committed. 
The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to determine the 
length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested by petitioner's failure to 
suggest any clear guidelines for deciding when a patient must be released. 
For example, he does not suggest whether the Due Process Clause would 
require States to limit commitment of insanity acquittees to maximum sen-
tences or minimum sentences. Nor does he explain what should be done in 
the case of indeterminate sentencing or suggest whether account would 
have to be taken of the availability of release time or the possibility of pa-
role. And petitioner avoids entirely the important question how his the-
ory would apply to those persons who committed especially serious crimi-
nal acts. Petitioner thus would leave the States to speculate how they 
may deal constitutionally with acquittees who might have received life 
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ment. 20 We have observed before that "[ w ]hen Congress un-
dertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific 
uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad 
and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation. . .. " 
Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). This 
admonition has particular force in the context of legislative 
efforts to deal with the special problems raised by the insan-
ity defense. 
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
is 
Affirmed. 
20 A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions 
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while 
many other States have a variety of special methods of commiting insanity 
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605--606, and nn. 4-6 (1981). Nineteen States commit 
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment. 
Id., at 605, n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law peti-
tioner's suggested requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be re-
leased' following expiration of his hypothetical maximum criminal sentence. 
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-47(b) (Supp. 1981). 
: 
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JUN 2 3 1983 









I From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
3UN 2 4 1983' 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
2nd DRAFT / 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-5195 
MICHAEL JONES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
COURT OF APPEALS 
[June-, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether petitioner, who was 
committed to a mental hospital upon being acquitted of a 
criminal offense by reason of insanity, must be released be-
cause he has been hospitalized for a period longer than he 
might have served in prison had he been convicted. 
I 
In the District of Columbia a criminal defendant may _., I 
be acquitted by reason of insanity if his insanity is "affirma-
tively established by a preponderance of the evidence." D. C. 
Code § 24-301(j) (1981). 1 If he successfully invokes 
the insanity defense, he is committed to a mental hospital. 
§ 24-301(d)(l). 2 The statute provides several ways of ob-
1 Section 24--301(j ) provides: 
"Insanity shall not be a defense in any criminal proceeding in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the Superior Court 
of the District of Columbia, unless the accused or his attorney in such pro-
ceeding, at the time the accused enters his plea of not guilty or within 15 I 
days thereafter or at such later time as the court may for good cause per-
mit, files with the court and serves upon the prosecuting attorney written 
notice of his intention to rely on such defense. No person accused of an 
offense shall be acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time of 
its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is af-
firmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence." 
2 Section 24--301(d)(l) provides: 
2 
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taining release. Within 50 days of commitment the acquittee 
is entitled to a judicial hearing to determine his eligibility for 
release, at which he has the burden of proving by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or 
dangerous. § 24-301(d)(2). 3 If he fails to meet this burden 
at the 50-day hearing, the committed acquittee subsequently 
may be released, with court approval, upon certification of 
his recovery by the hospital chief of service. § 24-301(e). 4 
Alternatively, the acquittee is entitled to a judicial hear-
"If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense 
raises the defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground that he 
was insane at the time of its commission, he shall be committed to a hospi-
tal for the mentally ill until such time as he is eligible for release pursuant 
to this subsection or subsection (e) of this section." I 
Under this provision, automatic commitment is permissible only if the de-
fendant himself raised the insanity defense. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, 
p. 74 (1970); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705 (1962). 
3 Section 24-301(d)(2) provides in relevant part: 
"(A) A person confined pursuant to paragraph (1) of this section shall \ 
have a hearing, unless waived, within 50 days of his confinement to deter-
mine whether he is entitled to release from custody .... 
(B) If the hearing is not waived, the court shall cause notice of the hear-
ing to be served upon the person, his counsel, and the prosecuting attorney 
and hold the hearing. Within 10 days from the date the hearing was I 
begun, the court shall determine the issues and make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law with respect thereto. The person confined shall have 
the burden of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the person confined is entitled to his release from custody, either con-
ditional or unconditional, the court shall enter such order as may appear 
appropriate." 
The statute does not specify the standard for determining release, but the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in this case that, as in release 
proceedings under § 24-301(e) and § 21--545(b), the confined person must 
show that he is either no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous to him-
self or others. See 432 A. 2d 364, 372 and n. 16 (1981) (en bane). 
'Section 24-301(e) provides in relevant part: 
''Where any person has been confined in a hospital for the mentally ill 
pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, and the superintendent of such 
hospital certifies: (1) That such person has recovered his sanity; (2) that, in 
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ing every six months at which he may establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that he is entitled to release. 
§ 24-301(k). 5 
Independent of its provision for the commitment of insan-
ity acquittees, the District of Columbia also has adopted a 
civil-commitment procedure, under which an individual may 
the opinion of the superintendent, such person will not in the reasonable 
future be dangerous to himself or others; and (3) in the opinion of the su-
perintendent, the person is entitled to his unconditional release from the 
hospital, and such certificate is filed with the clerk of the court in which the 
person was tried, and a copy thereof served on the United States Attorney 
or the Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, whichever office 
prosecuted the accused, such certificate shall be sufficient to authorize the 
court to order the unconditional release of the person so confined from fur-
ther hospitalization at the expiration of 15 days from the time said certifi- f 
cate was filed and served as above; but the court in its discretion may, or 
upon objection of the United States or the District of Columbia shall, after f 
due notice, hold a hearing at which evidence as to the mental condition of 
the person so confined may be submitted, including the testimony of 1 or I 
more psychiatrists from said hospital. The court shall weigh the evidence 
and, if the court finds that such person has recovered his sanity and will not 
in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or others, the court shall 
order such person unconditionally released from further confinement in 
said hospital. If the court does not so find, the court shall order such per-
son returned to said hospital. ... " 
• Section 2W01(k) provides in relevant part: 
"(1) A person in custody or conditionally released from custody, pursu-
ant to the provisions of this section, claiming the right to be released from 
custody, the right to any change in the conditions of his release, or other 
relief concerning his custody, may move the court having jurisdiction to 
order his release, to release him from custody, to change the conditions of 
his release, or to grant other relief .... 
(3) . .. On all issues raised by his motion, the person shall have the bur-
den of proof. If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the person is entitled to his release from custody, either conditional or un-
conditional, a change in the conditions of his release, or other relief, the 
court shall enter such order as may appear appropriate .... 
(5) A court shall not be required to entertain a 2nd or successive motion 
for relief under this section more often than once every 6 months. A court 
for good cause shown may in its discretion entertain such a motion more 
often than once every 6 months." 
4 
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be committed upon clear and convincing proof by the Govern-
ment that he is mentally ill and likely to injure himself or oth-
ers. §21-545(b). 6 The individual may demand a jury in the 
civil-commitment proceeding. § 21-544. Once committed, a 
patient may be released at any time upon certification of re-
covery by the hospital chief of service. §§ 21-546, 21-548. 
Alternatively, the patient is entitled after the first 90 days, 
and subsequently at 6-month intervals, to request a judicial 
hearing at which he may gain his release by proving by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or 
dangerous. § 21-546, 21-547; see Dixon v. Jacobs, 138 U. S. , 
App. D. C. 319, 328, 427 F. 2d 589, 598 (1970). 
II 
On September 19, 1975, petitioner was arrested for at-
tempting to steal a jacket from a department store. The 
next day he was arraigned in the District of Columbia Supe-
rior Court.on a charge of attempted petit larceny, a misde-
meanor punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one 
year. §§ 22-103, 22-2202. The court ordered petitioner 
committed to St. Elizabeths, a public hospital for the men-
tally ill, for a determination of his competency to stand trial. 7 
On March 2, 1976, a hospital psychologist submitted a report 
6 Section 21-545(b) provides in relevant part: I 
"If the court or jury finds that the person is mentally ill and, because of 
that illness, is likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain I 
at liberty, the court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate pe-
riod, or order any other alternative course of treatment which the court 
believes will be in the best interests of the person or of the public." 
See In re Nelson, 408 A. 2d 1233 (DC 1979) (reading into the statute the 
due process requirement of "clear and convincing" proof). 
7 Section 24-301(a) authorizes the court to "order the accused committed 
to the District of Columbia General Hospital or other mental hospital desig-
nated by the court, for such reasonable period as the court may determine 
for examination and observation and for care and treatment if such is nec-
essary by the psychiatric staff of said hospital." 
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to the court stating that petitioner was competent to stand 
trial, that petitioner suffered from "Schizophrenia, paranoid 
type," and that petitioner's alleged offense was "the product 
of his mental disease." Record 51. The court ruled that pe-
titioner was competent to stand trial. Petitioner subse-
quently decided to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. 
The Government did not contest the plea, and it entered into 
a stipulation of facts with petitioner. On March 12, 1976, the 
Superior Court found petitioner not guilty by reason of in-
sanity and committed him to St. Elizabeths pursuant to 
§ 24--301(d)(l). 
On May 25, 1976, the court held the 50-day hearing re-
quired by § 24--301(d)(2)(A). A psychologist from St. Eliza-
beths testified on behalf of the Government that, in the opin-
ion of the staff, petitioner continued to suffer from paranoid 
schizophrenia and that "because his illness is still quite ac-
tive, he is still a danger to himself and to others." Tran-
script 9. Petitioner's counsel conducted a brief cross-exami-
nation, and presented no evidence. 8 The court then found 
that "the defendant-patient is mentally ill and as a result of 
his mental illness, at this time, he constitutes a danger to 
himself or others." Id., at 13. Petitioner was returned to 
St. Elizabeths. I 
Petitioner obtained new counsel and, following some proce-
dural confusion, a second release hearing was held on Febru-
ary 22, 1977. By that date petitioner had been hospitalized 
for more than one year, the maximum period he could have 
spent if prison if he had been convicted. On that basis he f 
demanded that he be released unconditionally or recommit-
ted pursuant to the civil-commitment standards in 
§ 21-545(b), including a jury trial and proof by clear and con-
vincing evidence of his mental illness and dangerousness. 
8 Petitioner's counsel seemed concerned primarily about obtaining a 
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The Superior Court denied petitioner's request for a civil-
commitment hearing, reaffirmed the findings made at the 
May 25, 1976, hearing, and continued petitioner's commit-
ment to St. Elizabeths. 9 
Petitioner appealed to the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals. A panel of the court affirmed the Superior Court, 
396 A. 2d 183 (1978), but then granted rehearing and re-
versed, 411 A. 2d 624 (1980). Finally, the court heard the 
case en bane and affirmed the judgment of the Superior 
Court. 432 A. 2d 364 (1981). The Court of Appeals re-
jected the argument "that the length of the prison sentence 
[petitioner] might have received determines when he is enti-
tled to release or civil commitment under Title 24 of the D. C. 
Code." Id., at 368. It then held that the various statutory 
differences between civil commitment and commitment of in-
sanity acquittees were justified under the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment. Id., at 371-376. 
We granted certiorari, 454 U. S. 1141 (1982), and now 
affirm. 
III 
It is clear that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection." Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 425 (1979). 
Therefore, a State must have "a constitutionally adequate 
purpose for the confinement." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 
U. S. 563, 574 (1975). Congress has determined that a crim-
inal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity in the 
District of Columbia should be committed indefinitely to a 
9 "A subsequent motion for unconditional release under § 301(k) was de-
nied in March of 1977. Three months later, however, [petitioner] was 
granted conditional release on terms recommended by St. Elizabeths' staff, 
allowing daytime and overnight visits into the community. He was also 
admitted into the civil division of the hospital, though as a result of disrup-
tive behavior, he was retransferred to the forensic division. " 432 A. 2d, at 
368, n. 6. 
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mental institution for treatment and the protection of society. 
See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 73-74 (1970); Jones v. United 
States, 432 A. 2d, at 371 ("[T]he District of Columbia statu-
tory scheme for commitment of insane criminals is ... a reg-
ulatory, prophylactic statute, based on a legitimate govern-
mental interest in protecting society and rehabilitating 
mental patients"). Petitioner does not contest the Govern-
ment's authority to commit a mentally ill and dangerous per-
son indefinitely to a mental institution, but rather contends 
that "the petitioner's trial was not a constitution-
ally adequate hearing to justify an indefinite commitment." 
Brief for Petitioner 14. 
Petitioner's argument rests principally on Addington v. 
Texas, supra, in which the Court held that the Due Process 
Clause requires the State in a civil-commitment proceeding f 
to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the in-
dividual is mentally ill and dangerous. 441 U. S., at 
426-427. Petitioner contends that these due process stand-
ards were not met in his case because the judgment of not 
guilty by reason of insanity did not constitute a finding of 
present mental illness and dangerousness and because it was 
established only by a preponderance of the evidence. 10 Peti-
10 In the Court of Appeals petitioner apparently based these arguments 
on equal protection rather than due process, arguing that it was irrational 
for the Government to deny him a civil-commitment hearing at which the 
Government bore the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence. 
See 432 A. 2d, at 371. Both petitioner and the Government aclmowledge 
that this equal protection argument essentially duplicates petitioner's due 
process argument. That is, if the Due Process Clause does not require 
that an insanity acquittee be given the particular procedural safeguards 
provided in a civil-commitment hearing under Addington, then there nec-
essarily is a rational basis for equal protection purposes for distinguishing 
between civil commitment and commitment of insanity acquittees. See 
Reply Brief for Petitioner 22-23; Brief for Government 55. We agree, and 
therefore address petitioner's arguments in terms of the Due Process 
Clause. 
Petitioner does raise one additional equal protection argument that 
8 
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tioner then concludes that the Government's only conceivably 
legitimate justification for automatic commitment is to en-
sure that insanity acquittees do not escape confinement en-
tirely, and that this interest can justify commitment at most 
for a period equal to the maximum prison sentence the ac-
quittee could have received if convicted. Because petitioner 
has been hospitalized for longer than the one year he might 
have served in prison, he asserts that he should be released 
unconditionally or recommitted under the District's civil-
commitment procedures. 11 
stands on its own. The District of Columbia provides for a jury at civil-
commitment hearings, see § 21-544, and petitioner contends that equal 
protection requires that insanity acquittees also be permitted to demand a 
jury at the 50-day hearing. Because we determine that an acquittee's 
commitment is based on the judgment of insanity at the criminal trial, 
rather than solely on the findings at the 50-day hearing, see infra, at 9--12, 
the relevant equal protection comparison concerns the procedures available 
at the criminal trial and at a civil-commitment hearing. We therefore 
agree with the Court of Appeals that the absence of a jury at the 50-day 
hearing "is justified by the fact that the acquittee has had a right to a jury 
determination of his sanity at the time of the offense." 432 A. 2d, at 373. 
11 It is important to note what issues are not raised in this case. Peti-
tioner has not sought appellate review of the Superior Court's findings in 
1976 and 1977 that he remained mentally ill and dangerous, and, indeed, 
the record does not indicate that since 1977 he ever has sought a release 
hearing-a hearing to which he was entitled every six months. 
Nor are we asked to decide whether the District's procedures for release 
are constitutional. As noted above, see supra, at 2--4, the basic standard 
for release is the same under either civil commitment or commitment fol-
lowing acquittal by reason of insanity: the individual must prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he is no longer dangerous or mentally ill. 
There is an important difference, however, in the release provisions for 
these two groups. A patient who is committed civilly is entitled to uncon-
ditional release upon certification of his recovery by the hospital chief of 
service, see § 21-546, whereas a committed insanity acquittee may be re-
leased upon such certification only with court approval, see § 24--301(e). 
Neither of these provisions is before the Court, as petitioner has chal-
lenged neither the adequacy of the release standards generally nor the dis-
parity in treatment of insanity acquittees and other committed persons. 
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We turn first to the question whether the finding of insan-
ity at the criminal trial is sufficiently probative of mental ill-
ness and dangerousness to justify commitment. A verdict of 
not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the 
defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal of-
fense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental illness. 
Congress has determined that these findings constitute an 
adequate basis for hospitalizing the acquittee as a dangerous 
and mentally ill person. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, supra, 
at 74 (expressing fear that "dangerous criminals, particularly 
psychopaths, [may] win acquittals of serious criminal charges 
on grounds of insanity" and yet "escape hospital commit-
ment"); S. Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 '(1955) 
("Where [the] accused has pleaded insanity as a defense to a 
crime, and the jury has found that the defendant was, in fact, 
insane at the time the crime was committed, it is just and 
reasonable in the Committee's opinion that the insanity, once 
established, should be presumed to continue and that the ac-
cused should automatically be confined for treatment until it 
can be shown that he has recovered"). We cannot say that it 
was unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional for Con-
gress to make this determination. 
The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates 
dangerousness. 12 See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705, 
714 (1962) (The fact that the accused was found to have com-
mitted a criminal act is "strong evidence that his continued 
See 432 A. 2d, at 373, n. 19. 
12 The proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the acquittee committed a 
criminal act distinguishes this case from Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715 
(1972), in which the Court held that a person found incompetent to stand 
trial could not be committed indefinitely solely on the basis of the finding of 
incompetency. In Jackson there never was any affirmative proof that the 
accused had committed criminal acts or otherwise was dangerous. 
10 
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liberty could imperil 'the preservation of the peace'"). In-
deed, this concrete evidence generally may be at least as per-
suasive as any predictions about dangerousness that might be 
made in a civil-commitment proceeding.13 We do not agree 
with petitioner's suggestion that the requisite dangerousness 
is not established by proof that a person committed a non-
violent crime against property. This Court never has held 
that "violence," however that term might be defined, is a pre-
requisite for a constitutional commitment. 14 
18 In attacking the predictive value of the insanity acquittal, petitioner 
complains that "[ w ]hen Congress enacted the present statutory scheme, it 
did not cite any empirical evidence indicating that mentally ill persons who 
have committed a criminal act are likely to commit additional dangerous 
acts in the future." Reply Brief for Petitioner 13. He further argues that 
the available research fails to support the predictive value of prior danger-
ous acts. See id., at 13-14. We do not agree with the suggestion that 
Congress' power to legislate in this area depends on the research con-
ducted by the psychiatric community. We have recognized repeatedly the 
"uncertainty of diagnosis in this field and the tentativeness of professional 
judgment. The only certain thing that can be said about the present state 
of knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not 
reached finality of judgment .... " Greenwood v. United States, 350 
U. S. 366, 375 (1956). See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 472 (1981); 
Addington, 441 U. S., at 429--430; Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514, 535-537 
(1968) (plurality opinion). The lesson we have drawn is not that govern-
ment may not act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that courts 
should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments. 
14 See Overholser v. O'Beirne, 112 U. S. App. D. C. 267, 276, 302 F. 2d I 
852,861 (1961) (Burger, J.) ("[T]o describe the theft of watches and jewelry 
as 'non-dangerous' is to confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually 
less violent than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the pur-
pose of the statute is the same as to both.") (footnote omitted). Thus, the \ 
"danger" may be to property rights as well as to persons. It also may be 
noted that crimes of theft frequently may result in violence from the efforts 
of the criminal to escape or the victim to protect property or the police to 
apprehend the fleeing criminal. 
The relative "dangerousness" of a particular individual, of course, should 
be a consideration at the release hearings. In this context, it is note-
worthy that petitioner's continuing_ commitment may well rest in signifi-
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Nor can we say that it was unreasonable for Congress to 
determine that the insanity acquittal supports an inference of 
continuing mental illness. It comports with common sense 
to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient 
to lead him to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and 
in need of treatment. The precise evidentiary force of the 
insanity acquittal, of course, may vary from case to case, but 
the Due Process Clause does not require Congress to make 
classifications that fit every individual with the same degree 
of relevance. See Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 
428 (1974). Because a hearing is provided within 50 days of 
the commitment, there is assurance that every acquittee has 
prompt opportunity to obtain release if he has recovered. 
Petitioner also argues that, whatever the evidentiary value 
of the insanity acquittal, the Government lacks a legitimate 
reason for committing insanity acquittees automatically be-
cause it can introduce the insanity acquittal as evidence in a 
subsequent civil proceeding. This argument fails to consider 
the Government's strong interest in avoiding the need to con-
duct a de novo commitment hearing following every insanity 
acquittal-a hearing at which a jury trial may be demanded, 
§ 21-544, and at which the Government bears the burden of 
proof by clear and convincing evidence. Instead of focusing 
on the critical question whether the acquittee has recovered, 
the new proceeding likely would have to relitigate much of 
the criminal trial. These problems accent the Government's 
cant part on evidence independent of his acquittal by reason of insanity of 
the crime of attempted larceny. In December 1976 a medical officer at St. 
Elizabeths reported that petitioner "has a history of attempted suicide." 
Record 87. In addition, petitioner at one point was transferred to the civil 
division of the hospital, but was transferred back to the forensic division 
because of disruptive behavior. See n. 9, supra. The Government also 
advises that after petitioner was released unconditionally following the sec-
ond panel decision below, he had to be recommitted on an emergency civil 
basis two weeks later for conduct unrelated to the original commitment. 
See Brief for United States at 15, n. 18. 
12 
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important interest in automatic commitment. See Mathews 
v. ·Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 348 (1976). We therefore con-
clude that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is a suf-
ficient found~tion for commitment of an insanity acquittee for 
the purposes of treatment and the protection of society. 
B 
Petitioner next contends that his indefinite commitment is 
unconstitutional because the proof of his insanity was based 
only on a preponderance of the evidence, as compared to 
Addington's civil-commitment requirement of proof by clear 
and convincing evidence. In equating these situations, peti-
tioner ignores important differences between the class of po-
tential civil-commitment candidates and the class of insanity 
acquittees that justify differing standards of proof. The 
Addington Court expressed particular concern that members 
of the public could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal 
behavior which might be perceived by some as symptomatic 
of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within 
a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 441 U. S., 
at 426--427. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 
575. In view of this concern, the Court deemed it inappro-
priate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the 
risk of error." Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. But since 
automatic commitment under § 24-301(d)(l) follows only if 
the acquittee himself advances insanity as a defense and 
proves that his criminal act was a product of his mental ill-
ness, 16 there is good reason for diminished concern as to the 
risk of error. 16 More important, the proof that he committed 
16 See n. 2, supra. In this case petitioner stipulated that he had commit-
ted the offense by reason of insanity. 
16 That petitioner raised the insanity defense also diminishes the sig-
nificance of the deprivation. The Addington Court noted that the social 
stigma of civil commitment "can have a very significant impact on the indi-
vidual." 441 U. S. , at 426. A criminal defendant who successfully raises 
the insanity defense necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and 
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a criminal act as a result of mental illness eliminates the risk 
that he is being committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior," 
Addington, 441 U. S., at 427. A criminal act by definition is 
not "within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable." 
Id., at 426-427. 
We therefore conclude that concerns critical to our decision 
in Addington are diminished or absent in the case of insanity 
acquittees. Accordingly, there is no reason for adopting the 
same standard of proof in both cases. "[D]ue process is flex-
ible and calls for such procedural protections as the par-
ticular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 481 (1972). The preponderance of the evidence stand-
ard comports with due process for commitment of insanity 
acquittees. 17 
C 
The remaining question is whether petitioner nonetheless 
is entitled to his release because he has been hospitalized for 
a period longer than he could have been incarcerated if con-
victed. The Due Process Clause "requires that the nature 
and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to 
the purpose for which the individual is committed." Jackson 
v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972). The purpose of com-
mitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil com-
mitment, is to treat the individual's mental illness and pro-
tect him and society from his potential dangerousness. The 
committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recov-
ered his sanity or is no longer dangerous. See O'Connor v. 
thus the commitment causes little additional harm in this respect. 
11 A defendant could be required to prove his insanity by a higher stand-
ard than a preponderance of the evidence. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U. S. 790, 799 (1952). Such an additional requirement hardly would bene-
fit a criminal defendant who wants to raise the insanity defense, yet impo-
sition of a higher standard would be a likely legislative response to a hold-
ing that an insanity acquittal could support automatic commitment only if 
the verdict were supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
14 
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Donaldson, 422 U. S., at 575--576; Jones v. United States, 
432 A. 2d, at 372, and n. 16; H. R. Rep. No. 91-907, pp. 
73--74 (1970). And because it is impossible to predict how 
long it will take for any given individual to recover-or in-
deed whether he ever will recover-Congress has chosen, as 
it has with respect to civil commitment, to leave the length of 
commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic review of the 
patient's suitability for release. 
In light of the congressional purposes underlying commit-
ment of insanity acquittees, we think petitioner clearly errs 
in contending that an acquittee's hypothetical maximum sen-
tence provides the constitutional limit for his commitment. 
A particular sentence of incarceration is chosen to reflect 
society's view of the proper response to commission of a par-
ticular criminal offense, based on a variety of considerations 
such as retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. See, 
e. g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 183--186 (1976) (opin-
ion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168 (1963); Williams v. 
New York, 337 U. S. 241, 248--249 (1949). The State may 
punish a person convicted of a crime even if satisfied that he 
is unlikely to commit further crimes. 
Different considerations underlie commitment of an insan-
ity acquittee. As he was not convicted, he may not be pun-
ished. 18 His confinement rests on his continuing illness and 
dangerousness. Thus, under the District of Columbia stat-
ute, no matter how serious the act committed by the acquit-
tee, he may be released within 50 days of his acquittal if he 
has recovered. In contrast, one who committed a less seri-
ous act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill 
and dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation be-
tween severity of the offense and length of time necessary for 
18 As the Court of Appeals held below, "[s]ociety may not excuse a de-
fendant's criminal behavior because of his insanity and at the same time 
punish him for invoking an insanity defense." 432 A. 2d, at 369. 
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recovery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical crimi-
nal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his 
commitment. 19 
IV 
We hold that when a criminal defendant establishes by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime 
by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the Govern-
ment, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to 
a mental institution until such time as he has regained his 
sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society. This 
holding accords with the widely and reasonably held view 
that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should 
be treated differently from other candidates for commit-
ment. 20 We have observed before that "[ w ]hen Congress un-
19 The Court has held that a convicted prisoner may be treated involun-
tarily for particular psychiatric problems, but that upon expiration of his 
prison sentence he may be committed only as would any other candidate for 
civil commitment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 
U. S. 245 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972); Baxstrom v. 
Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966). None of those cases involved an insanity 
acquittee, and none suggested that a person under noncriminal confine-
ment could not be hospitalized in excess of the period for which he could 
have served in prison if convicted for the dangerous acts he had committed. 
The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to determine the 
length of a therapeutic confinement is manifested by petitioner's failure to 
suggest any clear guidelines for deciding when a patient must be released. 
For example, he does not suggest whether the Due Process Clause would 
require States to limit commitment of insanity acquittees to maximum sen-
tences or minimum sentences. Nor does he explain what should be done in 
the case of indeterminate sentencing or suggest whether account would 
have to be taken of the availability of release time or the possibility of pa-
role. And petitioner avoids entirely the important question how his the-
ory would apply to those persons who committed especially serious crimi-
nal acts. Petitioner thus would leave the States to speculate how they 
may deal constitutionally with acquittees who might have received life 
imprisonment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or the death 
penalty. 
20 A recent survey of commitment statutes reported that 14 jurisdictions 
16 
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dertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific 
uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad 
and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation .... " 
Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974). This 
admonition has particular force in the context of legislative 
efforts to deal with the special problems raised by the insan-
ity defense. 
The judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
IS 
Affirmed. 
provide automatic commitment for at least some insanity acquittees, while 
many other States have a variety of special methods of committing insanity 
acquittees. See Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 
Harv. L. Rev. 605, 605-606, and nn. 4-6 (1981). Nineteen States commit 
insanity acquittees under the same procedures used for civil commitment. 
Id., at 605, n. 3. It appears that only one State has enacted into law peti-
tioner's suggested requirement that a committed insanity acquittee be re-
leased following expiration of his hypothetical maximum criminal sentence. 
See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-47(b) (Supp. 1981). 
